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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKDROP
As global competition for foreign direct investment intensifies,
the question pending before the World Trade Organization
("WTO") is whether to negotiate an agreement on investment that
would address, inter alia, national laws that restrict market access
of foreign capital.' In the intervening years between the Singapore
Ministerial Conference in 1996 and the latest Ministerial Confer-
ence held in Doha, Qatar in 2001, several WTO members (including
the European Union, Japan, and Korea) and commentators urged
the WTO to include on its agenda negotiations leading to multilat-
eral rules on investment.2 Demands by the European Union
("EU") for a comprehensive trade negotiation round that includes
negotiations on investment could very well be a red herring in-
tended to draw attention away from negotiations on agricultural
trade reform and the EU's common agricultural policy ("CAP"),
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University-Detroit College of Law. J.D.
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1 At least one WTO member has characterized the question as one of under-
standing "what is missing in the current WTO framework." WTO Working
Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Submission from Can-
ada, at 2, WT/WGTI/W/19 (Dec. 11, 1997).
2 See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, EU Advocates GATS Approach to WVTO Talks on In-
vestment, Offers Nondiscrimination View, 19 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1218, 1219 Uuly
11, 2002); Daniel Pruzin, EU Official Says Support Growing for Comprehensive Trade
Round, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1284 (Aug. 4, 1999) [hereinafter Pruzin, EU Offi-
cial]; Daniel Pruzin, Japan Discussion Paper Highlights Likely Issues for WNTO Talks on
Investment Rules, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 881 (June 7, 2001) (describing Japan's
call for WTO negotiation on investment rules); Daniel Pruzin, Prospects Diminish-
ing for Talks on Rules Covering Investment, Competition, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1598 (Oct. 6, 1999); Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Offers Olive Branch on Talks at IATO on In-
vestment, But Not Inside Seattle Round, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1779 (Nov. 3,
1999); Co-operate on Competition, EcoNoMisT, July 4, 1998, at 16 (calling upon the
WTO to issue multilateral competition policy); The Borders of Competition,
ECONOMIsT, July 4, 1998, at 69 (suggesting WTO including minimum competition
policies).
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the proverbial "third rail" of EU politics -that is, if any EU politi-
cian touches it, their political life is finished.3 Before the start of the
aborted Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999, the United States
took the position that negotiations on a WTO investment agree-
ment should not be part of any new multilateral round of trade ne-
gotiations.4
3 See RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW: THE GATT-WTO
SYSTEM, REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, AND U.S. LAW 1188 (1998) (noting that "the CAP
is a highly charged subject"); Daniel Pruzin, EU Official, supra note 2, at 1284.
Without question the most politically charged of all the EU common policies, both
within and outside the EU, is the common agricultural policy. Article 32 of the
Treaty of Establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty") directs the EU
member states to develop a common agricultural policy. See Treaty Establishing
the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997) [hereinafter EC
Treaty]. Article 33 of the EC Treaty identifies the CAP's five objectives: (1) to in-
crease agricultural productivity, (2) to ensure a fair standard of living for farmers,
(3) to stabilize markets, (4) to assure availability of supplies, and (5) to ensure that
consumers pay reasonable prices. Id. art. 33. The EC Treaty offers no details on
how these five objectives are to be accomplished, but instead leaves it to the
Commission and Council to work out proposals and directives. Id. arts. 34-37.
The Commission has adopted three principles to guide it in developing the CAP:
(1) with the single market concept as the polestar, agricultural products must
move freely within the EU and be sold at stable prices set by the EU; (2) priority
should be given to EU-origin agricultural products to protect them from cheaper
imports; and (3) the costs of the CAP must be shared. See European Commission,
Activities of the European Union, Agriculture: Introduction, at
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/504000.htm (defining instruments
used for EC agricultural policy); BHALA & KENNEDY, supra, at 1185-86 (stating that
the CAP's main objective is "food self-sufficiency"). Some of the thorniest issues
that the EU has had to grapple with in framing the CAP have included the ques-
tion of food self-sufficiency, stable prices for farmers and consumers, and adjust-
ment to international trade competition. See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra, at 1178-80
(providing an introduction to GATT-WTO agricultural concerns). Under the
CAP, huge food surpluses have been created that are sold in world markets at
prices that severely undercut the prices of those same products offered by other
agricultural exporting countries, including the United States, Argentina, and Aus-
tralia. See Amy Kaslow, Farm Subsidies Create Bounty, Boondoggles, CHRISTIAN SC.
MONITOR, Nov. 4, 1992, at 12 (discussing the negative effects of farm subsidies).
Agricultural trade wars have been the result, with one country undercutting an-
other country's exporter's price by subsidizing exports to third countries. See
BHALA & KENNEDY, supra, at 1186 (noting further the problem of agricultural over-
production resulting in bidding wars); Will These Modest Proposals Provoke Mayhem
Down on the Farm? ECONOMIST, July 13, 2002, at 42 (analyzing the EC's agricultural
aid policies).
4 See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Outlines Priorities for WTO's Seattle Ministerial, 16
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1285 (Aug. 4, 1999). The United States was joined by the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN"), India, Mexico, and Pakistan.
See Daniel Pruzin, Seattle Ministerial and Beyond: A Long, Winding Road for WTO, 16
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1975,1977 (Dec. 1, 1999).
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The arguments for a binding, multilateral legal instrument on
foreign direct investment ("FDI")5 can be briefly summarized as
follows:
(1) A multilateral investment agreement is an important devel-
opment tool because it will attract FDI that will in turn improve
5 Investment can be divided into two broad categories: portfolio investment
and direct investment. The former involves acquiring shares of corporations
without exercising any direct control over management of the organization. Di-
rect investment, in contrast, involves acquiring a significant controlling interest of
an existing foreign firm or establishing a new firm (the latter is sometimes re-
ferred to as a "greenfield" investment). One measure of a controlling interest is
that an investor must hold at least ten percent of a firm's equity in order for that
investment to be classified as a direct investment. See Approaching the Next Fron-
tier for Trade in Services: Liberalization of International Investment, Industry, Trade, &
Tech. Rev., April 1996, USITC Pub. 2962 at 2 (distinguishing between portfolio
and direct investment). It is management control that distinguishes direct in-
vestment from portfolio investment. As used in this Article, the term "foreign di-
rect investment" refers to direct investment, including the purchase or sale of
business enterprises (mergers and acquisitions) and the establishment of a fresh or
"greenfield" investment.
Foreign direct investment can be further divided into three types: horizontal,
vertical, and distribution. WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between
Trade and Investment, The Relationship Between Trade and Foreign Direct Investment,
Note by the Secretariat, at 3-4, WT/WGTI/W/7 (Sept. 18, 1997). Horizontal FDI re-
fers to investment in facilities producing the same line of products in different
countries. This type of investment occurs when a product has a high weight to
value ratio and is thus expensive to transport (e.g., cement). Horizontal FDI can
also occur in order to jump a high tariff wall. Horizontal FDI tends to occur in
host countries with a large domestic market for the product in order to achieve
economies of scale, or in smaller countries which can serve as an export platform
to the adjacent region. Horizontal FDI displaces some exports of final goods from
the home country, but tends to generate offsetting trade in intermediate goods.
See id. at 13-15 (describing in detail horizontal FDI).
Vertical FDI refers to investment in production facilities that manufacture dif-
ferent stages of a product in different countries. The location of each stage is cho-
sen to minimize total production costs. For example, extractive industries are
found where the raw material is plentiful. Similarly, energy-intensive and labor-
intensive industries are located where energy and labor costs are low. By its very
nature vertical FDI is trade-creating, because it subdivides the production process
of a single product between or among countries. Trade barriers in both the host
and home country discourage vertical FDI. Tariffs imposed by the host country
on intermediate goods sold to an affiliate will raise the cost of the product. If the
final product produced abroad is later exported to the home country, and tariffs
are also assessed on the imported final product, then in combination the tariffs of
the host and home country may make a vertical FDI uneconomic. However, such
tariff barriers may encourage horizontal FDI. See id. at 16-17 (detailing the mod-
em view of vertical FDI).
Distribution FDI refers to investment in local sales offices, distribution net-
works, and services facilities. See id. at 17-18 (stating, "[Blut also in marketing,
distribution and service-related activities... ").
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competitiveness and promote the transfer of technology and
managerial know-how from home country to host country.
(2) A multilateral investment agreement will introduce greater
transparency, predictability, and legal security in the FDI process.
(3) National legislation provides inadequate legal protection for
FDI and is, thus, not an alternative to a multilateral agreement.
Stated slightly differently, a multilateral agreement on investment
has insurance value in that it gives a foreign investor greater confi-
dence that a host country's national investment laws and policies
will not be changed at the whim or caprice of national leaders to
the detriment of the investor. To a lesser extent, a multilateral in-
vestment agreement might be some insurance against corruption
by local officials in the host country.
(4) A multilateral investment agreement will bring policy co-
herence to the "spaghetti bowl" of bilateral and regional invest-
ment treaties.6
(5) Countries that are not parties to bilateral or regional in-
vestment agreements are marginalized or cut out as beneficiaries of
FDI inflows. As parties to a multilateral investment agreement,
they will be part of the mainstream.
(6) A multilateral investment agreement will eliminate resort to
wasteful investment incentives to attract FDI.7
(7) A country that is a party to a multilateral agreement on in-
vestment will enhance its credibility as a place that is hospitable to
FDI.8
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD"),9 the greatest value of a multilateral
6 Zdenek Dribek, A Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Convincing the Scep-
tics 4-5 WTO Econ. Res. and Analysis Div., Working Paper ERAD-98-05, Feb.
1998) (providing "powerful arguments in favor of MAI").
7 Id. at 5-6.
8 See Bernard Hoekman & Kamal Saggi, Multilateral Disciplines for Investment-
Related Policies? 15 (unpublished paper presented at conference on Global Region-
alism, Feb. 8-9, 1999) (on file with author) (arguing that FDI is a "credibility en-
hancing institution"); James R. Markusen, Multilateral Rules on Foreign Direct In-
vestment: The Developing Countries' Stake 51 (World Bank Study Paper, Oct. 1998)
(discussing the insurance value of such a treaty).
9 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD")
was founded in 1961. The OECD is the primary organization for highly-
industrialized and industrializing nations to discuss trade, investment, and other
economic matters of mutual interest. Its objectives are to achieve economic
growth and employment in member countries while maintaining financial stabil-
ity. Its twenty-nine members include the fifteen EU member countries, Australia,
[24:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss1/2
2003] A WTO AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT 81
agreement on investment is the stability, predictability, and trans-
parency it brings to the legal environment:
International rules have much to contribute to the stability
of the multilateral system by helping avoid distortions to
production and trade and in promoting more stable in-
vestment flows, higher quality investments and a better dis-
tribution of their benefits. Adherence to rules may be espe-
cially valuable to countries whose share of international
investment falls short of their needs, as well as to small and
medium-sized enterprises that might otherwise hesitate to
invest outside familiar territory. Rules offer transparency
and predictability for investors, and a vehicle for interna-
tional co-operation and dispute resolution.' 0
Canada, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zea-
land, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States.
Along with the WTO and the United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment, the OECD has actively studied the subject of foreign direct investment
and the role it plays in promoting trade and development. The most important of
its work products in the field of foreign investment is the 1976 Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, revised in 2000. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE OECD DECLARATION AND DECISIONS ON
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: BASIC TEXTS,
DAFFE/IME(2000)20 (2000). See also WTO Working Group on the Relationship
Between Trade and Investment, Communication from the OECD, The OECD Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises, WT/WGTI/W/40 Uune 11, 1998) (providing
guidelines to OECD member nations); WTO Working Group on the Relationship
Between Trade and Investment, Communication from the OECD, Revised OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, WT/WGTI/W/93 (Oct. 31, 2000) (stating
the same); WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Communication from the OECD, Summary of OECD Work on Issues Related to
Investment Policy Analysis, WT/WGTI/W/100 (Apr. 2, 2001) (addressing the con-
cerns of FDI); ARGHYRIOS A. FATOUROS, THE OECD GUIDELINES IN A GLOBALISATION
WORLD, DAFFE/IME/RD(99)3 (1999) (reconsidering past guidelines);
DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL, FISCAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, SURVEY OF OECD
WORK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (Working Paper Series 1998) (summarizing
findings on the role of international investment in globalization and economic de-
velopment).
10 OECD, Open Markets Matter: The Benefits of Trade and Investment Liber-
alisation 7 (Policy Brief, Oct. 1999). This view is cautiously shared by the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which has served as
the focal point in the United Nations system for all matters relating to FDI and
multinational corporations. In its World Investment Report 1998, UNCTAD con-
cluded that on balance a multilateral agreement on investment "would improve
the enabling environment for FDI, to the extent that it would contribute to greater
security for investors and greater stability, predictability and transparency in in-
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
The WTO Secretariat has added its support for a multilateral
agreement on investment. In a 1996 report, Trade and Foreign Direct
Investment," the Secretariat noted:
At an institutional level, the growing importance of FDI,
coupled with the absence of binding multilateral rules on
national policies toward FDI, has created what in many
quarters is viewed as an obstacle that could slowdown the
pace of further integration of the world economy. The per-
ceived need for multilateral rules on investment is not
new -indeed, the Havana Charter for the stillborn Interna-
tional Trade Organization... contained provisions on for-
eign investment-but attempts to reach a comprehensive
multilateral agreement with binding rules have thus far not
been successful.12
By favoring domestic investors vis-A-vis foreign investors, or
by discriminating against foreign investment regardless of country
of origin, producers of goods or suppliers of services may be pre-
vented from building or acquiring a facility within a foreign coun-
vestment policies and rules." UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998: TRENDS
AND DETERMINANTS 129 (1998) [hereinafter WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998]. Ac-
cord WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment,
Communication from Korea, A Benefit of Multilateral Investment Rules: Enhanced
Transparency, at. 1, WT/WGTI/W/70 (Mar. 30, 1999) (stating that "a high level of
transparency is crucial"); WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between
Trade and Investment, Communication from Japan, Improving Transparency, para. 1,
WT/WGTI/W/87 (July 5, 2000) ("Transparency is one of the most important ele-
ments."); WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Communication from Hong Kong, China, Transparency of Investment Environ-
ment, WT/WGTI/W/90 (Oct. 9, 2000); WTO Working Group on the Relationship
Between Trade and Investment, Communication from the European Community and
Its Member States, Some Ideas on Flexibility and Non-Discrimination, para. 8,
WT/WGTI/W/89 (Oct. 9, 2000) ("[Ble prepared to accept basic rules to increase
predictability."). But see UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996: INVESTMENT,
TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY ARRANGEMENTS 161-63 (1996) (concluding that
current bilateral and regional arrangements regulating FDI flows are working
well, so that a multilateral agreement on investment may be unnecessary). See
generally Hoekman & Saggi, supra note 8 (concluding that the case for initiating
negotiations on investment policies is weak).
1 Press Release, WTO, Report by the WTO Secretariat: Trade and Foreign
Direct Investment (Oct. 9, 1996) [hereinafter Trade and Foreign Direct Invest-
ment], at http://www.wto.org/english/news e/pres96_e/prO57_e.htm.
12 Id.
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try due to government barriers to entry of foreign investment capi-
tal. As a consequence, local manufacturers or service providers,
who may be less efficient than their foreign competitors, will be
shielded from foreign competition in the domestic market, reduc-
ing total wealth in the target host country. Thus, contend the ad-
vocates of an international investment agreement, national laws
and regulations that discriminate against foreign direct investment
can distort international capital movements in much the same way
as tariffs, quotas, and other non-tariff barriers can distort the flow
of international trade in goods and services.
Despite the policy arguments for a multilateral agreement on
investment, opinion on the issue is divided even among the illumi-
nati. At a special meeting sponsored by the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Investment ("UNCTAD") in 1997, some ex-
perts on FDI questioned the need for a multilateral agreement on
investment, while others supported the idea.13 The contentions
and assertions in favor of a multilateral agreement on investment
beg a host of questions.
First, does the international business community really need a
multilateral agreement on investment? Are private investors com-
plaining about a lack of access to foreign markets for their capital
because of restrictive foreign investment laws? The answer gener-
ally is "no," although anecdotal reports have circulated about per-
formance requirements that an investor has been required to fulfill
as a condition to making an investment.14 The point is that the
13 See UNCTAD, REPORT OF THE EXPERT MEETING ON EXISTING AGREEMENTS ON
INvESTMENT AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT DIMENSIONS (1997), circulated by the Working
Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from
UNCTAD, WT/WGTI/W/21 Uan. 6, 1998) (discussing the advantages and disad-
vantages to a multilateral agreement).
14 But see Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Foreign Investment Barriers 16
(2000) (reporting the results of a questionnaire to seventy-one Canadian compa-
nies that identified 106 specific restrictions faced by these companies when mak-
ing a foreign investment, which in twenty-one percent of the cases led to a cancel-
lation of the investment), at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/bi/ barriers.pdf.
In its annual National Trade Estimate Report, the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative reports on foreign barriers to trade in goods and services as well as
investment. See, e.g., U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2002 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS (2002). In the main, these annual Reports dis-
cuss trading partners' national barriers to investment but do not indicate that any
U.S. investor has specifically complained about the investment barrier, nor do
they identify specific complaints by U.S. investors who have been frustrated in
their attempt to make a foreign investment as a result of the spotlighted barrier.
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level and type of barriers to investment apparently have not been
sufficiently serious that foreign investors have felt motivated to
collectively urge their governments to negotiate an international
agreement on investment. Why hasn't there been a groundswell of
support for a multilateral agreement on investment within the
business community? One possible explanation for the apparent
lack of interest among the business community is that the demand
for foreign capital exceeds its supply, leaving foreign investors
with alternative locations for investment.'5 The general absence of
complaints from the investment community might well suggest
that the current legal regime governing FDI is not broken. It
would also help to explain why the private sector has not led the
charge for a multilateral agreement to liberalize FDI because,
namely, it has no economic incentive to do so because market ac-
cess for foreign capital is generally good.16 As is explained more
fully below, the pace of FDI has only quickened in the past decade,
not slowed, despite the absence of a multilateral agreement on in-
In addition, a survey of the petitions filed with the U.S. Trade Representative
("USTR") under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2002),
shows that only one petitioner has complained about barriers to foreign invest-
ment. On June 16, 1989, the USTR initiated an investigation of trade-restricting
measures imposed by the government of India on foreign investors. In two other
instances, the USTR self-initiated investigations in cases that were investment-
related. On October 11, 1996, the USTR self-initiated an investigation under Sec-
tion 301 with respect to certain acts, policies, and practices of the government of
Brazil concerning the grant of tariff-reduction benefits contingent on satisfying
certain export performance and domestic content requirements. On October 8,
1996, the USTR self-initiated an investigation under Section 301 with respect to
certain acts, policies and practices of the government of Indonesia concerning the
grant of conditional tax and tariff benefits intended to develop a motor vehicle
sector in Indonesia.
A table of the 121 Section 301 cases initiated by the U.S. Trade Representative,
summarizing each of the cases, is available at http://www.ustr.gov
/html/act3Ol.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2003). A table of the twenty-nine with-
drawn or rejected Section 301 petitions is available at http://www.ustr.gov
/html/in301.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2003). For an extensive analysis of Section
301, see BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 1009-68.
15 See Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 11, at 21 (noting the
occurrence of competition for foreign direct investment).
16 See Pierre Sauv6 & Christopher Wilkie, Exploring Approaches to Invest-
ment Liberalization in the GATS 6 (unpublished paper presented at the confer-
ence, Services 2000-New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization, co-
sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution, the
Center for Business and Government at Harvard University, and the Coalition of
Service Industries Education and Research Foundation, Washington, D.C., June 1-
2, 1999) (on file with author) (contending there has been no major "market or pol-
icy failure" to incentivize a push for FDI liberalization).
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vestment. From 1992 to 2001, the only year in which FDI declined
was 2001, which made sense following the global recession and the
aftershock of the September 11 terrorist attack. Moreover, despite
the WTO Secretariat's characterization that there was a "perceived
need for multilateral rules on investment" dating as far back as the
late 1940s,17 the Havana Charter provisions on FDI were so weak as
to amount to a mere exhortation (a point that is discussed more
fully below).18 In fact, all negotiations on a multilateral agreement
on investment since the Havana Charter have met with failure.' 9
Second, while the rule of law does provide transparency, stabil-
ity, and predictability, that fact does not necessarily mean that the
proper legal instrument for encouraging and promoting such
transparency, stability, and predictability in the context of foreign
investment has to be international in scope.20 What about the vast
network of bilateral and regional investment treaties and the role
they play in liberalizing the global market for foreign capital?
What benefits would be realized from the multilateralization of bi-
lateral investment treaties ("BITs") that don't already exist? Is the
push in some circles for a multilateral agreement on investment a
solution in search of a problem? In other words, do existing na-
tional, bilateral, and regional rules on investment provide adequate
access for foreign capital flowing to host countries? A WTO
agreement on investment might increase FDI flows by consolidat-
ing changes at the national, bilateral, and regional level that have
created a more liberal climate for FDI. The numbers substantiate
the success of national policies and bilateral and regional agree-
ments on investment. On the other hand, expanding those bilat-
eral and regional efforts to the multilateral level takes negotiators
into uncharted waters. As noted by UNCTAD, "the existence of a
network of BITs [bilateral investment treaties] cannot be assumed
17 Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 11 and accompanying
text.
18 See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text (detailing the Havana Char-
ter's lack of thorough treatment of foreign direct investment).
19 See Mina Mashayekhi, Trade-Related Investment Measures, in UNCTAD, A
POsmvE AGENDA FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ISSUEs FOR FUTURE TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 235 (2000) (discussing how none of the negotiations since the Ha-
vana Charter have succeeded).
20 But see WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Communication from Canada, at 3, WT/WGTI/W/36 (Apr. 8, 1998) ("A
comprehensive set of consistent rules among all WTO Members would allow for a
stable, transparent and consistent environment for firms operating in the global
market, whatever their ownership structure or place of incorporation.").
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to signal the preparedness of countries to move to another level, in
spite of a convergence of perspectives in certain substantive areas
as signified by existing BITs." 21 As UNCTAD notes, there has al-
ready been significant liberalization for FDI in many countries,
such that any multilateral agreement that prohibits the introduc-
tion of new barriers to FDI would essentially maintain the status
quo.22 An agreement on investment could thus conceivably have
little or no impact on FDI flows because it would not materially
change the policy and legal framework for FDI that presently exists
at the national level. If the economic benefits of foreign investment
for a host country are so strong and compelling (a point explored
more fully below),23 then host countries will have a strong incen-
tive to enact national laws to attract such investment. The evidence
shows that this is exactly what has happened with few, if any, re-
versals in national policies liberalizing market access for FDI in the
past ten to fifteen years. In such a legal environment, an interna-
tional instrument would in effect be mere surplus. The absence of
a multilateral agreement on investment has not hobbled FDI flows.
In addition, as the paramount international institution for liberaliz-
ing cross-border trade in goods and services, some have ques-
tioned whether the WTO could successfully address investment is-
sues in an institutional framework that is focused on the
movement of goods and services, rather than capital.24 Indeed, if a
country pursues a policy of open trade in goods and services, then
an investment agreement will have marginal impact for those for-
eign firms that can then access the foreign market through trade
rather than investment.25
21 UNCTAD, LESSONS FROM THE MAI 28 (1999) [hereinafter LESSONS FROM THE
MAIl.
22 See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 10, at 129 (explaining that
the maintenance of the status quo is one of several possible impacts of a multilat-
eral framework on investment).
23 See infra notes 259-73 and accompanying text (explaining why the host
country's benefits are significant).
24 See, e.g., Anyuan Yuan, China's Entry into the WVTO: Impact on China's Regu-
lating Regime of Foreign Direct Investment, 35 INT'L LAW. 195, 201 (2001) (discussing
whether the WTO can successfully address investment issues).
25 See Hoekman & Saggi, supra note 8, at 9 (explaining that this is the result
because "the realization of profit-shifting objectives requires trade policy instru-
ments"). However, in the case of certain services that are not tradeable across
borders, FDI takes on added importance. This additional importance of FDI high-
lights the significance of pursuing negotiations under the GATS to expand market
liberalization, especially under the commercial presence model of supply.
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Third, what about national sovereignty concerns voiced by de-
veloping countries insofar as their ability to regulate the activities
of foreign investors? What challenges to national labor standards
are posed by a multilateral agreement on investment? If the WTO
members did negotiate an agreement on investment, what would
be the interface between such an agreement and national competi-
tion (antitrust) laws? Can there be a WTO agreement on invest-
ment without a parallel WTO agreement on competition law and
policy? Developing countries, fearing the power of multinational
enterprises ("MNE") to crush local competition, have answered
"no" in response to this last question. As between developed
countries, if a proposed acquisition of a firm by a foreign MNE is
rejected by national-competition law enforcement authorities in the
EU, for example, on the ground that the acquisition or merger
would be anti-competitive, would such action be grounds for a
challenge under a WTO investment agreement?
Fourth, what are the lessons to be learned from the failure of
the OECD to conclude a multilateral agreement on investment in
1998? Efforts to liberalize international investment have a long his-
tory within the OECD, reflected primarily in its non-binding Code
of Liberalization of Capital Movements. These efforts were the
source of investment principles in subsequent trade agreements,
including the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")26
and the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
(the "TRIMs Agreement"). Given the lack of direction at the time
within the WTO regarding a multilateral agreement on investment,
OECD ministers voted in 1995 to sponsor negotiations and to con-
clude a multilateral agreement on investment within two years.
Firmly convinced that a multilateral agreement on investment
would reduce business uncertainty and improve the flow of in-
vestment capital around the world, negotiations within the OECD
on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment ("MAI") were
launched with a completion date set of May 1997.27 Despite the le-
26 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 15,1993, reprinted in 1 NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, TEXTS OF AGREEMENT, IMPLEMENTING BILL,
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, AND REQUIRED SUPPORTING STATEMENTS,
H.R. Doc. No. 159,103d Cong. (1st Sess. 1993) [hereinafter NAFTA STATEMENT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION] (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994).
27 See OECD, REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MOVEMENTS AND
INVISIBLE TRANSACTIONS, A MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT,
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gal and economic arguments for liberalizing national barriers to
FDI, the failure of the OECD to conclude the MAI by 1998 should
be a sobering reminder that successfully negotiating a comprehen-
sive multilateral agreement on investment is a supremely difficult
task.
The draft MAI's main features included provisions extending
most-favored-nation ("MFN") and national treatment to both the
establishment and the subsequent treatment of an investment; a
broad, asset-based definition of investment; standstill and rollback
provisions; provisions on country-specific reservations; standards
on expropriation, compensation in the event of a taking, and repa-
triation of profits; and binding arbitration in country-to-country
and investor-to-host country disputes.28 The final product would
have been a comprehensive set of investment rules that would
have overlapped with the multilateral trade agreements concluded
during the Uruguay Round -in particular, the TRIMs Agree-
ment- and that would have mirrored many of the features of the
U.S. prototype bilateral investment treaty.29 The MAI would have
DAFFE/CMIT/CIME (95) 13/FINAL (May 5, 1995), available at http://wwwl
.oecd.org/daf/mai/htm/cmitcime95.htm.
28 See OECD, THE MAI NEGOTIATING TEXT (as of Apr. 24, 1998) [hereinafter
MAI NEGOTIATING TEXT] (elaborating on these main features), available at
http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/mai/mai.pdf; ORGANIZATION
FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMMENTARY TO THE MAI
NEGOTIATING TEXT (as of Apr. 24,1998) (explaining OECD's positions on these fea-
tures of the MAI). For a brief account of the highlights of the main provisions of
the MAI and the MAI negotiating process, see LESSONS FROM THE MA, supra note
21; WORLD INvESTMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 10, at 65-69. See also Michael P.
Avramovich, The Protection of International Investment at the Start of the Twenty-First
Century: Will Anachronistic Notions of Business Render Irrelevant the OECD's Multi-
lateral Agreement on Investment?, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1201, 1277 (1998) (arguing
in support of concluding negotiations on an MAI); Stephen J. Canner, The Multi-
lateral Agreement on Investment, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 657, 666 (1998) (concluding
that an MAI must include provisions on binding dispute settlement, adequate
compensation, and compensation that includes the full value of the investor's in-
tangible assets).
29 A U.S. BIT provides U.S. investors with six basic benefits. The new proto-
type BIT contains the major features of its predecessor. Beginning with a compre-
hensive definition of direct investment that includes tangible as well as intangible
property, a U.S. BIT contains five core elements: (1) national treatment and MFN
treatment for investments; (2) standards for expropriation and compensation in
the event of a taking; (3) the right to transfer funds; (4) limits on performance re-
quirements consistent with the provisions of NAFTA and the TRIMs Agreement;
and (5) a binding dispute settlement mechanism.
The United States launched its BIT program in 1982 in order to secure for U.S.
direct investors certain rights and protections overseas. U.S. BITs originally were
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been a free-standing international treaty, open to accession by all
countries regardless of whether they were OECD members.
30
The negotiations ultimately floundered because several highly
contentious issues could not be satisfactorily resolved. These is-
sues were the definition of investment, exceptions to national and
MFN treatment, intellectual property, a cultural exception proposal
by France and Canada, exceptions for regional trade arrangements,
exceptions under national treatment, performance requirements,
labor and environmental issues, regulatory takings, the extraterri-
torial application of U.S. laws (in particular, the Helms-Burton
Act), and dispute settlement.31 In May 1998, the date set for com-
negotiated with developing countries exclusively. See generally Jeswald W. Sa-
lacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on
Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT'L LAW. 655 (1990) (detailing the
emergence and evolution of U.S. BITs). However, more recently the BITs program
has shifted focus to Eastern Europe, the republics of the former Soviet Union, and
Latin America.
The U.S. prototype BIT does not differ in its material respects from other
countries' standard models for BITs. See WTO Working Group on the Relation-
ship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from Japan, WT/WGTI/W/34
(Apr. 8, 1998) (illustrating standard BIT models); WTO Working Group on the Re-
lationship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from Korea, Korea's Bilat-
eral Investment Treaties, WT/WGTI/W/42 (July 6, 1998) (illustrating standard BIT
models); WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Communication from Turkey, Turkey's Experience with Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties, WT/WGTI/W/51 (Sept. 18,1998) (illustrating standard BIT models).
30 Sovereignty concerns led U.S. state governors to express reservations
about the MAI. See WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT
ON INVESTMENT: POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT 19-21 (1997)
(presenting a range of concerns involving how MAI might infringe upon sover-
eignty), available at http://www.westgov.org/wga/publicat/maiweb.htm. The
'MAI was at one time considered a possible framework for a WTO agreement on
trade and investment by the Clinton Administration. See Tarullo Says MAI May
Provide Framework for International Accord, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2032 (Nov. 26,
1997). For additional analysis of the MAI, see WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998,
supra note 10, at 65-69.
31 See LESSONS FROM THE MAI, supra note 21, at 1; Mashayekhi, supra note 19,
at 235 (presenting a failure to resolve these issues). On March 12, 1996, President
Clinton signed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of
1996, popularly known as the Helms-Burton Act. Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (1996). For articles cri-
tiquing the Helms-Burton Act, see Brice M. Clagett, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act
Is Consistent with International Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 434 (1996); Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 419 (1996);
Jonathan R. Ratchik, Cuban Liberty and the Democratic Solidarity Act of 1995, 11 AM.
U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 343 (1996). The Act broadens the U.S. embargo against Cuba:
(1) barring U.S. foreign aid to countries that provide assistance to Cuba; (2) au-
thorizing U.S. nationals who had property confiscated by the Cuban government
since 1959 to sue foreign companies if they are "trafficking" in the property that
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pletion of negotiations, the MAI negotiations officially entered a
"pause" phase.32 This action was taken following strong criticism
of the proposed text by labor and environmental groups. Some
countries participating in the negotiations also expressed concerns
about "free riders" who would receive the benefits of other coun-
tries' market openings on FDI, but who would not themselves
open their markets to FDI.33 France's withdrawal from the MAI
negotiations in October 1998, on the ground of inadequate protec-
tion of cultural industries, sounded the death knell of the MAI.34
Although the OECD MAI would have been open to acceptance
by all countries regardless of OECD membership, many develop-
ing countries were hostile to the idea in the absence of a comple-
mentary set of rules involving restrictive business practices. Some
developing countries feared that investment by multinational cor-
porations would result in local monopolies, which in turn can en-
gage in predatory pricing that would drive local competitors out of
business. On the other hand, other developing countries welcome
so-called "greenfield" investment that brings fresh capital, man-
was expropriated by the Cuban government after the Cuban revolution; and (3)
barring the issuance of visas to aliens who, after the effective date of the Act, con-
fiscate, convert, or traffic in property expropriated from a U.S. citizen. The Presi-
dent has the power to suspend for up to six months at a time the implementation
of provisions in Title III of the Act that authorize U.S. nationals to bring lawsuits
to recover confiscated property if doing so would be in the national interest. Both
Presidents Clinton and Bush have suspended the operation of Title Il.
For information about the possible impact on BITs between Cuba and several
EU member states because of the EU's apparent capitulation to the Helms-Burton
Act, see WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Communication from Cuba, WT/WGTI/W/45 (July 20,1998).
32 Daniel Schwanen, Chilling Out: The MAI Is on Ice but Global Investment Re-
mains Hot, C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 109, at 2 (June 18, 1998), available at
http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/Sch-03.pdf ("The negotiations toward a Multilat-
eral Agreement on Investment... have officially entered a 'pause' that some ob-
servers say could be permanent.").
33 See The Sinking of the MAI, EcONOMIsT, Mar. 14, 1998, at 81-82 (discussing
the potential free-rider problem).
34 See Peter T. Muchlinski, The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on In-
vestment: Where Now?, 34 INT'L LAW. 1033 (2000) (tracing the history of failed at-
tempts to negotiate an international investment agreement); Lawrence J. Speer,
Mulling Failed MAI Process, OECD Debates Future of Investment Liberalization Proc-
ess, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1570 (Sept. 29, 1999); Lawrence J. Speer & Gary G.
Yerkey, France Pulls Out of OECD Talks on Multilateral Investment Treaty, 15 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1750 (Oct. 21, 1998) (discussing France's withdrawal from the
negotiations when guarantees on labor and environment standards and a cultural
exception were not forthcoming).
[24:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss1/2
A WTO AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT
agement know-how, and export markets to the host country.35 In
the end, of course, it was the OECD members themselves who
spiked the draft Agreement. At the risk of placing too much blame
on any one country, France had strong reservations about the
negative impact a MAI would have on its cultural industries, a
misapprehension undoubtedly shared by Canada.36 Other OECD
members were pressured by domestic environmental groups that
pressed their case against the MAI as being a threat to the global
environment. In addition, labor advocacy groups wondered how a
MAI might negatively affect developing-country labor markets by
developed-country multinational investors. The upshot was that
by late 1998 the OECD MAI was a dead letter, notwithstanding the
great expectations shared by most participants in the negotiations
that a successful conclusion was barely weeks away.
Fifth, and finally, what are the lessons to be learned from the
pace of liberalization efforts achieved to date under two existing
WTO agreements that address key dimensions of FDI: the General
Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"), including the two sub-
sidiary agreements on financial services and basic telecommunica-
tions, and the TRIMs Agreement?
Against this backdrop, the overarching issue addressed in this
Article is whether international trade in goods and services should
be integrated with foreign direct investment through a WTO
agreement on investment. The arguments advanced for such an
agreement have an undeniable appeal as a theoretical matter. Pro-
ponents of a multilateral agreement on investment - the "global-
ization school"37-submit that national laws and regulations that
discriminate against foreign direct investment distort international
trade in much the same way as do tariffs, quotas, and other non-
tariff barriers to trade. By eliminating such laws that either dis-
35 See, e.g., James Lim, South Korea Installs Ombudsman to Resolve Problems of
Foreign Investors, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1792 (Nov. 3, 1999); James Lim, South
Korea Says It Will Continue Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment, 16 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1468 (Sept. 15, 1999); James Lim, South Korea Sets Long-Term Target to
Increase Foreign Direct Investment, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 390 (Mar. 9, 2000);
Shai Oster, China Looking to Private Investment for Economic Stimulus, Analysts Say,
17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 45 Oan. 13, 2000).
36 See Daniel Pruzin, Canada Seeks Support of Trade Partners for Multilateral Ac-
cord to Protect Culture, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1736 (Oct. 27, 1999) (noting Can-
ada's concern for cultural protection).
37 WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment,
Communication from Korea, Multilateral Framework on Investment: A Realistic Ap-
proach, para. 1, WT/WGTI/W/79 Uune 2,1999).
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criminate in favor of domestic investors or that discriminate
against foreign investors, the most efficient producers of goods and
suppliers of services with capital to invest, regardless of country of
origin, will be able to penetrate a market unhindered by govern-
ment interference.
But just how prevalent are national laws that impede or block
the flow of foreign capital? Empirical research on the subject is
scant. One study in the mid-1990s of the investment policies of the
twenty-nine members of the OECD-whose investment policies
might be expected to be the most liberal in the world-revealed
that they collectively maintain over 400 investment restrictions.38
The fifteen member-states of the EU as a group were reported to
have the greatest number of investment restrictions, accounting for
54% of all restrictions identified for OECD members. The United
States was reported to have the second largest number of restric-
tions, accounting for 17% of the OECD total, followed by Canada,
Mexico, and Australia with 14%, 7%, and 6%, respectively.39 How-
ever, as is discussed below, the decided trend in the latter half of
the 1990s and into the 21st century has been to enact regulatory
38 See Liberalization of International Investment, supra note 5, at 8.
39 Id. A proposed purchase in 1988 of an eighty percent interest in an Ameri-
can firm, Fairchild Semiconductor Corp., by a Japanese firm, Fujitsu, Ltd., was the
catalyst for a provision added to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988 to amend the Defense Production Act of 1950. The new provision, com-
monly known as the Exon-Florio amendment, authorizes the President to review
and prohibit the acquisition, merger, or takeover of a business in the United States
by a foreign person if such commercial activity could result in foreign control of a
U.S. firm that would threaten to impair national security. See Defense Production
Act § 721 (1950), as amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 2170.
In exercising his authority under Exon-Florio, the President is directed to
consider such factors as domestic production needed for projected national de-
fense requirements and the capacity of domestic industries to meet national de-
fense requirements. The 1992 Byrd-Exon amendment required an investigation
whenever an attempted purchase is made by an entity owned or controlled by a
foreign government. See 50 U.S.C. § 2170(c). The Byrd-Exon amendment was in
direct response to an unsuccessful bid by Thomson-CSF, a French company par-
tially owned by the French government, to purchase the missile division of LTV
Corp., a U.S. aerospace company. See generally Patrick L. Schmidt, The Exon-Florio
Statute: How It Affects Foreign Investors and Lenders in the United States, 27 INT'L
LAw. 795 (1993).
Pursuant to Executive Order, the Exon-Florio amendment is enforced by the
interagency Committee on Foreign Investment. See Exec. Order No. 12,661, 54
Fed. Reg. 779 (Dec. 27, 1988). It has been the target of heavy criticism from the
EU. See More U.S. Barriers to Trade with EU Arose in Past Year, EU Report Says, 13
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1244 July 31,1996).
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measures that are hospitable to FDI. Moreover, despite these re-
strictions and the absence of a multilateral agreement on invest-
ment, investors' appetite for making investments abroad has only
grown.40 Oddly enough, there appears to be an inverse correlation
between the number of restrictions on FDI and FDI flows. During
the ten-year period from 1992 to 2001, the top sixteen recipients of
FDI were OECD members. Of all OECD member countries, the
United States had the largest number of restrictions on FDI in the
1990s, as reported by the OECD, yet the United States received
more FDI inflows in the period 1992-2001 than any other country,
$1.27 trillion, more than double the numbers of second-place Brit-
ain.41 Similarly, even though China places numerous restrictions
on investment, it remains one of the world's top destinations for
foreign direct investment.42
A counterpoint to the globalization school of FDI is the "inter-
nalization school." The internalization school believes in minimiz-
ing the amount of outside intervention in a country's ability to es-
tablish national laws and regulations governing FDI, thus
reserving the maximum flexibility of host countries to deal with
FDI.43
Before examining in-depth the pros and cons of a WTO agree-
ment on investment, a survey of the history of investment rules
within the GATT-WTO legal regime, including the Uruguay
Round and post-Uruguay Round results, will provide important
background and perspective. The following survey will show that
WTO addresses the subject of foreign direct investment in several
40 See Patrick Tracey, Foreign Direct Investors See Increase; China, Others Gain
Investment Appeal, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 306 (Feb. 22, 2001).
41 Economic and Financial Indicators, ECONOMIST, Aug. 17, 2002, at 77.
42 Yuan, supra note 24, at 201. The four leading host countries for FDI in-
flows during the decade 1985-95 were the United States ($478 billion), the United
Kingdom ($200 billion), France ($138 billion), and China ($130 billion). Trade and
Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 11, at 5. In 1997, the United States ($76.5 bil-
lion), China ($40.8 billion), the United Kingdom ($26 billion), and France ($22 bil-
lion) were the top four recipients of FDI inflows. WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998,
supra note 10, tbl.I.9. In 1999, the United Kingdom surpassed the United States as
the largest outbound investor for the first time since 1988, although the United
States remained the leading recipient of FDI (over $250 billion) by a factor of
nearly three over second-place Sweden (approximately $75 billion). Economic and
Financial Indicators, ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 2000, at 105.
43 WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment,
Communication from Korea, Multilateral Framework on Investment: A Realistic Ap-
proach, para. 2, WT/WGTI/W/79 June 2, 1999). More will be said about the
views and arguments of the internalization school as this Article unfolds.
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important respects. When it comes to investment, the WTO is not
operating in a complete vacuum.
2. INVESTMENT RULES IN THE GATT-WTO SYSTEM
Over its fifty-five year history, the GATT-WTO international
trading system has had as its core goal the elimination of govern-
ment barriers to international trade in goods and now, under the
GATS, the creation of market access for services as well. Although
nowhere explicitly stated in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT") or any WTO agreement, the guiding economic
premise that underlies the entire GATT-WTO system is open trade.
One commentator has explained open trade (sometimes referred to
as liberal trade) in the following terms:
In a liberal economic system, government does not thwart
private parties in their attempts to enter voluntary transac-
tions, and taxes are stable, predictable, and nonprohibitive.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is lib-
eral in this sense.... Interventions [by governments] in lib-
eral exchange across frontiers to make trade fair may be the
political price of liberalism, but such interventions are
themselves its antithesis.44
Why did open trade become GATT's desideratum? The an-
swer is short but compelling: by exploiting the law of comparative
advantage, liberal trade policies permit the unrestricted flow of the
best goods and services across national borders at the lowest
prices, thereby increasing total world wealth. Under the law of
comparative advantage, resources are allocated efficiently across
and within industries in response to competitive pressures from
imports. Both of these phenomena lead to product specialization
and increased firm size that in turn lowers the unit cost of goods
and services. The role that multilateral trade rules play in fostering
liberal trade manifests itself in two important ways. First, speciali-
zation and economies of scale become possible because of secure
access to a barrier-free international market. Second, increased in-
44 Martin Wolf, Why Trade Liberalization Is a Good Idea, in THE URUGUAY
ROUND: A HANDBOOK ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 14 (J. Michael
Finger & Andrzej Olechowski eds., 1987).
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ternational competition leads to product and process innovation,
further reducing costs and expanding consumer choices.45
The kinds of government conduct restricting market access that
have been of greatest interest to the GATT contracting parties, and
today, to the WTO members, include reducing and eliminating tar-
iffs on imported goods, limiting the use of import and export quo-
tas, imposing discipline on the imposition of safeguard measures
(i.e., escape clause relief), ensuring that state-trading enterprises
that have a monopoly on the purchase and/or sale of goods con-
duct their operations on the basis of market disciplines, circum-
scribing the use of antidumping duties, discouraging subsidies to
sunset and sunrise domestic industries, and limiting the extent to
which governments can restrict imported goods on the basis of
product standards. All of these trade liberalization measures can
have the salutary effect of indirectly combating certain restrictive
business practices engaged in by domestic firms, e.g., price fixing,
by allowing greater import competition that will in turn break up
such illegal arrangements through price competition. The GATIT-
WTO system has had little or nothing to say about private restric-
tive business practices, government-sponsored commodity cartels
(e.g., the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries "OPEC"),
government-sponsored boycotts, and government procurement
laws that discriminate in favor of domestic suppliers.46 Until the
Uruguay Round, the same was true for national laws that dis-
criminate against, restrict, or otherwise distort the global market
for foreign direct investment.
45 For classical and contemporary arguments in support of free trade and the
arguments for protectionism, see RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY
AND PRACnCE 1-123 (2001); Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and Environment:
Lessons from the Federal Experience, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1329, 1330 (1992); The
Miracle of Trade, ECONOMIST, Jan. 27,1996, at 61-62.
46 The plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement opens govern-
ment procurement of goods, services, and construction contracts to enterprises
from the other signatories to the Agreement. See Agreement on Government Pro-
curement, Apr. 15, 1994, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope
/gproc-e/agrmnt-e.htm. (last visited on Jan. 31, 2003). To date, twenty-seven
countries and the European Communities are parties to the Government Pro-
curement Agreement, with seven countries involved in accession negotiations.
An updated list of countries that are party to the Agreement on Government Pro-
curement is available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/gproc-e
/memobs_e.htm. (last visited Jan. 31, 2003).
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2.1. The Havana Charter and GATT 1947
The World Trade Organization traces its origins to 1944. In
that year, a comprehensive economic and financial plan for post-
World War II reconstruction and development was proposed by
the United States and the United Kingdom at Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire. A triad of international economic and financial insti-
tutions was envisioned. Two of the institutions, the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), were created to ad-
dress development and monetary issues. Rounding out the institu-
tional triad was the International Trade Organization ("ITO"). The
General Agreement was to serve as an interim agreement until the
ITO and its founding document, the Havana Charter, could be ap-
proved by national legislatures. 47
In September 1946, the United States drafted a proposed Char-
ter that became the basis for discussions at the First Session of the
Preparatory Committee on the Havana Charter.48 During the pe-
riod 1946-1947, the Preparatory Committee began drafting the ITO
Charter. Independent of this project, the Committee members also
conducted tariff-reduction negotiations in anticipation of the com-
pletion of the ITO Charter. They negotiated approximately 45,000
tariff concessions affecting about $10 billion of world trade in
goods.49 In order to protect the value of these concessions, the
Committee members further agreed to the early acceptance of
47 For a complete history of GATT and the Bretton Woods system, see
KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIc ORGANIZATION
(1970); ROBERT E. HUDEc, THE GATr LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY
(2d ed. 1990); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969); G.J.
LANJOUW, INTERNATIONAL TRADE INSTITUTIONS (ACE Translations trans., 1995);
OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM
4-6 (1985); ARMAND VAN DORMAEL, BRETTON WOODS: BIRTH OF A MONETARY SYSTEM
(1978); Gerald A. Bunting, GATT and the Evolution of the Global Trade System: A His-
torical Perspective, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 505 (1996).
48 The members of the Preparatory Committee were Australia, Belgium, Lux-
embourg, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India,
Lebanon, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the U.S.S.R., the
United Kingdom, and the United States. With the exception of the former Soviet
Union, all of these countries became GATT contracting parties under Protocols of
Provisional Application. See WTO, 1 ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND
PRACTICE, at 1-9 (1995).
For additional background on the preparatory work on GATT, see DAM, su-
pra note 47, at 10-16; JACKSON, supra note 47, at 35-57; LONG, supra note 47, at 4-6;
Armin von Bogdandy, The International Trade Law, in U.S. TRADE BARRIERS: A
LEGAL ANALYSIS 73, 74-76 (Eberhard Grabitz & Armin von Bogdandy eds., 1991).
49 BHALA, supra note 45, at 127-28, 133.
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some of the obligations in the draft ITO Charter. The combination
of the tariff concessions and interim trade rules was formalized in
the GATT. In short, in order to expedite the start of international
negotiations on tariff reductions and their implementation pending
approval of the Havana Charter by national legislatures, GATT
was approved provisionally by national representatives, effective
January 1, 1948.50 President Truman approved it on behalf of the
United States pursuant to authority granted under the Reciprocal
Trade Agreements Act of 1934.51
GATT Article XXIX makes it plain that GATT was not intended
by its drafters to function on a permanent basis. It was contem-
plated that once the Havana Charter entered into force, and with it
the ITO, Part II of GATT that contains the bulk of the international
legal commitments (other than the MFN obligation and tariff
commitments) would be suspended.52
In the end, the Havana Charter never entered into force. In
fact, no acceptances of the Charter were ever received by the
United Nations, the depositary for Charter accessions. 53 The Ha-
vana Charter was a far more comprehensive document than GATT.
It contained provisions relating to employment, economic devel-
opment, restrictive business practices, and dispute resolution un-
der ITO auspices.5 4 Had it been approved, the Havana Charter for
50 Id. at 127-28.
51 Id. at 128.
52 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXIX, opened for signature
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter 1947
GATT]. GATT Article XXIX provides that Part II of the Agreement shall be sus-
pended on the day on which the Havana Charter enters into force. In addition, it
provides that if by September 30, 1949, the Havana Charter has not entered into
force, the contracting parties shall meet before December 31, 1949, to agree
whether the Agreement shall be amended, supplemented or maintained.
53 See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 2.
Once it became clear that the Havana Charter had no chance of being
approved by the neo-isolationist U.S. Senate, the State Department is-
sued a statement that the Charter would not be submitted again to Con-
gress. As a consequence, GATT was pressed into service by default to fill
the institutional vacuum. Despite its left-footed start, GATT became the
centerpiece of international trade law, doubling as a multilateral trade
agreement and an international trade forum for its 114 contracting par-
ties for nearly five decades.
Id.
54 Final Act and Related Documents of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Employment, Havana, Cuba, Mar. 24, 1948, U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/4
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an International Trade Organization would have covered not only
tariffs, quotas, and other non-tariff barriers to trade in goods, but
also restrictive business practices (Articles 46-54),55 commodity
agreements (Articles 55-70),56 and foreign direct investment (Arti-
cles 11 & 12).57 Although the refusal of national legislatures-in
particular, the neo-isolationist U.S. Senate -to approve the Havana
Charter could be viewed quite naturally as a missed opportunity, it
is debatable whether the Charter would have thrown open the
gates to FDI. The Havana Charter's coverage of foreign direct in-
vestment is, at best, skeletal. In fact, far from being a comprehen-
sive code analogous to today's typical bilateral investment treaties,
Articles 11 and 12 merely sketch out in broad brush the role of the
International Trade Organization in promoting FDI, and minimal
rights of ITO members which are host countries for FDI.
First, Article 11.2 of the Havana Charter authorized the ITO to
enter into collaborative programs with other inter-governmental
organizations (e.g., the World Bank and the IMF) that would (1)
lead to the conclusion of a bilateral or multilateral agreement on
double taxation in order to stimulate foreign investment, and (2)
"promote the adoption of a general agreement or statement of
principles regarding the conduct, practices and treatment of for-
eign investment."58 Article 11 clearly saves for another day the de-
tails of a multilateral agreement on investment.
Second, Article 12 of the Havana Charter, entitled International
Investment for Economic Development and Reconstruction, is a state-
ment of non-binding principles regarding FDI. Under Article 12.1,
members recognize that international investment "can be of great
value in promoting economic development and reconstruction,
and consequent social progress," and that "the international flow
of capital will be stimulated to the extent that Members afford na-
tionals of other countries opportunities for investment and security
for existing and future investments." 59 Article 12.1(c) goes on to
reserve to members the following rights:
(1948) [hereinafter Havana Charter]. See generally CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR
WORLD TRADE (1949).
55 Havana Charter, supra note 54, arts. 46-54.
56 Id. arts. 55-70.
57 Id. arts. 11-12.
N Id. art. 11.2(c).
59 Id. art. 12.1.
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(i) to take any appropriate safeguards necessary to ensure
that foreign investment is not used as a basis for interfer-
ence in its internal affairs or national policies;
(ii) to determine whether and to what extent and upon
what terms it will allow future foreign investment;
(iii) to prescribe and give effect on just terms to require-
ments as to the ownership of existing and future invest-
ments;
(iv) to prescribe and give effect to other reasonable re-
quirements with respect to existing and future invest-
ments. 60
What clearly emerges from Article 12(c) is the right to restrict
investment to match national development plans. Article 12.1(d)
further notes that economic development "may be promoted" if
source and host countries enter into bilateral or multilateral in-
vestment agreements. 61 As such, it is more of a suggestion than a
legally-binding commitment. Finally, under Article 12.2, members
agree that if they do enter into such bilateral or multilateral agree-
ments, they would provide reasonable opportunities for invest-
ment on non-discriminatory terms.62
In short, considering the Havana Charter's mostly hortatory,
and even at that, sparse provisions on FDI, it would be a stretch to
conclude that the failure to ratify the Havana Charter had an im-
mediate or lasting negative impact on FDI flows.
Filling the void left by the failure to approve the Havana Char-
ter, and with it, the ITO, was the GATT, the fountainhead of inter-
national trade law.63 Signed by twenty-three nations-twelve de-
60 Id. art. 12.1(c)(i)-(iv).
61 Id. art. 12.1(d).
62 Id. art. 12.2.
63 1947 GATr, supra note 52; GUIDE TO GATr LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note
48, at 4-7.
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veloped and eleven developing economies -on October 30, 1947,
and headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, GATT 1947 performed
double duty for forty-seven years as both the premier multilateral
trade agreement and international trade organization. GATT 1947
is the immediate predecessor of GATT 1994 and the WTO, which
assumed GATT's dual roles on January 1, 1995, with the successful
completion of the Uruguay Round.64
GATT 1947 is virtually silent on the subject of FDI. The ques-
tion of investment was revisited in the 1955 GATT review confer-
ence after it was obvious that the Havana Charter and the ITO
were stillborn. That conference recommended that contracting
parties take steps to stimulate the international flow of capital, 65
but nothing concrete ever emerged from that conference.
2.2. WTO Rules on Investment
After more than seven years of negotiations, the most far-
reaching and comprehensive development in world trade since
1947 took place in 1994 with the successful completion of the Uru-
guay Round of multilateral trade negotiations (the "Round"). Pe-
ter Sutherland, the first Director-General of the World Trade Or-
ganization, described the conclusion of the Uruguay Round as "a
defining moment in modern history."66 Although the Uruguay
64 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act];
EDMOND McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION 1.12-3 (1996).
65 Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 11, at 33-34.
66 PHILLIP EVANS & JAMES WALSH, THE EIU GUIDE TO THE NEW GATT 1 (1994).
For additional reading on the Uruguay Round summarizing the significant por-
tions of the WTO Agreement, see generally URUGUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENTS,
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 1, H.R. Doc. 316, 103d Cong., 656-67 (1994)
[hereinafter URUGUAY ROUND STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION]; BHALA &
KENNEDY, supra note 3; JOHANNA W. BUURMAN & JEFFREY J. SCHOIr, THE URUGUAY
ROUND: AN ASSESSMENT (1994); JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE URUGUAY ROUND (1995); JOHN KRAUS, THE GATT
NEGOTIATIONS: A BUSINESS GUIDE TO THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND (1994);
ERNEST H. PREEG, TRADERS IN A BRAVE NEW WORLD: THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE
FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM (1995); THE GAIT, THE WTO AND
THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT: UNDERSTANDING THE FUNDAMENTAL
CHANGES (Harvey M. Applebaum & Lyn M. Schlitt eds., 1995); THE URUGUAY
ROUND RESULTS: A EUROPEAN LAWYERS' PERSPECTIVE (Jacques Bourgeois ed., 1994);
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996); John
H. Jackson, The Uruguay Round and the Launch of the WEO: Significance & Chal-
lenges, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION, supra, at 5; Terence P.
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Round results did not silence the critics of international trade, it
did at least lower the volume. The Uruguay Round arrested the
slide away from liberal trade and the multilateral rules designed to
promote it by renewing the original GATT 1947 cornmitment to
open markets and the elimination of government intervention that
impedes trade flows. What is more, the Uruguay Round expanded
the multilateral trade system's portfolio by including two new sec-
tors, trade in services and intellectual property. 67
Although the treatment of FDI in the WTO multilateral trade
agreements is not comprehensive-no WTO agreement currently
exists that creates a framework for the regulation of all aspects of
FDI - two WTO multilateral trade agreements ("MTAs"), together
with two subsidiary agreements on trade in services, integrate
trade and FDI to varying degrees.68
Stewart, The Uruguay Round Agreements Act: An Overview of Major Issues and Poten-
tial Trouble Spots, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL
FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION, supra, at
29; TERENCE P. STEWART, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY
(1986-1992) (1996); Symposium, Negotiating the Free Trade Labyrinth, 18 WHITTIER L.
REv. 281 (1997); Symposium, Uruguay Round - GATT/WTO, 29 INT'L LAW. 335
(1995).
67 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter the
TRIPS Agreement] (listing contents of "Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights").
68 Four other WTO agreements address investment tangentially. First, the
TRIPS Agreement is the most comprehensive framework agreement of its kind
within the GATT-WTO system. Intellectual property rights are often treated as a
form of investment. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral
Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Trade Negotiations. Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125-97 (1994) [hereinafter 1994
GATT] (containing the complete text of the Agreement... Rights). Although the
TRIPS Agreement does not address the issue of FDI directly, its provisions on na-
tional treatment, MFN, minimum standards of intellectual property protection,
and domestic enforcement procedures bear directly on the legal environment in
which FDI operates. If a foreign investor cannot place an investment in a host
country with the assurance that its intellectual property rights (patents, trade-
marks, copyrights, etc.) will be adequately protected from infringement, that in-
vestor may very well decide not to make the investment. With the minimum pro-
tections of the TRIPS Agreement in place for patents, trademarks, copyrights,
trade secrets, geographical designations, layout designs of integrated circuits, and
industrial designs, coupled with effective mechanisms for the enforcement of
those rights against piracy and infringement within the host country, FDI will be
encouraged, especially FDI by firms that have valuable intellectual property to
protect. The TRIPS Agreement thus serves an important role in promoting in-
vestment. See, e.g., Sauv( & Wilkie, supra note 16, at 14 (discussing the TRIPS
Agreements relationship to intellectual property issues).
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First, the GATS is a comprehensive agreement governing all
trade in services (with the exception of maritime and air transport
services). Second, the 1997 Agreement on Financial Services liber-
alizes trade and investment in the financial services sector. Third,
the 1997 Agreement on Basic Telecommunications likewise liberal-
izes trade and investment in the basic telecommunications sector.
Fourth, the TRIMs Agreement provides a patchwork of rules pro-
hibiting WTO members from requiring both foreign and domestic
investors, sourcing inputs locally, imposing trade-balancing re-
quirements on investors as a condition for importing goods or ob-
taining foreign exchange, restricting access to foreign exchange for
the purchase of imports, and restricting the volume or value of ex-
ports that a company must make.
These four agreements are analyzed in the following subsec-
tions.
Second, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the "SCM
Agreement") overhauled the comparatively weak Tokyo Round predecessor
agreement with tightened and expanded disciplines on the government provision
of domestic and export subsidies to domestic producers. The SCM Agreement not
only authorizes importing countries to impose countervailing duties on subsi-
dized imports that cause injury, but also goes further by curbing the adverse ef-
fects of subsidies in foreign markets. Article 6 of the SCM Agreement makes ac-
tionable the provision of subsidies that cause "serious prejudice" to the interests
of another member. Annex IV:5 of the SCM Agreement identifies government
funds to firms in a "start-up situation" as an example of a subsidy that can give
rise to a "serious prejudice" complaint. (A "start-up" situation is one where fi-
nancial commitments for product development or construction of facilities to
manufacture products benefiting from the subsidy have been made, even though
production has not begun). See URUGUAY ROUND STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AcTION, supra note 66, at 897-941.
Third, Article III:2 of the plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement
provides that procuring entities will not discriminate against locally-established
suppliers on the basis of their degree of foreign affiliation or ownership. Agree-
ment on Government Procurement, supra note 46, art. 111:2.
Fourth, any FDI-related dispute arising under GATT 1994 or a WTO MTA
must be resolved under the provisions of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Annex 2,1994 GATT, supra note 68, at 1226-47 (containing the complete text
of the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes). This vastly improved, rules-based WTO dispute settlement process
will give investors a more certain legal climate within which to make their foreign
investment, to the extent a WTO agreement covers the matter in dispute and the
investor's home country chooses to espouse the investor's claim.
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2.2.1. The GATS
GATT 1947 was almost exclusively concerned with trade in
goods. The Uruguay Round's banner achievements include ex-
panding the scope of the GATT-WTO system to include the ser-
vices sectors. The GATS is a very significant step in establishing an
international framework for trade in services, including FDI.
69
The service sector has overtaken manufacturing as the most
important part of developed countries' economies. Service indus-
tries account for sixty-one percent of GDP and over one-half of
employment in developed countries.70 The ratio of exports of
world merchandise trade to world services trade was close to three
to one in 2001,71 with world trade in commercial services totaling
$1.44 trillion in 2002 compared to $4.75 trillion in merchandise
trade.72
Given the substantial increase in the volume of services trade,
liberalizing trade in services by bringing multilateral disciplines to
bear on this sector was an important goal for developed countries
in the Uruguay Round.73 Developing countries, on the other hand,
were unreceptive to the proposal to add services trade to the Uru-
guay Round agenda. Under the leadership of India and Brazil,
they opposed putting services trade on the Uruguay Round
agenda at all. 74 To the extent developed countries enjoy any com-
parative advantage in this sector, it is in the labor-intensive con-
struction industry; however, restrictive immigration and labor
69 See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agree-
ment, supra note 67, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1167-96 (1994) [hereinafter the GATS]
(containing the complete text of the GATS).
70 The Manufacturing Myth, ECONOMIST, Mar. 19, 1994, at 91. Jobs in the ser-
vice sector provide nearly eighty percent of U.S. employment, a figure that is ex-
pected to increase to eighty-eight percent by 2005. Id. Services trade represented
more than one quarter of total U.S. exports in 2002. WTO ANNUAL REPORT 2002, at
23-24 (2002). In 2002, U.S. exports of commercial services totaled almost $263 bil-
lion, representing a global trade surplus in services in 2002 of $75 billion. Id. at 24.
71 WTO ANNUAL REPORT 2002, supra note 70, at 23-24.
72 Id.
73 See EVANS & WALSH, supra note 66, at 28 (arguing that developed countries
enjoy a comparative advantage in the more capital-intensive and highly-skilled
service industries, such as telecommunications and financial services).
74 For background on the issues confronting the Uruguay Round negotiators
in liberalizing trade in services detailing the conflict between developed and de-
veloping countries, see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS
AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 119-30 (1987); EVANS & WALSH, supra note 66, at 28 (noting
the comparative advantages of developed and developing countries).
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laws historically have prevented cross-border trade in such ser-
vices. More importantly, developed countries showed no interest
in changing their trade-restrictive immigration laws.75 Ultimately,
services trade was added to the Uruguay Round agenda. After re-
solving some preliminary issues (e.g., the definition and quantifica-
tion of services trade),76 the GATS was successfully concluded.
The GATS is the first multilateral agreement covering trade
and investment in the services sector.77 It is divided into six parts,
consisting of twenty-nine articles and eight annexes. 78 The GATS is
modeled after the GATT in both name and content. The bricks and
mortar of the GATS are built on three pillars.
First, the GATS framework agreement proscribes core princi-
ples and basic obligations governing trade in services that are ap-
plicable to all WNTO members. These basic obligations include
rules on MFN treatment, national treatment, and transparency. 79
Second, market access commitments made by WTO members
are included in national schedules of commitments that are ap-
pended to and made an integral part of the GATS.80 The members'
schedules of market access commitments are analogous to the
schedule of tariff concessions that members make under GATT Ar-
ticle 11.81
75 See EVANS & WALSH, supra note 66, at 28 (discussing opposition between
developed and developing countries).
76 See id. at 29 (defining trade in services).
77 For additional analyses of the GATS, see generally BHALA & KENNEDY, su-
pra note 3, at 1242-70, URUGUAY ROUND STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, su-
pra note 66, at 966; U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN
SERVIcES: EXAMINATION OF MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS' SCHEDULES OF COMMITMENTS,
USITC Pub. 2940 (Jan. 1996); U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, THE YEAR IN TRADE 1993:
OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 19-24, USITC Pub. 2769 (1994);
MCGOVERN, supra note 64, Part D; Bernard Hoekman, Assessing the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING EcONOMIES
88 (Will Martin & L. Alan Winters eds., 1996); Richard B. Self, General Agreement
on Trade in Services, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL
TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 523
(Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996); Mary E. Footer, The International Regulation of Trade
in Services Following Completion of the Uruguay Round, 29 INT'L LAW. 453 (1995).
78 GATS, supra note 69, at 1167-68.
79 See id. arts. II, III & XVII, at 1169-70, 1180 (listing general obligations and
disciplines for MFN treatment and national treatment).
80 Id. art. XVI, at 1179-80.
81 See 1947 GATT, supra note 52, art. II, at 200 (setting forth the concessions
required of contracting members).
[24:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss1/2
A WTO AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT
Third, the GATS' eight annexes complement the general rules
and market access commitments. The Uruguay Round partici-
pants recognized that negotiations would have to be continued on
certain service sectors if the Uruguay Round was ever going to be
concluded. These specific sectors (maritime transport, telecommu-
nications, and financial services) had proven to be major stumbling
blocks for the negotiators. Thus, appended to the GATS are sev-
eral annexes with guidelines and deadlines for future market ac-
cess negotiations on the maritime transport, financial, and basic
telecommunication services sectors.82 Market access commitments
were successfully negotiated in 1997 for the financial services and
basic telecommunication sectors.83  Negotiations on maritime
transport services were deferred and continue to be deferred.84
Part I of the GATS sets out its scope of coverage and defines
several key terms (other definitions are provided in GATS Article
XXVIII). Under GATS Article :1, WTO members agree in principle
to universal coverage of all trade in commercial services.85 No ser-
82 See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 1244.
83 See infra notes 152-67, 203-35, and accompanying text (detailing negotia-
tions over financial service and basic telecommunication sectors).
84 At the center of the maritime services deadlock is the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.
§ 883 (1988), which preserves certain preferences for the U.S. coastal shipping in-
dustry. Although it is generally true that broad exemptions for existing national
laws inconsistent with GATT are not permitted, the Jones Act was temporarily
exempted from GATT, pursuant to the General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A,
para. 3(a). See Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1155 (1994). Paragraph 3(a) of the General Inter-
pretative Note provides in pertinent part:
The provisions of Part II of GATT 1994 shall not apply to measures taken
by a Member under specific mandatory legislation, enacted by that
Member before it became a contracting party to GATT 1947, that prohib-
its the use, sale or lease of foreign-built or foreign-reconstructed vessels
in commercial applications between points in national waters or the wa-
ters of an exclusive economic zone.
Id. at 1155. The WTO Ministerial Conference was to have reviewed this exemp-
tion by 1999 and every two years thereafter as long as the exemption remains in
force. Id. para. 3(b), at 1155. The WTO General Council initiated the five-year re-
view of the Jones Act exemption in July 1999, and continued to consider this mat-
ter at its meetings in October and November 1999, and in February, May, and July
2000. No conclusions could be reached during these discussions. WTO General
Council, Minutes of Meeting Held on 7, 8, 11 and 15 December 2000, WT/GC/M/61
(Feb. 7, 2001).
85 GATS Article I:3(b) defines "services" as "any service in any sector except
services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority." GATS, supra note
69, at 1169. Article 1:3(c) in turn defines "services supplied in the exercise of gov-
ernmental authority" as "any service which is supplied neither on a commercial
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vice sector is excluded a priori under the framework agreement.
The GATS Annexes do, however, exclude air transport services
and reserve for later negotiation specific commitments on maritime
transport.86
2.2.1.1. Modes of Supply.
GATS Article 1:2 defines "trade in services" by the following
four "modes of supply," i.e., the way in which services are deliv-
ered.
The first mode is the cross-border supply of services "from the
territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member." 87
For example, a securities firm in Country A sells bonds from Coun-
try A to consumers in Country B; or an architect from Country A
sends design drawings by mail to a client in Country B.
The second mode is consumption of services "in the territory of
one member to the service consumer of any other Member." 88 For
example, a tour company in Country A supplies a service to Coun-
try B consumers in Country A; or a student from Country A stud-
ies abroad in Country B.
Third, the service supplier of one member supplies services
through a "commercial presence in the territory of any other Mem-
ber."89 For example, a bank located in Country A renders banking
services through its branch located in Country B; or an advertising
firm in Country A establishes an office in Country B to render ser-
vices to clients located there.
Fourth and finally, the service supplier of one member supplies
services "through the presence of natural persons of a Member in
the territory of any other Member."90 For example, an architect
from a U.S. firm performs on-site design services in Europe; or an
accountant from Country A travels to Country B to render account-
ing services to a client in Country B.
basis, nor in competition with one or more service suppliers [i.e., government
monopolies]." Id.
86 GATS, supra note 69, at 1188-89 (containing the text of the Annex on Air
Transport Services); id. at 1192 (containing the text of the Annex on Negotiations
on Maritime Transport).
87 Id. art. I:2(a), at 1169.
88 Id. art. 1:2(b).
89 Id. art. 1:2(c).
90 Id. art. 1:2(d).
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The first, second, and fourth modes of supply involve the cross-
border delivery of services. The third mode of supply involves the
sale of services through an affiliate, i.e., the delivery of services by
a foreign-owned firm within the territory of another member
through facilities or other commercial presence. The commercial
presence mode of supply is especially important because it en-
hances competition for services markets that are necessarily local
in their geographic scope and, therefore, immovable. As noted by
the United States in a submission to the WTO Working Group on
the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, investment under
the commercial presence mode of supply can not only supplement
open international trade, but it can also introduce or increase com-
petition where open trade has not yet reached.91
The Annex on Article II Exemptions is arguably the most im-
portant of the eight annexes appended to the GATS.92 Contrary to
the rigid, unconditional MFN obligation found in Article I of
GATT, GATS Article II introduces some flexibility by authorizing
MFN exemptions,93 provided that the exemption is listed in the
91 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Communication from the United States, at 3, WT/WGTI/W/55 (Sept. 25,1998)
(discussing the correlation between free flows of investment and increased com-
petition).
Economically meaningful trade in services, especially under the commercial
presence mode of supply, requires that service suppliers and their customers be
able to make unimpeded capital transactions across national borders. To that end,
GATS Article XI limits the ability of WTO members to restrict international trans-
fers and payments for current transactions relating to specific market access
commitments. GATS, supra note 69, at 1175-76. Members may restrict such pay-
ments and transfers solely in accordance with GATS Article XII on balance-of-
payments restrictions. Id. at 1176-77.
92 See id., Annex on Article II Exemptions, at 1187 (containing the Annex on
Article II Exemptions).
93 GATS Article II: does provide for immediate and unconditional MFN
treatment to services and service suppliers of any other WTO member. The
phrase "treatment no less favourable" used in GATS Article 11:1 has been inter-
preted as being synonymous with "no less favorable conditions of competition."
WTO, Dispute Panel on European Communities, Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas, para. 7.353, WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997). There,
the panel concluded that the EC's 30% allocation of available import licenses for
bananas at in-quota tariff rates created less favorable conditions of competition for
the like-service suppliers from the complaining WTO members (i.e., Ecuador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and the United States). The allocation was, there-
fore, inconsistent with GATS Article II. The panel's conclusion was affirmed by
the Appellate Body. See WTO Appellate Body, European Communities Regime for
the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, para. 244, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept.
9,1997) (affirming the Dispute Panel's conclusion).
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member's Schedule of Commitments and does not extend beyond
ten years.94 Nevertheless, despite the principle in the Annex that
MFN exemptions should not exceed ten years,95 only nine of the
424 listed MFN exemptions specify a duration of ten years.96
Seventy-nine of the WTO members (counting the EU as one
member) listed MFN exemptions in their schedules of GATS com-
mitments.97 Of the 424 exemptions, 35% are in the transport ser-
vices sector, 25% are in the communications sector (primarily in
audiovisual services),98 13% are in the financial services sector, and
94 See WTO, Compilation of Article II (MFN) Exemptions by Sector, Informal
Note by the Secretariat, Job. No. 1551 (Mar. 9, 2000) (specifying the nature of the
exemptions). The format that the WTO members use in listing their MFN exemp-
tions contains five items of information: (1) a description of the sector or sectors to
which the exemption applies; (2) a description of the measure, indicating why it is
inconsistent with Article II; (3) the country or countries to which the measure ap-
plies; (4) the intended duration of the exemption; and (5) the conditions creating
the need for the exemption. See OECD, Working Party of the Trade Committee,
Trade in Services: A Roadmap to GATS MFN Exemptions, at 4-5 n.2,
TD/TC/WP(2001)25/FINAL (Oct. 29, 2001) [hereinafter Roadmapl (outlining the
five types of information to be provided for each exemption).
95 GATS, supra note 69, Annex on Article II Exemptions, para. 6, at 1187.
96 See Trade in Services: A Roadmap to GATS MFN Exemptions, supra note 94, at
19 ("Only 9 of the 424 exemptions are said to apply for a duration of 10 years.").
All unexpired exemptions were reviewed by the Council for Trade in Services in
2000. For a summary and critique of that review, see WTO, Council for Trade in
Services, Communication from Hong Kong, China, Japan and Korea, S/C/W/173 (Oct.
6,2000) (discussing matters arising from the MFN Exemption Review).
97 See Trade in Services: A Roadmap to GATS MFN Exemptions, supra note 94, at
6 ("The 424 exemptions to Article II of the GATS have been listed by 79 WTO
Members (counting the EC as one Member), a majority of the WTO member-
ship."). "[M]ost of those 79 Members have listed 5 exemptions or less, while 10
countries listed more than 10 [exemptions]." Id. Of the Quad members (i.e., Can-
ada, the EC, Japan, and the United States), only Japan did not list any GATS MFN
exemptions. See id. at 8 (describing exemptions listed by members).
98 See, e.g., id. at 6 (containing the EC Schedule of Commitments which pro-
vides preferences to EC-member states for audiovisual services). An example of
an Article II exemption is the one the United States took in the 1997 basic tele-
communications negotiations. The exemption was in response to Canada's un-
willingness to eliminate its 46.7% equity cap restriction on foreign ownership of
most basic telecom service providers. The exemption provides:
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18% apply to all services sectors.99 Of the various conditions that
have prompted the listing of GATS MFN exemptions, 55% relate to
international agreements, while 37% of the exemptions identify re-
ciprocity as the reason for the exemption.100 Almost half of the ex-
emptions that are based on reciprocity have been taken in the
transport sector.10' Reciprocity accounts for more than 80% of the
exemptions listed for professional services and nearly 50% for fi-
nancial services.' 02 For example, the United States has listed MFN
exemptions regarding the movement of persons for countries with
whom the United States has a friendship, commerce and naviga-
tion treaty or a bilateral investment treaty; certain differential taxa-
tion measures; and certain aspects of air, road, pipeline, and space
transport. 03
Exemptions are subject to negotiation in subsequent trade lib-
eralizing rounds. 04 Any exemption with a term greater than five
years is subject to review by the WTO Council for Trade in Ser-
THE UNITED STATES-LIST OF ARTICLE II (MFN) EXEMPTIONS
Sector or Description of Measure Countries Intended Conditions
Subsector Indicating Its Inconsis- to Which Duration Creating the
tency with Article II the Meas- Need for the
ure Applies Exemption
Telecommunica- Differential treatment of All Indefiite Need to en-
tion services: countries due to applica- sure substan-
One-way satellite tion of reciprocity meas- tially full
transmission of ures or through market access
DTH and DBS international agree- and national
television ser- ments guaranteeing treatment in
vices and of digi- market access or na- certain
tal audio services tional treatment markets
WTO, United States, List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions, GATS/EL/90/Suppl.2
(Apr. 11, 1997). The abbreviations "DTH" and "DBS" stand for "direct-to-home"
and "direct broadcast satellite," respectively.
99 See Roadmap, supra note 94, at 10 (detailing the sectoral incidence). The bal-
ance of the exemptions are in professional services (18), recreation and sports ser-
vices (5), distribution services (3), construction services (2), health services (1), and
tourism services (1). See id. (detailing the sectoral incidence).
100 See id. at 22-24 (listing MFN exceptions by categories and characteristics
relating to reciprocity).
101 Id.
102 See id. at 24 (noting that reciprocity accounts for 83% of professional ser-
vices and 47% of financial services).
103 WTO, United States, Final List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions, at 78-94,
GATS/EL/90, (1994), reprinted in U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, U.S. Schedule of
Commitments Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, Inv. No. 332-
354 (May 1997).
104 GATS, supra note 69, Annex on Article II, para. 6, at 1187.
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vices. 05 However, the Council has no express authority to demand
termination of the exemption.10 6
2.2.1.2. Market Access
If the framework agreement is the skeleton of the GATS, then
the schedule of market access commitments is the flesh on the
bones. The WTO members' schedules list the service sectors and
modes of supply for which individual members have agreed to
provide full or partial access to the service suppliers of other WTO
members.
In order to harmonize members' schedules, during the Uru-
guay Round, the GATT Secretariat suggested the use of a Services
Sectoral Classification List ("Classification List").107 The Classifica-
tion List employs 155 service industries, with four possible modes
of supply for each industry and with each mode of supply subject
to both market access and national treatment commitments.108
105 Id. Annex on Article II Exemptions, para. 3, at 1187.
106 Id. Annex on Article II Exemptions, para. 4, at 1187 (limiting the Council's
authority).
107 The Services Sectoral Classification List classifies services into the follow-
ing twelve sectors (which is further divided into 155 subsectors):
1. Business (six subsectors, including professional services)
2. Communication (five subsectors, including telecommunication services)
3. Construction and Related Engineering (five subsectors)
4. Distribution (five subsectors, including wholesale, retail, and franchising)
5. Education (five subsectors)
6. Environment (four subsectors)
7. Financial (three subsectors)
8. Health and Social Services (four subsectors)
9. Tourism and Travel (four subsectors)
10. Recreational, Cultural, and Sporting (five subsectors)
11. Transport (nine subsectors)
12. Other Services Not Included Elsewhere
The GATS classification system has been criticized by more than one source for
lacking clarity. See, e.g., Mina Mashayekhi, GATS 2000: Progressive Liberalization, in
UNCTAD, A POSITIVE AGENDA FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ISSUES FOR FUTURE
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 169, 187 (2000); Mark Felsenthal, GATS Classification Called
Unclear; Film Industry Urges Broader Application, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 585
(Apr. 2,1997).
108 See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 1262-63 (describing Classification
list). The following table is an illustration of the format of members' schedules of
commitments:
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Thus, with more than 100 Round participants negotiating bilater-
ally on a request/offer basis for market access to 1240 service
"cells" on a MFN and national treatment basis, the services trade
negotiations were, not surprisingly, protracted.109
Some Round participants wanted to schedule market access
commitments on the basis of a positive list approach. Unless the
service sector or mode of supply is expressly listed in a member's
schedule of commitments, it is not covered under the GATS. Other
participants wanted to proceed on the basis of a negative list ap-
proach. Market access would exist for all sectors and modes of
supply on a national treatment basis unless express reservations
were made in the member's schedule of commitments. The spe-
cific commitments made under the GATS are a blend of these two
approaches. Only those industries that are listed in a member's
schedule of commitments are open to foreign service suppliers
with respect to at least one mode of supply (i.e., a positive list ap-
proach).110 However, if a member has made a commitment, only
the conditions, limitations, or qualifications on market access and
national treatment listed in the schedule may be imposed (i.e., a
negative list approach)."' Thus, all schedules must specify (1)
terms, limitations, and conditions on market access; (2) conditions
and qualifications on national treatment; (3) undertakings relating
to additional commitments; (4) the time frame for implementation
of commitments; and (5) the date of entry into force of commit-
ments. 12 Measures that are inconsistent with both Article XVI
(market access) and Article XVII (national treatment) are to be in-
scribed in the column relating to market access limitations, in
[MEMBER'S NAME] -SCHEDULE OF SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS
Modes of supply: (1) Cross-border supply; (2) Consumption abroad; (3) Com-
mercial presence; and (4) Presence of natural persons.
Sector or Limitations on Limitations on Na- Additional
Subsector Market Access tional Treatment Commitments
The WTO has prepared a Guide to Reading the GATS Schedules of Specific Commit-
ments and the Lists of Article II (MFN) Exemptions, available at http://www.wto
.org/english/tratop-e/serv e/gujdel e.htm. This matrix equals 1240 service
"cells" for which market access commitments were requested.
109 BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 1256.
110 See TRIPS, supra note 67, art. XVI:I, at 1179 (laying out both the positive
and negative list approaches).
111 Id.
112 See id. art. XX:I, at 1181 (listing the specifications of the schedules).
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which case the inscription will be considered a condition or qualifi-
cation on national treatment as well 13
Developed countries made market access commitments on ap-
proximately 45% of their service sectors.1 4 Developing countries
as a group made commitments on only 12%. Starting with 620 as
the maximum number of service sectors, subsectors, and modes of
supply on which commitments could have been made, the United
States made 384 commitments; the EU, 392; Canada, 352; Japan,
408; and Mexico, 252.115 For all service sectors, only 25% are
scheduled by developed countries without conditions or qualifica-
tions."16 The comparable figure for developing countries is 7%.117
If a member does make market access commitments, and
unless a reservation is otherwise recorded in a member's schedule
of commitments, then full market access and national treatment is
required.1 8 A member is prohibited from maintaining or adopting
several types of limitations or measures, unless it has otherwise so
specified in its schedule.119 Typical kinds of numerical limitations
that a member might inscribe in its schedule of commitments in-
clude the following:
113 Id. art. XX:2, at 1181.
114 Hoekman, supra note 77, at 105-07.
115 See id. at 102 (listing numbers of commitments scheduled for individual
GATS members). In 1995, the International Trade Commission completed a de-
tailed analysis of the specific commitments made by Canada, the EU, Japan, and
Mexico in the areas of distribution, education, communication, health care, pro-
fessional, transportation, and travel and tourism. The Commission concluded
that, of a possible 440 entries that each country could have made in these service
sectors, these four trading partners entered full commitments ranging from 104 to
214, or 24% to 49%. See General Agreement on Trade in Services: Examination of
Major Trading Partners' Schedules of Commitments 10-4, USITC Pub. 2940, Inv.
332-358 (Dec. 1995) [hereinafter USITC Examination of GATS]. The Commission
undertook a parallel study in 1996 for South America. See General Agreement on
Trade in Services: Examination of South American Trading Partners' Schedules of
Commitments, USITC Pub. 3007, Inv. No. 332-367 (Dec. 1996).
116 See Hoekman, supra note 77, at 105 (discussing "the magnitude of com-
mitments where no restrictions apply to both market access and national treat-
ment for a given sector-mode of supply").
117 Id.
118 GATS, supra note 69, art. XVI:1, at 1179.
119 Id. art. XVI:2(a)-(f), at 1179-80.
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(1) limitations in the form of quotas or the requirement of an
economic needs test on the number of service suppliers or opera-
tions;120
(2) limitations in the form of quotas on the total value of service
transactions or assets;' 21
(3) measures that restrict or require specific types of a legal en-
tity or joint venture through which a service supplier may supply a
service;'22
(4) limitations on the total number of natural persons that may
be employed in a particular service sector;123 and
(5) limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of
a maximum percentage limit on foreign shareholding or the total
value of individual or aggregate foreign investment.124
2.2.1.3. Progressive Liberalization
Appreciating that an agreement on the complete liberalization
of trade in services would not happen overnight, Part IV of GATS
schedules future negotiations for further liberalization of trade in
services. It also lays down rules for negotiating schedules and for
the subsequent modifications of those schedules. GATS Article
XIX schedules successive rounds of negotiations beginning no later
than 2000 and periodically thereafter. They are aimed at the pro-
gressive liberalization of trade in services. For each round, negoti-
ating guidelines and procedures are to be established, taking into
account the autonomous trade liberalization efforts undertaken by
members since 1995 and the special situation of least-developed
countries. 125 GATS Article XIX contemplates that the process of
progressive liberalization may take place through bilateral, pluri-
lateral, or multilateral negotiations in each round, provided they
120 Id. art. XVI:2(a), (c), at 1179. Examples include a license for a new restau-
rant based on an economic needs test, annually established quotas for foreign
medical practitioners, nationality requirements for service suppliers (equivalent to
a zero quota), and restrictions on the amount of broadcasting time available for
foreign films.
121 Id. art. XVI:2(b), at 1179. For example, foreign bank subsidiaries' assets
might be capped at a fixed percentage of total domestic assets of all banks.
122 Id. art. XVI:2(e), at 1180. Examples include a requirement that foreign
companies establish subsidiaries, or that in a particular sector commercial pres-
ence take the form of a partnership.
123 Id. art. XVI:2(d), at 1180.
124 Id. art. XVI:2(f), at 1180.
125 See id. art. XIX:3, at 1181 (describing negotiating schedules).
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are aimed at raising the overall level of specific commitments. 26
Improved commitments on trade liberalization of most service sec-
tors have been rolled over to the so-called Doha Development
Agenda or Round.127
2.2.1.4. Movement of Natural Persons
Under the Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying
Services Under the Agreement ("Annex"), members agree to pro-
vide temporary entry for management and specialized personnel
during the ordinary course of providing services. "Movement of
natural persons" refers to the temporary admission of foreign na-
tionals into the territory of another WTO Member as part of the
business of supplying services abroad. 128 The GATS does not ap-
ply to measures affecting natural persons seeking access to a mem-
ber's employment market. It also does not apply to measures re-
garding citizenship, residence, or employment on a permanent
basis.129
The Annex does not prevent a member from applying meas-
ures to regulate the entry of natural persons. Such measures may
include measures to ensure the orderly movement of persons
across borders, provided that the measures are not applied in a
manner that nullifies or impairs the benefits accruing to any mem-
ber under the terms of a specific commitment. However, the sole
fact that a visa is required for natural persons of certain members
and not others is not to be regarded as nullifying or impairing
benefits under a specific commitment. 30
As noted by India in a submission to the Working Group on the
Relationship Between Trade and Investment, there has been a dis-
connect in the discussion about free movement of capital and any
discussion about the free movement of labor.131 As India points
out:
126 See id. art. XIX:4, at 1181 (discussing the different modes but common goal
of progressive liberalization).
127 See infra notes 310-30 and accompanying text.
128 GATS, supra note 69, Annex on Article II Exemptions, para. 1, at 1187-88.
129 Id. para. 2, at 1188.
130 Id. para. 4 n.1, at 1188.
131 WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Communication from India, WT/WGTI/W/39 June 4,1998).
[24:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss1/2
A WTO AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT
Both the mobility of capital and the mobility of labour are
accepted as delivery modes for trade and investment in
goods and services. If capital is mobile and flows across
countries and regions, it is a natural corollary that labour
must also have comparable mobility. A liberal integrated
approach is necessary to the mobility of labour as part of
the free global flows of capital, goods and services.132
India's observation and suggestion that the movement of labor
be taken up in the work program of the Working Group on the Re-
lationship Between Trade and Investment has been all but ignored
by the other participants.
2.2.1.5. Summary: The Results of the GATS Negotiations
Most market access and national treatment commitments to
date are essentially standstill agreements. That is, existing market
access and national treatment limitations, if any, are maintained.133
However, members commit not to impose additional trade restric-
tions in the future. 34 Consequently, while the GATS lays a foun-
dation, broad trade liberalization in services did not take place in
the Uruguay Round. With the exception of the financial services
and telecommunication services negotiations where members
sought genuine liberalization of those two service sectors (dis-
cussed next), the most noteworthy achievement of the first round
of services trade negotiations was to provide an unprecedented
amount of information on barriers to services trade maintained by
WTO members. Thus, through the commitments that identify
measures that are barriers to services trade, the Uruguay Round
negotiators accomplished the twin goals of establishing bench-
marks for future services trade negotiations and making barriers to
services trade more transparent where market access commitments
were made. Because of the GATS positive list approach, however,
benchmarks and transparency are non-existent if no market access
commitment has been made for a service sector or subsector.
132 Id. para. 3.
133 USITC Examination of GATS, supra note 115, at 14.
134 Id.
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2.2.2. Trade in Financial Services
2.2.2.1. Introduction
Although the extent of market openings overall, including
openings for FDI, were extremely modest in the Uruguay Round
GATS negotiations, genuine market openings were achieved in the
financial services and basic telecommunications sectors in post-
Round negotiations. Let us turn first to the financial services nego-
tiations.
Realizing that a final agreement on financial services was out of
reach by the December 1993 deadline for the Uruguay Round, par-
ticipants agreed to continue negotiations on financial services
through June 1995 to see if adequate market access commitments in
the areas of banking, securities, and insurance could be secured.135
Frustrated with the reluctance of participants to make broad finan-
cial services offers during the Uruguay Round, the United States
reacted by making conditional MFN offers as a negotiating tactic
for prying more liberal offers from foot-draggers. 136 Countries
whose offers were deemed adequate received reciprocal offers
from the United States. Unconditional MFN treatment was with-
held, however, from countries that the United States considered to
be "free riders." 137 This two-tiered approach rankled many par-
ticipants as a dangerous departure from the near-sacrosanct un-
conditional MFN principle enshrined in GATT Article J.138
The United States announced on June 28, 1995 that it would
maintain its exemption from the MFN obligation relating to trade
in financial services because it regarded the offers made by the
other participants as insufficient. 39 In response, the EU arranged
for improved offers in an effort to induce other participants not to
135 Kenneth Freiberg, Introductory Note, World Trade Organization: Second
Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and Related Deci-
sions, 35 IL.M. 199, 200-01 (1996) [hereinafter Second Protocol to the GATS] (dis-
cussing the extensions to the financial services negotiations).
136 See id. at 201-02 (discussing U.S. tactics to deal with insufficient market
access commitments by other nations).
137 Id.
138 See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, THE YEAR IN TRADE 1994: OPERATION OF THE
TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 14, USITC Pub. 2894 (1995) [hereinafter THE YEAR IN
TRADE 1994].
139 See Second Protocol to the GATS, supra note 135, at 202 (discussing the
accommodations the United States made for countries whose offers were deemed
insufficient).
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withdraw their financial services commitments. 140 By July 1995,
approximately thirty WTO members (counting the EU as one)
reached an interim agreement on financial service commitments.
They adopted a Second Protocol to the GATS, containing schedules
of commitments that expired on December 12, 1997.141 That date
coincided with the new date for the completion of the financial
services follow-up negotiations that were launched in 1997.
In order to facilitate the post-Round financial services negotia-
tions, the WTO members agreed at the end of the Uruguay Round
to the Understanding on Commitments on Financial Services
("Understanding"). 42 The Understanding was intended to harmo-
nize the structure of the market access commitments agreed to by
the members during the post-Round financial services negotia-
tions.
First, the Understanding contains a standstill restriction that
provides that members will only inscribe conditions, limitations,
and qualifications to their specific commitments to the extent of ex-
isting, non-conforming measures. 43 (Under Part III of the GATS, in
contrast, it is also possible for a member to inscribe future non-
conforming measures in a member's schedule of commitments.)
Second, regarding market access commitments, members agree
to the following eight rules:'"
(1) Members shall list in their schedules of financial service
commitments existing monopoly rights and shall endeavor to
eliminate them or reduce their scope.
(2) Notwithstanding GATS Article XIII on government pro-
curement, members agree to accord MFN and national treatment
to non-resident financial service suppliers in the purchase or acqui-
sition of financial services by public entities.
(3) Members shall permit the cross-border delivery and pur-
chase of insurance services relating to (a) maritime shipping, com-
mercial aviation, and space launching; (b) reinsurance; and (c) fi-
nancial information and data processing.
140 See THE YEAR IN TRADE 1994, supra note 138, at 31 n.83.
141 See Second Protocol to the GATS, supra note 135. For background on the
financial services negotiations through 1997, see WTO, OPENING MARKETS IN
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE ROLE OF THE GATS (Special Studies 1997).
142 GATS, supra note 69, Understanding on Commitments in Financial Ser-
vices, at 1260.
143 See id. at 1260 (discussing limitations of standstill provisions).
144 See id. at 1260-63 (outlining market access commitment rules).
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(4) Members shall grant non-resident financial service suppliers
the right to establish a commercial presence within their territory,
including through the acquisition of existing enterprises, subject to
terms, conditions, and procedures for authorization of the estab-
lishment of a commercial presence that are otherwise consistent
with the GATS.
(5) Members shall permit financial service suppliers of any
other member established in the former's territory to offer any new
financial service.
(6) Members shall not take measures that prevent transfers of
information or the processing of information that are necessary for
the conduct of ordinary business of a financial service supplier,
subject to the right to protect personal data and privacy and the
confidentiality of individual records and accounts.
(7) Members shall permit the temporary entry of personnel of a
financial service supplier that has established a commercial pres-
ence in the territory of a member, including senior managerial per-
sonnel possessing proprietary information essential to the service
supplier, specialists in the operation of the supplier, and, subject to
the availability of qualified personnel within the member's terri-
tory, computer and telecommunications specialists, actuarial spe-
cialists, and legal specialists.
(8) Members commit to remove or limit any significant adverse
effects on other members' financial service suppliers of (a) non-
discriminatory measures that prevent other members' financial
service suppliers from offering all of the financial services permit-
ted by the member; (b) non-discriminatory measures that limit the
expansion of financial service activities into a member's entire ter-
ritory; (c) measures that apply to both banking and securities ser-
vices when the financial service supplier concentrates its activities
in securities services; and (d) other measures that adversely affect
the ability of financial service suppliers to operate, compete, or en-
ter a member's market. Members need not, however, discriminate
against their own financial service suppliers in honoring this com-
mitment.
Third, regarding national treatment, members agree to provide
financial service suppliers of other members access to payment and
clearing systems operated by public entities, and to official funding
and refinancing facilities available in the ordinary course of busi-
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ness, other than the facilities of a member's lender of last resort.145
When membership or participation in any self-regulatory body, se-
curities or futures exchange, or any other organization, is required
by a member as a condition of supplying a particular financial ser-
vice on an equal footing with resident financial service suppliers,
members must ensure that such entities accord national treatment
to non-resident financial service suppliers.146
2.2.2.2. The 1995 Interim Agreement on Financial Services
With the Understanding on Commitments on Financial Ser-
vices in place, the Uruguay Round participants had laid the
groundwork for multilateral negotiations leading to a rules-based
agreement on financial services. However, despite the best efforts
of the Uruguay Round participants to chart a course toward deeper
and broader offers on market access for financial services that
would culminate in a comprehensive, multilateral agreement,
those efforts failed to produce improved commitments from cer-
tain key players, most notably the United States. The United States
concluded that market access commitments by some Asian coun-
tries, particularly India, Korea, and Malaysia, were not adequate to
warrant U.S. support of a comprehensive agreement.147 Accord-
ingly, the United States signed the Second Protocol and submitted
its schedule of commitments that included an MFN exemption re-
stricting access to its financial services sector to other members' fi-
nancial services suppliers on the basis of reciprocal treatment of
U.S. suppliers by those members. 148
Undaunted, the other participants, behind the leadership of the
EU, reduced their commitments to a Second Protocol to the
145 Id. para. C.1, at 1263.
146 Id. para. C.2, at 1263.
147 See BHALA, supra note 45, at 747.
148 See id. at 748; WTO, United States: Specific Schedule of Commitments,
GATS/SC/90/Supp. 1, and List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions,
GATS/EL/90/Supp. 1 (1995), reprinted in U.S. Schedule of Commitments, supra
note 103, app. B-i; James Bedore, Financial Services: An Overview of the World Trade
Organization's Negotiations, INDUSTRY, TRADE, & TECH. REv. 1, USITC Pub. 2942
(Dec. 1995); Financial Services Committee Approves Accord Without U.S., 12 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1311 (Aug. 2, 1995); Japan, South Korea Sign On to Financial Ser-
vices Accord, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1266 (July 26, 1995); ASEAN Members Agree
to Maintain Offers in WTO Financial Services Negotiations, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1175 (July 12, 1995).
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GATS, 149 the implementing document of the interim financial ser-
vice agreement ("Interim Agreement") that contains their sched-
ules of commitments on financial services. The Interim Agreement
of 1995 contains commitments from thirty-one countries covering
90% of world trade in financial services, including some access to
members' banking, insurance, and securities markets.150 The
commitments extend to all WTO members on an MFN basis.
2.2.2.3. The 1997 Agreement on Financial Services
Negotiations on a comprehensive financial services agreement
resumed on April 7, 1997. Participants set December 12, 1997 as
the deadline for reaching an agreement.15' Negotiators started
with a clean slate, so that all members that had made commitments
under the interim agreement started from zero. The negotiations
were successfully completed on December 12, 1997, with the
agreement to enter into force by March 1, 1999 at the latest.152 A to-
tal of fifty-six offers (representing seventy countries, counting the
EU member states as one) were submitted and annexed to the Fifth
Protocol to the GATS, bringing to 102 the number of WTO mem-
149 Second Protocol to the GATS, supra note 135. The Second Protocol en-
tered into force on September 1, 1996, and expired on December 12, 1997. Id.
WTO members involved in negotiating the Second Protocol include Australia,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, the EC,
Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico,
Morocco, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Singapore, the Slovak Re-
public, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela. BHALA &
KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 1280 n.131.
150 See BHALA, supra note 45, at 748. A list of the WTO members making
commitments under the 1995 Interim Agreement is available at http://www
.wto.org/english/ tratop-e/serv_e/finance_ee/financecommitmentse.htm. For
example, the Philippines opened its insurance market to foreign firms for the first
time in fifty years. Thailand committed to issue seven extra banking licenses by
1997. Brazil opened participation in the privatization of its banks to foreign firms.
BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 1280.
151 WTO Council for Trade in Services, Decision on Financial Services Negotia-
tions, S/L/39 (1997). For background on the 1995 Interim Agreement negotiations
and the 1997 WTO financial services negotiations, see WTO, Background Note,
The Results of the Financial Services Negotiations Under the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e
/serve/finance-e/financefibacke.htm.
152 WTO, Background Note, supra note 151. As a result of the negotiations,
the United States, Columbia, and Thailand decided to withdraw their broad MFN
exemptions based on reciprocity. Only a small number of countries submitted
limited MFN exemptions or maintained existing broad MFN exemptions. Id.
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bers that made financial services commitments under the GATS.153
As measured in revenue, the agreement covers more than 95% of
trade in banking, insurance, securities, and financial information.54
In the insurance sector, for example, fifty-two countries repre-
senting over 90% of world insurance premiums have guaranteed
market access through a commercial presence for all insurance
subsectors (i.e., life, non-life, reinsurance, brokerage, and auxiliary
services). 55 Forty-five countries permit 100% ownership of insur-
ance subsidiaries or entry through branches, including the Quad
members and Mexico; seven countries allow 100% ownership of
subsidiaries, but no entry through branches (i.e., Brazil, Chile, In-
donesia, Jamaica, Nicaragua, South Africa, and Venezuela); and
nine countries allow majority control of insurance subsidiaries (i.e.,
Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Pakistan, the Philippines, Romania, Singa-
pore, Slovenia, and Thailand).'5 6
The participants in the 1997 financial services negotiations also
made commitments in connection with the cross-border delivery of
insurance services.15 7 For example, in the specialty category of ma-
rine, aviation, and transport ("MAT") insurance, twenty-seven
countries now permit cross-border MAT insurance, including Can-
ada, the EU and Mexico. 158 Thirty-five countries have made com-
mitments in the reinsurance and brokerage subsectors of cross-
153 For a summary of the improvements in the new financial services com-
mitments, see Press Release, WTO, Successful Conclusion of the WTO's Financial
Services Negotiations (Dec. 15, 1997), available at http://www.wto.org/english
/newse/pres97e/pr86_e.htm; Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary,
Statement by Secretary Rubin and Ambassador Barshefsky Regarding the Suc-
cessful Conclusion of WTO Financial Services Negotiations (Dec. 13, 1997), avail-
able at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1997/12/finserv.pdf; Press Release, Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative, World Trade Organization (WTO) Financial Ser-
vices Negotiations (Dec. 13, 1997), available at http://www.ustr.gov/releases
/1997/12/finservl.pdf.
154 See Press Release, Statement by Secretary Rubin and Ambassador Barshef-
sky, supra note 153 (listing the commitments made on a country-by-country basis);
WTO, Non-Attributable Summary of the Main Improvements in the New
Financial Services Commitments (Feb. 26,1997) (listing the commitments made on
a country-by-country basis), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e
/news98_e/finsum.htm.
155 See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, WTO Financial
Services Negotiations, supra note 153, at 1.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 3.
158 Id.
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border insurance activities.159 For example, Japan has authorized
the cross-border delivery of reinsurance, but not brokerage ser-
vices.16
0
In banking, sixty countries guarantee a right of establishment
for banks.'61 Thirty-five countries, including the Quad members,
permit 100% ownership of subsidiaries or branches. Sixty-four
countries have grandfathered acquired rights of foreign banks. 162
In the securities sector, forty-five countries, including the Quad
members, guarantee a right of establishment of foreign securities
firms.163 Thirty-seven of them permit 100% ownership of subsidi-
aries or branches.'" Fifty-nine countries have grandfathered the
rights of foreign securities firms. 165 Fifty countries permit foreign
firms to provide and transfer financial data and information. 166
In sum, in marked contrast to the flaccid results of the Uruguay
Round negotiations on services trade in general, the 1997 agree-
ment on financial services achieved significant market liberaliza-
tion for FDI in the financial services sector. The 1997 agreement
demonstrates what is possible in sectoral, FDI negotiations. Simi-
lar results were achieved in the telecommunication services sector,
discussed next.
2.2.3. Telecommunications Trade
2.2.3.1. Introduction
Telecommunication products and services are an increasingly
valuable and growing component of an advanced economy's
manufacturing base. Near the start of the post-Round negotiations
on basic telecommunications in 1995, global telecommunication
services revenue stood at $601.9 billion, or 2.1% of global gross
domestic product ("GDP).167 The world telecommunications
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 4.
162 Id. at 5.
163 Id. at 4.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 5.
166 Id. at 4.
167 See WTO, Data on Telecommunications Markets Covered by the WTO
Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications (Feb. 17, 1997) ("Revenue from inter-
national service was estimated at nearly $63 billion in 1995; accounting for 10% of
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market is clearly an economically valuable one. It also is a fast-
growing one, with average annual revenue growth rates of 4.2%
from 1990 to 1995 in industrialized countries, and 9.7% in develop-
ing countries in that same period. 68 In 1995, the EU, Japan, and
the United States together accounted for nearly three-quarters of
total revenue in world telecommunications.169
It is against this backdrop that the WTO members negotiated
several commitments on telecommunications services trade, both
during the Uruguay Round and after. At the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round in December 1993, approximately one-half of the
participants scheduled specific commitments on value-added tele-
communication services. 70 Negotiations on basic telecommunica-
tion services were extended through 1996 and concluded in 1997
(discussed below). The Uruguay Round participants also reached
agreement on access to members' telecommunication networks,
memorialized in the GATS Annex on Telecommunications (dis-
cussed next).
2.2.3.2. The GATS Annex on Telecommunications
The telecommunications sector serves a dual role as both a dis-
tinct sector of economic activity and as the means of delivery for
other economic activities. Recognizing this duality, the GATS An-
nex on Telecommunications was negotiated to ensure that in its
total revenue."), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres97_e
/data3.htm.
Telecommunication services are commonly bifurcated into basic and value-
added services. Value-added services are sometimes referred to in the United
States as "enhanced" services. Basic telecommunication services include voice
telephone, telex, and telegraph. Value-added services are computer-based and
include electronic and voice mail, online and database information retrieval, and
data and transaction processing. See Michael Nunes, U.S. Telecommunication Ser-
vices: Industry and Trade Outlook, INDUSTRY TRADE & TEcH. REv. 1 nn.2 & 3 (July
2002); WTO, Coverage of Basic Telecommunications and Value-Added Services
(defining and giving examples of basic and value-added telecommunications ser-
vices), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/serv-e/telecom~e
/telecom_coveragee.htm.
168 See WTO, Data on Telecommunications Markets Covered by the WTO
Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications (Feb. 17, 1997), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres97_e/data3.htm.
169 Id.
170 BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 1290.
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role as the means of delivery, access to telecommunication net-
works does not turn into a non-tariff barrier to trade.171
The scope of the Annex is broad, but not universal. It applies
to all measures that affect access to and the use of public telecom-
munication transport networks and services, but does not apply to
measures affecting cable or broadcast distribution of radio or tele-
vision programming.172 Every WTO member must ensure that the
obligations of the Annex are applied to their own suppliers of pub-
lic telecommunication transport networks and services by what-
ever means necessary.173
Unless a member has scheduled a specific commitment that re-
quires access or use, nothing in the Annex requires a member to
authorize a service supplier of any other member to establish, con-
struct, acquire, or otherwise supply telecommunication transport
networks or services.174 Likewise, and undoubtedly to the relief of
developing countries, the Annex does not require a member to ac-
quire, lease, or build a telecommunications network or supply tele-
communication services that are not offered to the public gener-
ally.175
The heart of the Annex is paragraph 5, whose heading could
easily serve as the subtitle of the Annex: Access to and Use of Public
Telecommunications Transport Networks and Services. Paragraph 5(a)
provides, in pertinent part, "[Elach Member shall ensure that any
service supplier of any other Member is accorded access to and use
of public telecommunications transport networks and services on
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions, for the
supply of a service included in its Schedule."
171 GATS, supra note 69, Annex on Telecommunications, at 1192. For an
analysis of the Annex on Telecommunications, see Taunya L. McLarty, Liberalized
Telecommunications Trade in the WVTO: Implications for Universal Service Policy, 51
FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 3842 (1998).
172 GATS, supra note 69, Annex on Telecommunications, para. 2(a)-(b), at
1193. Public telecommunications transport service means a service that a member
requires to be offered to the public generally (thus, they may be privately owned),
and includes telegraph, telephone, telex, and data transmission. Id. para. 3(b).
Public telecommunication transport network means the infrastructure which
permits telecommunications between defined network termination points. Id.
para. 3(c).
173 Id. para. 2(a) n.1.
174 Id. para. 2(c)(i).
175 Id. para. 2(c)(ii).
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A footnote clarifies that the term "non-discriminatory" refers to
MFN and national treatment, as defined in the GATS. 176 It adds
that sector-specific usage of the term means "terms and conditions
no less favourable than those accorded to any other user of like
public telecommunications transport networks or service under
like conditions." This language strongly suggests that no deroga-
tions from the MFN or national treatment obligations may be listed
in a member's schedule of commitments regarding access to or use
of public telecommunication networks or services.
The specific access and use rights accorded foreign service
suppliers include: (1) the right to purchase or lease and attach
terminal or other equipment that is necessary to supply services;
(2) the right to interconnect private leased or owned circuits with
public networks or services; (3) the right to use operating protocols
of the supplier's choice in the supply of any service; and (4) the
right to use networks and services for the movement of informa-
tion within and across borders, subject to reasonable measures
necessary to ensure security and confidentiality (e.g., encryption
requirements).177
A member may impose three general types of measures on ac-
cess and use. First, a member may impose measures necessary to
ensure that public service suppliers are able to make their net-
works or services available to the public generally. 7 8 Second, a
member may impose measures necessary to protect the technical
integrity of networks or services. 179 Third, a member may impose
measures necessary to ensure that service suppliers are providing
only services for which the member has scheduled a commit-
ment.180 Provided that the conditions fall within one of the three
types of permissible measures just described, a member may im-
pose specific conditions on access and use. These conditions in-
clude: (1) restrictions on resale or shared use; (2) requirements to
use specified technical interfaces and protocols for inter-connection
with such networks and services; (3) approval of terminal or other
equipment that interfaces with the network; (4) restrictions on in-
ter-connection of private leased or owned circuits with such net-
176 Id. para. 5(a) n.2, at 1194.
177 Id. para. 5(b)-(d). Cf. GATS Art. III bis, at 1170.
178 GATS, supra note 69, Annex on Telecommunications, para. 5(e)(i), at 1194.
179 Id. para. 5(e)(ii).
180 Id. para. 5(e)(iii).
2003]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
works or services; and (5) requirements on registration and licens-
ing.181
Developing countries are given a special dispensation that al-
lows them to protect (or "strengthen" in the words of the Annex)
their domestic telecommunications infrastructure and service ca-
pacity through reasonable conditions on access and use, notwith-
standing the limitations imposed on members by paragraph 5.182
Any such conditions must be specified in the developing country
member's schedule (which no member has done). The Annex also
encourages technical cooperation between developed and develop-
ing members. 183
Finally, recognizing the importance of international standards
for global compatibility and inter-operability of telecommunication
networks and services, members agree in paragraph 7 to promote
such standards through appropriate international organizations,
including the International Telecommunication Union and the In-
ternational Organization for Standardization. 184 Members also
agree to engage relevant Non-Governmental Organizations by
making arrangements with them for consultation on matters aris-
ing from the implementation of the Annex.185
In summary, what the Annex on Telecommunications repre-
sents is a national treatment commitment that sets the stage for
equal treatment of foreign telecommunication service providers
vis-A-vis their domestic competitors if and when market access is
offered to the former. Such market access was secured at least in
part during the Uruguay Round in the case of value-added tele-
communications services.
2.2.3.3. Commitments on Value-Added Telecommunication
Services
Value-added telecommunication service suppliers create global
networks by leasing lines from basic telecommunication carriers.
Consumers can access value-added services, such as e-mail or
computer databases, by connecting to a value-added telecommuni-
cation network through a personal computer. Consumers can use
181 Id. para. 5(f).
182 Id. para. 5(g).
183 Id. para. 6.
184 Id. para. 7(a).
185 Id. para. 7(b).
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a local telephone number provided by the supplier, a long-distance
number, an Integrated Services Digital Network ("ISDN") connec-
tion through a local telephone network, or a local telephone com-
pany to connect to a network.186 The modes of delivery for value-
added telecommunication services are either cross-border or
through a foreign commercial presence.187 Physical delivery occurs
through telecommunication and computer networks that link
communication centers throughout the world.' 88 As noted above,
the Annex on Telecommunications ensures suppliers reasonable
and nondiscriminatory access to and use of public telecommunica-
tion network carriers and services when such services or facilities
are required to supply a service included in a member's schedule
of commitments.
The Uruguay Round negotiations on specific commitments on
value-added telecommunication services were a modest success.
Fifty-eight countries, including all of the Quad members, sched-
uled commitments on value-added telecom services. As is true
with the vast majority of specific GATS commitments negotiated
during the Uruguay Round, however, the value-added service
commitments are standstill commitments that maintain the status
quo rather than liberalize trade.189 However, because the global
market for value-added telecom services was comparatively open
at the start of the negotiations, the standstill commitments made in
the Uruguay Round prevent rollbacks on existing market access. 190
With a few exceptions, U.S. providers of value-added tele-
communication services operate freely in Canada, the EU, Japan,
and Mexico. 191 This open business environment for value-added
telecommunication services is largely the by-product of bilateral
and regional agreements that predate the GATS.192 Nevertheless,
186 See USITC Examination of GATS, supra note 115, at 5-2 (describing the na-
ture of international trade in value-added telecommunication services).
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 5-3.
190 See Richard Brown, Basic Telecommunications Service Negotiations in the
World Trade Organization: Impetus, Offers, and Prospects, INDUSTRY, TRADE & TECH.
REV. 1, 5-6, USITC Pub. 3017 (Jan. 1997) (describing background and achievements
of the Uruguay Round basic telecommunication services negotiations).
19 See USITC Examination of GATS, supra note 115, at 5-4, tbl.5-1 (highlight-
ing commitments made by U.S. major trading partners).
192 For example, the United States and Japan concluded an international
value-added network services ("IVANS") agreement in 1991 that provided market
access to Japanese business markets for U.S. providers of value-added telecom-
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the GATS buttresses this already favorable climate through the
standstill commitments scheduled by the Quad members.
First, with regard to the cross-border delivery of value-added
telecommunication services, market access is virtually unrestricted
in Canada, the EU, Japan, and the United States.193 While no na-
tional treatment limitations exist in Mexico, some modest market
access restrictions require that a permit be obtained to provide
many types of value-added services. 94 None of the Quad mem-
bers listed any MFN exemptions that apply directly to value-added
telecommunication services.195
Second, with regard to the delivery of value-added telecom
services through a commercial presence, foreign service suppliers
face far more restrictions within all Quad members. Thus, for ex-
ample, while Canada and Japan do not have any limitations that
are specifically targeted at the value-added telecom service sector,
cross-industry ("horizontal") restrictions on market access include
capping equity ownership, voting rights, and representation on
boards of directors.1 96 Typical cross-industry limitations on na-
tional treatment include requirements that newly established busi-
nesses be controlled by residents of the host country. 197
Value-added telecommunication service providers in the
United States have expressed overall satisfaction with the GATS
commitments made by Canada, the EU, Japan, and Mexico.' 98
Their main criticism is the GATS' scheduling methodology.' 99 The
U.S. industry complains that the GATS's positive list approach
does not automatically accord market access or national treatment
to new services that grow out of technological advances.200 Be-
cause restrictions on emerging services are unbound, trading part-
munication services. See id. at 5-6. NAFTA also provides U.S. value-added ser-
vice suppliers with liberalized access to the Canadian and Mexican markets. See
id. at 5-5.
193 Id. app. L.
194 See Marie C. Wold, Liberalization of the Mexican Telecommunication Sector,
INDUSTRY, TRADE, & TECH. REv. 1, USITC Pub. 3039 (Apr. 1997) (discussing the ef-
fects of Mexico's liberation of its long-distance telecommunications sector on U.S.
investment, trade, and employment in that industry).
195 USITC Examination of GATS, supra note 115, at 5-3.
196 Id. at 5-3.
197 Id.
19s Id. at 5-6.
199 Id.
200 Id.
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ners may impose on such services whatever national treatment
limitations or market access restrictions they choose without pay-
ing compensation to adversely affected WTO members. NAFTA's
negative list approach in the services sector is, for that reason, a
preferable methodological approach, because all emerging services
are automatically entitled to market access and national treat-
ment.201
2.2.3.4. The 1997 Agreement on Basic Telecommunication
Services
While several countries offered commitments on value-added
telecommunications during the Uruguay Round, the negotiations
on basic telecommunications were a different story.202 The reason
for this difference is explained by the wide variations in openness
among countries in their basic telecommunications markets. As
noted by Bhala and Kennedy in this regard:
For example, in contrast to the open and competitive U.S.
telecommunications market that followed the 1984 break-
up of AT&T, the basic telecommunications market in
Europe is dominated by public and private monopolies or
single service providers. Because of this gulf in perspec-
tives, offers on basic telecommunications were slow to de-
velop.203
Despite these hurdles, rather than end negotiations on this
branch of telecommunication services trade, the participants
agreed instead to extend negotiations on basic telecommunications
for two years.204 After a further extension of negotiations, an
201 See USITC Examination of GATS, supra note 115, at 5-6.
202 See Laura B. Sherman, Introductory Note, World Trade Organization:
Agreement on Telecommunications Services (Fourth Protocol to General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services), 36 I.L.M. 354, 355 (1997) (noting that "[blasic tele-
communications was one of the four services sectors left unresolved by the Uru-
guay Round").
203 BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 1290.
24 WTO Ministerial Conference, Decision on Negotiations on Basic Tele-
communications, para. 5, 33 I.L.M. 144, 145 (1994).
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Agreement on Basic Telecommunications was finally concluded in
early 1997.205
On February 15, 1997, sixty-nine developed and developing
countries from fifty-five WTO members (fifty-four governments
plus the fifteen EU member states) successfully concluded an
agreement on basic telecommunication services that entered into
force on January 1, 1998.206 No single document memorializes the
participants' "agreement" per se.207 Rather, the legal document
that provides authoritative and complete information on the com-
mitments made by each participant is the National Schedule of
Specific Commitments annexed to the Fourth Protocol of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services.208 The basic telecommunica-
tion services covered by the agreement are defined broadly as any
telecommunication transport network or service.209
205 See Sherman, supra note 202, at 356-58 (discussing Basic Telecommunica-
tions negotiations).
2N Id. at 357 n.23; WTO Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications,
Report of the Group on Basic Telecommunications, para. 6, S/GBT/4 (Feb. 15, 1997),
33 I.L.M. 369, 370 (1997).
207 See Sherman, supra note 202, at 357-58 (describing the various documents
that form the package that is the agreement on basic telecommunications).
208 See WTO, Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services,
S/L/20 (Apr. 30, 1996), 36 I.L.M. 366 (1997) (agreeing to a Schedule of Specific
Commitments).
209 See Sherman, supra note 202, at 359 (noting that all types of basic services
are included); Press Release, WTO, The WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommu-
nications: Informal Summary of Commitments and M.F.N. Exemptions (Mar. 6,
1997) [hereinafter WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications Press Release]
(noting that "[u]nder a very broad and essentially open-ended definition em-
ployed for the negotiations, basic telecommunications were considered any tele-
communications transport networks or services"), available at http://www
.wto.org/english/news.e/pres97_e/bt summ3.htm. The WTO has identified the
following services as being within the scope of the basic telecommunications ser-
vices negotiations: voice telephone services, packet-switched data transmission
services, circuit-switched data transmission services, telex services, telegraph ser-
vices, facsimile services, private leased circuit services, mobile telephone services,
mobile data services, paging, personal communications services, satellite-based
mobile services, fixed satellite services, and teleconferencing. WTO Negotiations
on Basic Telecommunications Press Release, supra. Circuit-switching is the tech-
nical description of older technology for the switching process that dedicates to
two or more users the exclusive use of the circuit until the connection is termi-
nated. Packet-switching is newer technology that is used almost exclusively for
data exchange. Unlike circuit-switched data, packet-switched data are transmit-
ted in multiple "packets" through available circuits and reassembled at the termi-
nation point. See generally From Circuits to Packets, ECONOMIST, Sept. 13, 1997, at
25-27 (discussing telecommunications).
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The market access openings achieved in the negotiations are
impressive. The agreement covers 95% of world revenue in tele-
communication services (before the agreement, only 17% of the top
twenty telecommunication markets were open to foreign service
providers).21 0 With the agreement, close to 100% of those markets
are now open.211
The fifty-five national schedules of specific commitments have
three elements: market access, investment, and pro-competitive
regulatory principles. A sample of the market access commitments
shows that sixty-one countries, representing 99% of WTO mem-
bers' total basic telecommunication services revenue, commit to the
competitive supply (i.e., two or more suppliers are permitted) of
international voice telephone services and other international ser-
vices either immediately on January 1, 1998 or, in the case of
twenty-four countries, on a phased-in timetable.212 Forty-one
schedules list commitments on local service; thirty-eight list
commitments on domestic long-distance service; and forty-two list
commitments on international service.21 3 Market access commit-
ments on other basic telecommunication services include forty-
nine schedules with commitments on data transmission service,
forty-six on cellular/mobile telephone service, forty-one on leased
circuit service, and thirty-six on fixed satellite service.214 Nine
countries listed MFN exemptions (Argentina, Antigua and Bar-
210 See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement of
Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, Basic Telecom Negotiations (Feb. 15, 1997)
[hereinafter USTR Basic Telecom Negotiations Press Release] (summarizing the
commitments for each of the fifty-five participants), available at WTO Negotiations
on Basic Telecommunications Press Release, supra note 209 (including text sum-
marizing the commitments for each of the fifty-five participants on a member-by-
member basis).
211 See USTR Basic Telecom Negotiations Press Release, supra note 210, at 1;
WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications Press Release, supra note 209.
212 See USTR Basic Telecom Negotiations Press Release, supra note 210, at 1.
213 WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications Press Release, supra
note 207. The following countries deferred full market access to international
telephone services: Spain, until December 1, 1998; Peru, until 1999; Argentina, Ire-
land, Portugal, Singapore, and Venezuela, until 2000; Bolivia and the Czech Re-
public, until 2001; Greece, Poland, Romania, and the Slovak Republic, until 2003;
Hungary, Mauritius, until 2004; Bulgaria, Indonesia, until 2005; Grenada, Senegal,
Thailand, and Turkey, until 2006; Brunei, until 2010; Antigua and Barbuda, until
2012; and Jamaica, until 2013. See USTR Basic Telecom Negotiations Press Re-
lease, supra note 210, at 9.
214 WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications Press Release, supra
note 209, para. 4.
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buda, Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and
the United States).215
On foreign direct investment, most schedules of conunitments
(fifty-six countries covering 97% of WTO members' total basic tele-
communication services revenue) permit delivery through some
form of a commercial presence. 216 Foreign service suppliers thus
have the right to acquire, establish, or own all or part of a foreign-
based telecommunications company. Focusing on the major trad-
ing partners of the United States (the EU, Japan, Canada, and Mex-
ico), the EU, for example, in its schedule of commitments, agreed
to full market access and national treatment with respect to the de-
livery of the following services through a commercial presence:
voice telephone, packet-switched data transmission, circuit-
switched data transmission, telex, telegraph, facsimile, leased cir-
cuit, and mobile and personal communication systems.217 With re-
spect to these same services, however, Japan limits foreign capital
participation in its two largest carriers, Nippon Telegraph and
Telephone and Kokusai Denshin Denwa, to a maximum of 20%.218
Canada likewise restricts the delivery through a commercial pres-
ence of basic telecommunication services by limiting foreign capi-
tal participation in most basic telecommunication service compa-
nies based in Canada to 20% direct ownership and 46.7% combined
215 Id.
216 See USTR Basic Telecom Negotiations Press Release, supra note 210, at 7.
217 Id. at 4; WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications Press Release,
supra note 209, para. 29 ("The EC offer commits to complete liberalization of basic
telecom services (facilities-based and resale) across the EC for all market segments
(local, long distance, and international). The offer also covers, for example, satel-
lite networks and services and all mobile and personal communications services
and systems."); WTO, European Communities and Their Member States, Schedule
of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/31/Suppl.3 (1997). Some EU member states
have deferred the implementation of the commercial presence commitment until
2000 (Ireland and Portugal) and 2003 (Greece). See USTR Basic Telecom Negotia-
tions Press Release, supra note 210, at 7.
218 WTO, Japan, Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/46/Suppl.2
(1997); WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications Press Release, supra note
209, para. 41.
In April 1996, agreed to remove long-standing foreign equity limits on
Type I carriers and radio-based services, leaving only two companies,
KDD and NT, with foreign equity limits (at 20%). Aside from these
company-specific restrictions, open market access is committed in all
market segments for basic telecommunications services (facilities-based
and resale).
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direct and indirect ownership. 219 Mexico also inscribed market ac-
cess limitations with regard to delivery through a commercial
presence for all telecommunications service suppliers. Direct for-
eign participation in such companies is capped at 49%.22o An ex-
ception exists, however, for cellular services, where Mexico allows
100% foreign ownership.22'
2.2.3.5. The Regulatory Framework for Basic Telecommunica-
tions Services
The basic telecommunications industry historically has been
dominated by monopoly service suppliers. Against this historical
backdrop, the WTO Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunica-
tions recognized that in order for the market access comnuitments
to be fully realized and for new market entrants to be able to com-
pete effectively in this monopolistic business climate, it was essen-
tial that the participants reach agreement on a set of principles
governing the regulatory framework for basic telecommunications
services.222 To that end, the Negotiating Group developed a so-
called Reference Paper on competition principles generally relating
to anti-competitive behavior, interconnection, universal service,
transparency in licensing, independence of regulators, and alloca-
tion of resources.223 More specifically, the Reference Paper ad-
dresses the following issues:
(1) Safeguards against certain anti-competitive practices by
monopolies are to be put in place, such as cross-subsidization or
219 WTO, Canada, Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/16/Suppl.3
(1997); WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications Press Release, supra note
209, para. 20 ("Limits foreign equity in all facilities-based suppliers to 20% direct
and 46.7% combined direct and indirect foreign ownership.").
220 WTO, Mxico, Lista de compromisos especificos [Schedule of Specific Com-
mitments], GATS/SC/56/Suppl.2 (1997); WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecom-
munications Press Release, supra note 209, para. 45 ("raising the foreign equity
limitation to 49% for all telecommunications service suppliers").
221 See WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications Press Release, supra
note 209, para. 45 ("For cellular telephony, allows more than 49% foreign invest-
ment subject to prior authorization."); Wold, supra note 194, at 6 ("Although Mex-
ico generally limited foreign investment in telecommunications services providers
to 49%, Mexico's commitment to the WTO permits 100% ownership of firms pro-
viding cellular services.").
222 See Sherman, supra note 202, at 357 (explaining the results of the Negotiat-
ing Group on Basic Telecommunications).
223 See id.; Reference Paper, 36 I.L.M. 367 (1997). The source for the Reference
Paper is the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-61 (2000). See
USTR Basic Telecom Negotiations Press Release, supra note 210, at 5.
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using information obtained from competitors with anti-
competitive results.22 4
(2) Interconnection is to be cost-based and timely, on non-
discriminatory terms, rates, and quality.225
(3) Universal service requirements (i.e., requirements that
mandate basic telecommunication service for every citizen at af-
fordable prices) are to be transparent and non-discriminatory. 226
(4) Licensing criteria must be transparent and publicly avail-
able. The reasons for the denial of a license are to be made avail-
able to the applicant upon request.
7
(5) Regulators must be independent from suppliers of basic
telecommunication services.228
(6) Rules for the allocation of scarce resources, such as radio
spectrum frequencies, are to be transparent and non-
discriminatory.2 29
Sixty-five of the sixty-nine participating governments, covering
93% of WTO members' total basic telecommunication services
revenue, inscribed commitments on regulatory principles in their
national schedules.230 Of these, fifty-seven committed to the Refer-
ence Paper by inscribing it in whole or in part in their schedule of
commitments, including the Quad members and Mexico.231 Bang-
ladesh, Brazil, Mauritius, Morocco, Turkey, and Venezuela de-
ferred the date of entry into force of the regulatory principles. Bo-
livia, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and the Philippines adopted them
in part.2 32
Of all the service sectors for which GATS commitments have
been made, the scope of the commitments made on basic telecom-
munications services is the most ambitious to date. It opens the
world's three largest telecommunication markets -the EU, Japan,
and the United States-to international competition. As of mid-
224 Reference Paper, supra note 223, para. 1.2, at 367.
225 Id. para. 2.2, at 368.
226 Id. para. 3, at 368.
227 Id. para. 4, at 369.
2n Id. para. 5, at 369.
229 Id. para. 6.
230 See USTR Basic Telecom Negotiations Press Release, supra note 210, at 5,
8.
231 Id. at 8; WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications Press Release,
supra note 209, para. 6 ("Fifty-seven committed to the Reference Paper in whole or
with few modifications.").
232 Id.
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2002, eighty-nine countries had made commitments on at least one
telecommunication subsector.233 Additional market openings are
being sought in the follow-on GATS negotiations that were initi-
ated in 2000.234
2.2.4. The TRIMs Agreement
Working to bolster the FDI commitment made under the GATS
and the 1997 Agreements on Financial Services or Basic Telecom-
munications is the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Meas-
ures (the "TRIMs Agreement") concluded during the Uruguay
Round.235 The TRIMs Agreement represents a very modest at-
tempt to reinforce GATT rules respecting national treatment and
the prohibition on import quotas, but falls short of being a com-
prehensive set of rules regulating international investment.236 The
TRIMs Agreement builds on GATT Article III, which requires
members to provide national treatment to imported products, and
GATT Article XI, which prohibits members from imposing quanti-
tative restrictions on the importation or exportation of goods. Al-
though GATT Article 111:4, 5, and 7 do apply to certain aspects of
investment laws, the GATT panel dispute involving the Canadian
Foreign Investment Review Act spotlighted the need for Article III
233 See Nunes, supra note 167, at 8-9.
2M See, e.g., id. at 9 ("In general, the negotiating proposals seek to encourage
full commitments on telecommunications services, eliminate restrictions on mar-
ket access and national treatment."); WTO Council for Trade in Services, Special
Session, Communication from Canada, Initial Negotiating Proposal on Telecommunica-
tion Services, Initial Negotiating Proposal on Telecommunications Services, para. 6,
S/CSS/W/53 (Mar. 14, 2001) (urging "those Members that have not made com-
mitments in the area of basic telecommunications and value-added telecommuni-
cations, or that have made limited commitments or commitments with long
phase-in periods, to make commitments and to accelerate liberalization"); WTO
Council for Trade in Services, Special Session, Communication from the European
Communities and Their Member States, GATS 2000: Telecommunications, para. 12,
S/CSS/W/35 (Dec. 22, 2000) (proposing that all WTO members "[clommit for
Modes 1, 2 and 3 all sub-sectors and all modes without restrictions (i.e., schedules
should read none for market access and national treatment), and include as addi-
tional commitments the whole reference paper on BT [Basic Telecommunica-
tions]").
235 See Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, reprinted in
URUGUAY RouND TRADE AGREEMENTS, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACrION 1,
H.R. Doc. 316,103d Cong., 1448 (1994) [hereinafter TRIMs Agreement].
236 For background on the TRIMs Agreement, see Mashayekhi, supra note 19,
at 237-39 (noting the divergent positions of the United States and Japan, on the
one hand, which sought broad restrictions on the use of negative TRIMs, and the
EU, on the other hand, which had a less ambitious list of prohibited TRIMs).
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repair through the adoption of specific and unambiguous rules on
certain trade-distorting investment measures, in particular local
content requirements. 237
What is a trade-related investment measure or "TRIM?" A
TRIM is any measure imposed by a government (usually, but not
exclusively, a developing country) on a foreign investor (often, but
not always, a multinational enterprise) as a condition for investing
in the host country. TRIMs can be positive or negative. Examples
of positive TRIMs (investment incentives) include financial incen-
tives, such as tax holidays or subsidies, to invest within the host
country generally or within certain economically depressed re-
gions of the host country specifically. 238 Examples of negative
TRIMs (performance requirements) include local equity require-
ments, licensing requirements, profit remittance restrictions, for-
eign exchange restrictions, transfer-of-technology requirements,
domestic sales requirements, trade-balancing requirements, local-
content requirements, export requirements, and import-
substitution requirements. 239
The TRIMs Agreement deals exclusively with negative TRIMs
and addresses only a handful of the most egregious trade-related
investment measures. The Agreement has three main features.
First, it identifies certain types of investment measures that are in-
consistent with GATT. Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement stipu-
lates that "no Member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent
with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994."240
Article 2.2 refers to the illustrative list of TRIMs that are inconsis-
tent with Articles III:4 and XI:1 of GATT 1994.241 The TRIMs An-
nex provides that measures must be mandatory, that is, enforce-
able under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or
237 See GATT Dispute Panel Report on Canada, Canada-Administration of the
Foreign Investment Review Act, Feb. 7, 1984, GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 140
(1980) (holding that undertakings between investors and the Canadian govern-
ment regarding domestic content were incompatible with GATT Article III).
238 See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996, supra note 10, at 180 (listing "[m]ain
types of incentive measures offered to foreign investors").
239 Id. at 179. For an inventory of performance requirements, see WTO
Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Joint Study by the WTO and
UNCTAD Secretariats, Trade-Related Investment Measures and Other Performance Re-
quirements, G/C/W/307 (Oct. 1, 2001). The World Bank also takes a dim view of
performance requirements. See World Bank, Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign
Direct Investment, 31 I.L.M. 1379 (1992).
240 TRIMs Agreement, supra note 235, art. 2.1, at 1448.
241 See id. art. 2.2, at 1448.
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compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage.242
Next, these mandatory measures are prohibited if they require the
purchase or use of domestic products (i.e., local content require-
ments); limit the purchase or use of imported products to an
amount related to the volume or value of local products that are
exported (i.e., trade-balancing requirements); or tie access to for-
eign exchange to an investor's foreign exchange earnings (i.e., for-
eign exchange balancing restrictions).243 The prohibited measures
listed in the Illustrative Annex to the TRIMs Agreement under-
score the close link between foreign investment and international
trade. The prohibitions of the TRIMs Agreement apply equally to
measures imposed on domestic firms, not just on foreign invest-
ments, and cover both new and existing investments.244
242 Id. Annex, at 1452.
243 Id. For a study of the impact on international investment and trade flows
of local content requirements, export performance requirements, and trade bal-
ancing requirements, see WTO Council for Trade in Goods, Joint Study by the
WTO and UNCTAD Secretariats, Trade-Related Investment Measures and Other Per-
formance Requirements 21-26, G/C/W/307/Add.1 (Feb. 8,2002).
244 See MCGOVERN, supra note 64, at 8.24-1 (noting that the TRIMs Agreement
"is not limited to measures in regard to foreign investment. Measures that are
aimed at encouraging local manufacturing capability are investment measures")
(footnote omitted). See also WTO Dispute Panel on Indonesia, Certain Measures
Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R (July 2, 1998). In 1993, Indonesia
established a car program (modified and expanded in 1996) that was designed to
foster and promote a local automobile industry. The car program provided for
local content requirements linked to certain tax benefits for completed cars incor-
porating a certain percentage value of domestic products, and to customs duty
benefits for imported parts and components used in cars incorporating a certain
percentage value of domestic products. The United States, Japan, and the EU
complained that the car program violated Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement and
GATT Article 111:4. (Despite the transition period that developing countries have
under the TRIMs Agreement, the complaint was nevertheless filed against Indo-
nesia because the measures at issue were introduced after the effective date of the
TRIMs Agreement.). The WTO panel agreed, finding that tax and tariff benefits
made contingent upon meeting local content requirements under the car program
constitute "advantages" within the meaning of the Illustrative List to Article 2 of
the TRIMs Agreement, and thus violate Article 2.1 of the Agreement. See id. para.
14.91. See also WTO Dispute Panel on India, Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of
Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector,
WT/DS90/R (Dec. 21, 2001) (holding that an obligation to use a certain portion of
local parts and components in the manufacture of cars violates Article III:4), appeal
withdrawn by India, WTO Appellate Body on India, Measures Affecting the Auto-
motive Sector, para. 14.91, WT/DS146/AB/R (Mar. 19, 2002).
A similar TRIMs dispute between the United States and the Philippines was
eventually resolved through a mutually agreed solution. See Daniel Pruzin, U.S.
to Refrain from Pursuing TRIMs Panel on Philippine Cars Mhile Nations Seek Deal, 17
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 46, at 1777 (Nov. 23, 2000). At issue was the Philip-
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Second, the Agreement requires that all inconsistent TRIMs be
notified and eliminated in two years in the case of developed coun-
tries, five years in the case of developing countries, and seven
years in the case of least-developed countries. 245 A time extension
is possible under Article 5.3 if a developing country or least-
developed country member "demonstrates particular difficulties in
implementing the provisions of this Agreement." 246 In order not to
disadvantage established enterprises that are subject to a TRIM
relative to new investments that are exempt from it, under Article
5.5, members may apply the same TRIM to new investments dur-
ing the transition period, where the existing and new investment
produce like products.247
Third, in a small victory for developing-country members, the
Council for Trade in Goods was to review the operation of the
TRIMs Agreement by the end of 1999. As part of the Council's re-
view, the Council was to "consider whether the Agreement should
be complemented with provisions on investment policy and com-
petition policy." 248 The TRIMs Agreement's built-in agenda thus
dovetails into the work of the two Working Groups established in
the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference meeting to examine the
issues of trade and foreign investment and trade and competition
policy. 249
The TRIMs Agreement does not address key FDI issues, such
as the right of establishment, repatriation of profits, or technology
transfer. The TRIMs Agreement does, however, mark the first suc-
pine government's Motor Vehicle Development Program that allowed manufac-
turers based in the Philippines to import parts and finished vehicles at preferen-
tial duty rates, provided the manufacturers met local content requirements and
earned foreign exchange needed to buy imported parts by exporting completed
vehicles.
245 See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 235, art. 5, at 1449.
246 In 2000, eight developing countries (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Malay-
sia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Romania) sought an extension of the
five-year period within which to eliminate all prohibited TRIMs. In 2001, they
were granted a waiver of the obligation to comply with the TRIMs Agreement's
transition period until December 31, 2001, with a possible second extension until
December 31, 2003. See, e.g., WTO, Extension of the Transition Period for the Elimina-
tion of Trade-Related Investment Measures Notified under Article 5.1 of the Agreement
on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Argentina, G/L/460 (Aug. 7, 2001). See also
Ravi Kanth, WVTO Approves Extending Deadline for TRIMS Compliance for Eight
Members, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1255 (Aug. 9, 2001).
247 See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 235, art. 5.5, at 1449.
248 Id. art. 9, at 1451.
249 See infra notes 257-74 and accompanying text.
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cessful attempt made within the GATT-WTO system to facilitate
foreign investment by eliminating non-tariff barriers to trade in
goods associated with foreign investment. The Agreement is de-
signed to ensure that governments do not apply measures to for-
eign investment that create restrictions on trade in goods. It gives
investors the assurance that they may freely buy, sell, import, and
export goods that are produced in countries outside the country in
which their investment is located. At the same time, however, the
TRIMs Agreement may have been a solution in search of a prob-
lem. It is reported, for example, that only 6% of all overseas affili-
ates of U.S. companies are affected by TRIMs.250 It is also reported
that most TRIMs have little effect on managers' behavior because
they would have made most of the same decisions with or without
local investment measures to influence or guide their decision-
making.251
Moreover, the practices that the TRIMs Agreement does ad-
dress could have been dealt with under existing GATT rules. The
negative TRIMs listed in the Illustrative Annex all violate GATT
Articles III and XI with or without a TRIMs Agreement stating that
they do.252 The TRIMs Agreement is, in effect, a codification of
GATT jurisprudence-a restatement of existing GATT rules.25 3
The absence of a strong dispute settlement mechanism under
GATT 1947 probably explains why more TRIMs were not chal-
lenged under GATT 1947.2 4
Finally, two areas where a TRIMs Agreement is silent are re-
strictive business practices and positive TRIMs. As part of the
WTO's built-in agenda, Article 9 of the TRIMs Agreement calls for
a five-year review of the Agreement (i.e., in 1999) to consider
whether it should be complemented with provisions on investment
and competition policy.255 Two WTO Working Groups were estab-
lished in 1997 to examine the relationship between trade and in-
25o See EVANS & WALSH, supra note 66, at 32.
251 Id.
252 See McGOVERN, supra note 64, at 8.24-1 (" [I]t is difficult to think of circum-
stances in which liability could arise under [GATT Articles III or XI1 but not under
[the TRIMs Agreement].").
253 See Mashayekhi, supra note 19, at 239 ("It prohibits those measures which
are prohibited by GATT Article[s] III.").
254 The U.S. complaint against Canada's Foreign Investment Review Act is a
notable exception. See GATr Dispute Panel on Canada, Canada - Administration of
the Foreign Investment Review Act, supra note 237.
255 See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 235, art. 9, at 1449.
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vestment and between trade and competition policy over a two-
year period.256 A brief review of the work of the Working Group
on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment follows.
3. THE WTO WORK PROGRAM ON THE TRADE-INVESTMENT
RELATIONSHIP
As the foregoing discussion has attempted to demonstrate, ex-
isting WTO rules and agreements do address investment issues
more than just incidentally. In an attempt to build on the founda-
tion that had been laid both in the Uruguay Round and in post-
Uruguay Round negotiations, the Ministerial Declaration issued at
the conclusion of the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference called
for the establishment of two Working Groups, one on trade and
investment and the other on trade and competition policy. The
Declaration provides:
Having regard to the existing WTO provisions on matters
related to investment and competition policy and the built-
in agenda in these areas, including the TRIMs Agreement,
and on the understanding that the work undertaken shall
not prejudge whether negotiations will be initiated in the
future, we also agree to:
- establish a working group to examine the relationship be-
tween trade and investment; and
- establish a working group to study issues raised by Mem-
bers relating to the interaction between trade and competi-
tion policy, including anti-competitive practices, in order to
identify any areas that may merit further consideration in
the WTO framework.257
The Singapore Ministerial Declaration expresses some ambiva-
lence about the direction of the Working Group on the Relation-
ship Between Trade and Investment ("WGTI"), stating that the
Working Group's mandate does not prejudge whether or not fu-
ture negotiations on a WTO investment agreement will be
26 See infra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
257 Singapore Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 13 December 1996, para.
20, WT/MIN(96)/DEC (Dec. 18, 1996).
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launched, and that any future negotiations will take place only af-
ter an explicit consensus decision by WTO members regarding
such negotiations.2
The substantive work performed by the WGTI has included (1)
studying the relationship between trade and investment for devel-
opment and economic growth; (2) studying the economic relation-
ship between trade and investment; and (3) conducting a stocktak-
ing and examining the implications of existing international
instruments and activities regarding trade and investment.25 9
Many of the contributions to the WGTI note that the linkages
between trade and foreign investment are several and assert that
the effects of investment for host country and investor country
alike are beneficial. In this respect, the views of the OECD, the
WTO, and UNCTAD on the benefits of FDI in facilitating economic
growth, technological innovation, and competitiveness have con-
verged. For example, the OECD noted the beneficial effects of FDI
in the following 1998 communication to the WGTI:
Direct investment by MNEs [multinational enterprises] has
the potential rapidly to restructure industries at a regional
or global level and to transform host economies into prodi-
gious exporters of manufactured goods or services to the
world market. In so doing, FDI can serve to integrate na-
258 Id. The Singapore Ministerial Declaration also directs the Working Group
to cooperate with UNCTAD to ensure that the development dimension of the
Working Group's terms of reference is taken into account. Id. For a summary of
UNCTAD's work on a possible multilateral framework on investment, see WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 10, at 73.
259 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Report (1997) to the General Council, WT/WGTI/1/Rev.1 (Dec. 9, 1997)
(reporting topics discussed during various 1997 meetings); WTO Working Group
on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Report (1998) of the Working
Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment to the General Council,
WT/WGTI/2 (Dec. 8, 1998) (discussing substantive work done by the group in
1998); WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment,
Report (1999) of the Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment
to the General Council, WT/WGTI/3 (Oct. 22, 1999) (discussing substantive work
done by the group in 1999); WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between
Trade and Investment, Report (2000) of the Working Group on the Relationship Be-
tween Trade and Investment to the General Council, WT/WGTI/4 (Nov. 27, 2000)
(discussing substantive work done by the group in 2000); WTO Working Group
on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Report (2001) of the Working
Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment to the General Council,
WT/WGTI/5 (Oct. 22, 2001) (discussing substantive work done by the group in
2001).
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tional markets into the world economy far more effectively
than could have been achieved by traditional trade flows
alone. As with private sector investment more generally,
the benefits from FDI are enhanced in an environment
characterized by an open trade and investment regime, an
active competition policy, macroeconomic stability and pri-
vatization and deregulation. In this environment, FDI can
play a key role in improving the capacity of the host coun-
try to respond to the opportunities offered by global eco-
nomic integration, a goal increasingly recognized as one of
the key aims of any development strategy.26°
The WTO Secretariat echoed the OECD's conclusions and of-
fered some of its own insights on the importance of FDI:
Despite the difficulties associated with the measurement of
the efficiency-enhancing effects induced by FDI, let alone
with the assessment of the specific channels by which a
transfer of technology affects local productivity, the empiri-
cal literature offers some important conclusions. First, there
appears to be a wide consensus that FDI is an important,
perhaps even the most important, channel through which
advanced technology is transferred to developing coun-
tries. Second, there also seems to be a consensus that FDI
leads to higher productivity in locally-owned firms, par-
ticularly in the manufacturing sector. Third, there is evi-
dence that the amount of technology transferred through
FDI is influenced by various host industry and host country
characteristics. More competitive conditions, higher levels
of local investment in fixed capital and education, and less
26 WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Communication from the OECD, Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Devel-
opment 4-5 WT/WGTI/W/26 (Mar. 23, 1998). See also OECD, Open Markets Mat-
ter: The Benefits of Trade and Investment Liberalisation (Policy Brief, Oct. 1999)
(discussing the benefits of trade and investment liberalization). For similar views
on the positive relationship between trade and investment, see WTO Working
Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from
Japan, WT/WGTI/W/11 (Nov. 3, 1997).
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restrictive conditions imposed on affiliates appear to in-
crease the extent of technology transfers.261
Foreign direct investment thus plays an important role as an
engine of world growth and increased globalization. According to
UNCTAD, "global integration seems to have proceeded faster
through FDI than through trade." 262
Benefits accrue to both the host country and home country
from foreign direct investment. For investor countries the benefits
of FDI include facilitation of international trade, product speciali-
zation, and the stimulation of innovation.263 The effects of out-
bound FDI on home country trade can be positively related. In the
case of the United States, for example, U.S. exports tend to be posi-
tively associated with U.S. direct investment abroad. The explana-
261 Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 11, at 19 (footnotes omit-
ted). UNCTAD added in its 1997 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT that a liberal FDI
regime must be complemented and supported by rules on competition:
[FDI] continues to be a driving force of the globalization process that
characterizes the modem world economy. The current boom in FDI
flows, which has been accompanied by increasing flows of foreign port-
folio equity investments, underscores the increasingly important role
played by transnational corporations (TNCs) in both developed and de-
veloping countries. This role has been facilitated by the liberalization of
FDI policies that has taken place in many countries in recent years, as
part of an overall movement toward more open and market-friendly
policies. However, reaping the benefits of FDI liberalization requires not
only that barriers to FDI are reduced and standards of treatment estab-
lished - the focus of most FDI liberalization to date -but also that com-
petition in markets is maintained.
UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1997: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS,
MARKET STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION POLICY XV (1997) [hereinafter WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 1997]. See also WTO Working Group on the Relationship Be-
tween Trade and Investment, Note by the Secretariat, The Effects of Foreign Direct In-
vestment on Development: Technology and Other Know-How Transfers and Spillovers,
WT/WGTI/W/65 (Nov. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Note by the Secretariat] (noting the
beneficial effects of technology transfers); WTO Working Group on the Relation-
ship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from Korea, Foreign Direct In-
vestment and Transfers of Technology, WT/WGTI/W/11 (May 30, 2000) (noting the
beneficial effects of technology transfers); WTO Working Group on the Relation-
ship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from Japan, Investment Rules
for Developing Policies, WT/WGTI/W/104 LJune 12, 2001) (noting the beneficial
effects of technology transfers).
262 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 10, at 7.
263 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Relationship Between Investment and Competition Policy, Communication
from the United States, at 3, WT/WGTI/W/55 (Sept. 25, 1998).
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tion for this relationship is that during the 1990s nearly 30% of U.S.
exports were exports of U.S. parent firms to their foreign affili-
ates.264 Thus, if affiliate activity increases, and the ratio of affiliate
sales to parents' exports to affiliates remains constant, U.S. exports
will increase as well.
Several empirical studies have been conducted to determine
whether the trade relationship between an MNE and its foreign af-
filiates is complementary, that is, are U.S. exports from the parent
firm used as intermediate goods in the affiliate's production, or
whether the trade relationship is one of substitution, that is, do af-
filiate sales in third-country markets displace U.S. exports that
would have otherwise gone to those markets? One would expect
exports of the parent firm to third-country markets to be reduced if
those markets are now served by the foreign affiliate. In the ag-
gregate, whether FDI leads to rises or declines in U.S. exports de-
pends on whether the complementarity effects outweigh the sub-
stitution effect. Studies generally have found complementarity
between trade and FDI 265 All studies that have examined the im-
pact of outbound FDI on the export trade of the home country
agree that at most the net effect is not very pronounced. 266 First,
local production in the host country displaces exports of finished
goods from the home country, but at the same time creates de-
mand for intermediate products used by the foreign affiliate. Sec-
ond, local production of one product line may generate demand
for the other product lines of the parent company. Third, local af-
filiates often engage in the marketing of the parent's entire product
line, thereby improving the competitive position of the foreign in-
vestor vis-A-vis local firms and exporters from other countries. 267
The economic benefits of FDI for host countries include the ef-
ficient use of host-country resources, technology transfer to the
host country (including organizational and managerial skills), posi-
tive employment effects (job creation) in the host country, and im-
264 Examination of U.S. Inbound and Outbound Direct Investment 2-6, 5-5,
USITC Pub. 3383 Oan. 2001) (discussing effect of U.S. direct investment abroad on
U.S. imports).
265 See id. at 2-7 (examining the effects of inbound and outbound U.S. direct
investment); Note by the Secretariat, supra note 261, at 17 (using statistical testing
of spillovers to understand the impact of FDI).
266 Note by the Secretariat, supra note 261, at 17.
267 See id. (noting changes in the market shares of foreign and local firms).
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proved productivity of local firms. 268 Studies that have examined
the effects of inbound FDI and the export trade of the host country
show that inbound FDI contributes positively to the export per-
formance of developing countries. It does so directly through the
export activities of MNEs and indirectly by reducing the costs of
domestic firms to begin or expand exporting.269
Two types of investment policies that can affect trade are in-
vestment incentives and performance requirements. Investment
incentives typically do not play a fundamental role in the invest-
ment decision, unlike factors such as infrastructure, market size,
production costs, and the skill-level of the local workforce. Never-
theless, all other things being equal, investment incentives do ap-
pear to influence foreign investors in their investment decision.270
Countries that maintain high trade barriers and those that
maintain low trade barriers both attract FDI, but of different types.
FDI to countries with a protected market tend to be stand-alone
production units that serve the domestic market. Countries with an
open trade policy attract vertical FDI. The WTO Secretariat con-
cludes that on average, countries with an open trade regime attract
more FDI than protectionist countries. 271 Countries with a more
outward-oriented approach to trade experience a significant posi-
tive effect on GDP growth from FDI inflows, whereas inward-
oriented countries experience no GDP growth from FDI inflows.272
268 See Open Markets Matter, supra note 260, at 29 (stating that "well func-
tioning systems of innovation and technology diffusion are proving essential to
... job creation," among other things).
269 See id. (discussing the export activities of small and medium sized enter-
prises).
270 See id. at 25 (discussing the importance of trade and investment, and its
impact on the world economy).
271 See Note by the Secretariat, supra note 261, at 4 (detailing the preference
for FDI in technologically developed industries).
272 Id. The parallel working group established at the Singapore Ministerial
Conference, the Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competi-
tion Policy, also has reported that open policies toward FDI and properly func-
tioning competition polices are mutually supportive. Liberal investment rules
make markets contestable, thereby challenging domestic oligopolies and reducing
the likelihood of cartels and monopolies. At the same time, effective competition
polices can ensure against possible abuses of market power by foreign investors.
Thus, for example, with open investment rules in place, an exporter unable to
penetrate a foreign market because incumbent wholesalers and retailers, owned
or controlled by local producers of competing goods, will not handle the ex-
porter's goods could establish a new distribution channel or purchase an existing
one, thereby eliminating the local distribution bottleneck. A liberal investment
policy, in short, can simultaneously promote competition and trade in the host-
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In sum, a few general principles emerge from the work of the
WGTI on the trade-investment relationship. First, a policy of open
investment appears to undergird a liberal trade policy by encour-
aging the movement of capital to markets where competition is
then either introduced or increased, and resources can then be
used more efficiently and transformed into goods and services for
local and worldwide distribution. Second, an open investment
climate -while not the sole determinant of whether an investment
will be made, but clearly an essential one-greatly increases the
chances for new market entrants, and with them, increased compe-
tition.273
country market, and perhaps in the global market as well. See WTO Working
Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, Report (1999) of
the Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy to the Gen-
eral Council 24, WT/WGTCP/3 (Oct. 11, 1999); WTO Working Group on the Inter-
action Between Trade and Competition Policy, Communication from the United
States, Relationship Between Investment and Competition Policy, at 4,
WT/WGTCP/W/102 (Sept. 25, 1998) (addressing the relationship between in-
vestment and competition policy).
273 The factors that determine whether a firm (predominantly a multinational
enterprise or "MNE") will make a foreign direct investment can be summarized
using what is known as the "OLI" theory, i.e., that factors of (O)wnership,
(L)ocation, and (I)ntemalization. See John H. Dunning, Trade, Location of Economic
Activity and the MNE: A Search for an Eclectic Approach, in THE INTERNATIONAL
ALLOCATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: PROCEEDINGS OF A NOBEL SYMPOSIUM HELD AT
STOCKHOLM 395-418 (B. Ohlin et al. eds., 1977) (discussing the impact of FDI un-
dertaken by MNEs); UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2000: CROSS-BORDER
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS AND DEVELOPMENT 141-42 (2000) [hereinafter WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 20001. Regarding the first factor, ownership, the firm may
own intangible assets (e.g., intellectual property, management know-how, mar-
keting networks) that can be profitably exploited on a comparatively large scale.
Under the second factor, location, firms that produce goods can minimize produc-
tion costs by dividing production among countries rather than producing in and
exporting from the home country exclusively. The third factor, internalization,
focuses on whether the profits to be earned by exploiting the assets within the
company are greater than licensing the use of those assets to a foreign firm. In the
view of MNEs, technological advantages are what gives them an edge over do-
mestic competitors, followed by marketing and managerial assets. See GILLES Y.
BERTIN & SALLY WYATT, MULTINATIONALS AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY: THE CONTROL
OF THE WORLD'S TECHNOLOGY 25-29 (1988) (discussing the impact of technology on
the world economy). Thus, if an MNE licensed its intellectual property, it would
be revealing details of an important asset to the licensee. By entering into a licens-
ing agreement an MNE would lose the control that outright equity ownership of a
foreign affiliate would provide. Such an agreement would also give the licensee
valuable information that could make it a future competitor of the MNE in coun-
tries where enforcement of intellectual property rights is weak. The licensee also
might not possess the skills necessary to work the technology that is transferred
under the licensing agreement. For these reasons, an MNE might conclude that
there is greater profit potential in making an FDI rather than licensing to a foreign
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Thus, an open and hospitable climate for foreign investment
can increase the general welfare of both the host and home coun-
try, can promote economic efficiency, can stimulate competition
among firms nationally and transnationally, and can ultimately
benefit consumers both in the host country and abroad in the form
of lower prices for goods and services. Third, an open investment
climate not only increases competition in markets for goods and
services that are tradable across borders, but it also makes markets
more competitive for services that are local and immovable.
Fourth, a liberal investment climate can also mitigate or eliminate
local distribution bottlenecks that might prevent competition, es-
pecially in situations where local manufacturers own local distribu-
tion networks.274
Despite the force of the economic arguments for FDI as an en-
gine of growth and development, is a WTO agreement on invest-
ment a solution in search of a problem? Is internalization-relying
on national laws and bilateral and regional agreements to promote
FDI inflows - preferable to globalization that looks to a multilateral
agreement as the legal vehicle for facilitating FDI? As explained in
the next Section, an internalization response to FDI is superior to a
globalization approach.
4. A WTO AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT: A SOLUTION IN SEARCH
OF A PROBLEM?
A WTO agreement on investment is a solution in search of a
problem for the following reasons. First, FDI flows are steadily in-
creasing, even in the absence of a multilateral investment agree-
firm. See Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 11, at 9-10. In addition,
the market for the MNE's other products might be favorable in the host country
and a potential licensee or local distributor might not have the skills to effectively
market them. The benefits of keeping the assets in-house, however, must exceed
the costs of managing a larger, geographically dispersed organization located in
different legal and cultural settings. For more on the internalization factor, see
OLIvER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY IN THE EcONOMIcS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION (1975); WTO
Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Note by the
Secretariat, The Relationship Between Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, at 3,
WT/WGTI/W/7 (Sept. 18, 1997).
For a survey of the reasons why firms engage in foreign direct investment,
and the perceived benefits and costs of FDI, see Trade and Foreign Direct Invest-
ment, supra note 11, at 8, 15-17.
274 See WTO Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competi-
tion Policy, Report to the General Council; at 40, WT/WGTCP/2 (Dec. 8, 1998).
2003]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
ment.275 Second, the threat to national sovereignty that a WTO
agreement on investment represents to developing countries is a
genuine concern.276 Third, the development concerns of develop-
ing countries and their capacity (or incapacity) to absorb yet an-
other WTO agreement cannot be ignored.277 Fourth, it is safe to
predict that many exceptions and reservations will be made to any
WTO agreement on investment, effectively hollowing it out.278
Fifth, an incremental, sectoral approach, i.e., a GATS approach, is a
tested and proven approach at the WTO for successfully negotiat-
ing market liberalization for foreign investment.279 Sixth, the most
pressing issue facing the WTO membership in the context of FDI is
not a lack of market access for foreign capital.280 The immediate
problems are TRIMs, both positive and negative, that potentially
distort investment patterns. Seventh and finally, it is far from clear
that the current network of bilateral and regional investment
agreements provides an unstable and unpredictable legal envi-
ronment for FDI.281
Each of these seven points is discussed below.
4.1. FDI Flows Are Increasing Annually, Not Decreasing
First of all, it is far from clear that there is a need for an interna-
tional investment agreement if one takes into consideration the
views of the international investment community. Private inves-
tors as a group have not complained about a lack of access to for-
eign markets for their capital because of restrictive foreign invest-
ment laws. Because the demand for foreign capital outstrips the
supply, it is a seller's market for investment capital, thus creating
incentives for countries to liberalize their markets autonomously
for foreign investment without being prodded to do so by a multi-
lateral agreement.282 This is especially true for developing coun-
275 See infra notes 282-97 and accompanying text.
276 See infra notes 298-309 and accompanying text.
277 See infra notes 310-31 and accompanying text.
278 See infra notes 332-39 and accompanying text.
279 See infra note 340 and accompanying text.
w8 See infra notes 341-70 and accompanying text.
281 See infra notes 371-86 and accompanying text,
282 WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Communication from India, at 2, WT/WGTI/W/74 (Apr. 13,1999).
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tries: with decreased flows of foreign aid, there is a heightened ur-
gency to attract FDI as a substitute.283
Even if investors are prevented from moving capital to a sector
of a foreign country that is closed to them because of national laws
prohibiting foreign investment, is the right answer to throw a mul-
tilateral agreement on investment at the problem? Has the absence
of such an agreement stifled foreign capital flows to host countries?
The statistics indicate that, on the contrary, the flow of foreign
capital to overseas destinations has been rapid and has only
slowed in the face of a global recession. As the following table
shows, FDI has steadily increased year over year to developed-
country host countries. Importantly from a development perspec-
tive, developing countries generally have received a steadily in-
creasing amount of FDI annually as well, although as a percentage
of worldwide FDI inflows, developing countries' share has de-
creased in recent years.284
283 See Mashayekhi, supra note 19, at 236 ("[Wlith the reduction of official aid,
countries' need for private investment has increased.").
284 The dramatic percentage decline in 1998 is attributable to the Asian finan-
cial crisis. See UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1999: FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT xx (1999). As a percentage of
gross domestic product, FDI inflows represented 7.6% of GDP in developed coun-
tries in 1996. The comparable figure for developing countries was 15.6%, double
that of developed countries. See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 10, at
399-400 annex tbl. B.6.
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Table 1: FDI Inflows Based on UNCTAD & World Investment Report
1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 (in billions)
FDI Inflows to FDI Inflows to Developing Coun-
Developed Developing tries' Percentage
Countries Countries Share of Total FDI
Inflows
1992 $120.3 $51.1 30
1993 $138.9 $72.5 34
1994 $141.5 $95.6 40
1995 $211.5 $105.5 33
1996 $195.4 $129.8 40
1997 $233.1 $148.9 39
1998 $460 $166 27
1999 $636 $208 21
2000 $1,053 $247 19
2001285 $510 $225 31
(est.)
UNCTAD reports that in the case of the forty-nine least-
developed countries ("LDCs"), as a group FDI increased from an
annual average of $0.6 billion during 1986-1990 to an annual aver-
age of $3.6 billion during the latter half of the 1990s.286 In 1999, FDI
flows to LDCs reached more than $5 billion.287 For the period 1986-
1999 as a whole, the average annual growth rate of FDI to LDCs
has been 20%.288 This growth rate was broad-based: twenty-seven
285 See Daniel Pruzin, U.N. Agency Cites Sharp Drop in Global Foreign Invest-
ment for 2001, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1512 (Sept. 27, 2001) (projecting figures
with respect to the fall in FDI).
286 See UNCTAD, FDI IN LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AT A GLANCE 1 (2001)
[hereinafter FDI IN LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES] ("FDI flows to the 49 LDCs as a
group increased from an annual average of $0.6 billion during 1986-1990 to an an-
nual average of $3.6 billion during the latter half of the 1990s.").
287 See id. ("In 1999, FDI flows increased further, to reach more than $5 bil-
lion).
288 See id. ("[Tihis represents an average annual growth rate of 20 per cent,
compared to 22 per cent for developing countries as a group."). Investment flows
to LDCs are still directed mainly to a few countries. In the period 1986-1990, five
countries accounted for 77% of FDI inflows. However, in the period 1996-1999,
that percentage had declined to 50%. Id. at 7.
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LDCs experienced an average annual growth rate of more than
20% and another eight LDCs of between 10% and 20%.289
Of course, despite these impressive statistics, there is no control
group to test the counterfactual of what the global economy would
look like with a multilateral agreement on investment in place.
Had a multilateral agreement on investment been in place, query
whether certain foreign investments that were not made would
have been made. UNCTAD concedes that it is difficult to predict
how much difference a multilateral framework agreement on in-
vestment would make in terms of the quantity, quality, and pat-
terns of actual FDI flows.290 What cannot be disputed as a matter
of statistical fact is that in the absence of a multilateral agreement
on investment, the growth of FDI has been impressive. The stock
of FDI increased fourfold between 1992 and 1997, being valued in
1997 at $3.5 trillion.291 In 1997, FDI flows increased 19% over 1996
figures, to a record-breaking level of $400 billion.292 In 1999, FDI
grew by 25% to $827 billion, up from $660 billion in 1998,293 with
developing countries receiving $200 billion of the total.294 By com-
parison, the total inflow of foreign direct investment worldwide in
1995 was $315 billion, with $203 billion of that figure going to de-
veloped countries.295 The inflow of FDI into developing countries
increased eleven-fold from $13 billion in 1981 to nearly $149 billion
in 1997.296
289 See id. at 1-2 (charting LDC growth rates). More than 90% of FD is
through greenfield investment rather than through cross-border M&A activity.
Id. at 7.
290 See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 10, at 130.
291 See id. at xvii (discussing FDI trends).
292 See id. (discussing FDI trends).
293 See Financial Indicators: Cross-Border Investments, EcONOMIST, Feb. 12, 2000,
at 105 (providing FDI figures) [hereinafter Financial Indicators].
294 See Daniel Pruzin, UN Agency Says FDI Jumped by 25 Percent in '99 to $827
Billion, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 234 (Feb. 10, 2000) (discussing FDI growth); Fi-
nancial Indicators, supra note 293, at 105; Business This Week, EcONOMIST, Feb. 5,
2000, at 5 (discussing cross-border mergers and acquisitions).
295 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996, supra note 10, at 227. FDI in developed
countries increased from $37 billion in 1981 to $109 billion in 1993. Patrick Low &
Arvind Subramanian, TRIMs in the Uruguay Round: An Unfinished Business?, in
THE URUGUAY ROuND AND THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, supra note 93, at 413-14.
296 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 10, at 16. In 1996, two-thirds
of FDI in developing countries went to Asia, whose FDI inflows rose 25% from
1995 to $81 billion. See Emerging Market Indicators, ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 1997, at 116.
The growth of multinational enterprises has contributed to the tremendous in-
crease in the volume of foreign direct investment. The FDI spurt was fueled in the
20031
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The view among many developing countries is that growth in
FDI is considered to be beneficial because it enhances economic
growth, productivity, and competitiveness. 297 Couple this view
with the reality that the demand for foreign capital exceeds its
supply, and it is easy to understand why, for those countries eager
to attract foreign capital, it is incumbent upon them to create and
foster a domestic legal environment that is hospitable to foreign
investment, with or without the legal compulsion of a WTO in-
vestment agreement.
4.2. Sovereignty Concerns
What of the national sovereignty concerns expressed by devel-
oping countries insofar as their ability to regulate the activities of
foreign investors? Because FDI often involves issues of significant
control over a domestic firm, it raises sovereignty issues for many
host countries. As noted above in connection with the discussion
of the Havana Charter, Article 12 recognized the sovereignty of
host nations to regulate foreign investment.298 While it is argued -
mostly by developing countries -that MNEs are able to engage in
restrictive business practices in host countries that lead to monop-
oly profits, lower economic efficiency within the host country, and
new barriers to entry by potential competitors, the WTO Secretariat
has made the alternative argument that the entry of an MNE
"might have the effect of breaking up a comfortable domestic oli-
gopolistic market structure and stimulating competition and effi-
ciency.... The empirical evidence, however, points strongly to
pro-competitive effects." 299  Nevertheless, in instances where
last half of the decade of the 1990s by cross-border mergers and acquisitions ($797
billion), rather than greenfield investment in new plants and factories. See WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 10, at 16.
297 See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1997, supra note 261; WORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT 1996, supra note 10; Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 11.
An extensive bibliography on trade and investment can be found in Trade and
Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 11, at 46-53.
298 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
299 Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 11, at 16 (citing in sup-
port RICHARD E. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1982), and EDWARD M. GRAHAM, GLOBAL CORPORATIONS AND NATIONAL
GOVERNMENTS (1996)). The United Nations prepared a non-binding Draft Code of
Conduct on Transnational Corporations that dealt in part with restrictive business
practices of MNEs. For the similarities and differences between the Draft Code
and the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises, see WTO Working Group
on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from
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MNEs do engage in restrictive business practices in the host coun-
try, how are developing countries that lack the human and techni-
cal capacity to combat such practices? 300 For developing countries
and for countries with economies in transition, enacting and im-
plementing competition legislation can be a formidable task.301
The many hurdles facing developing countries in implementing a
competition law regime include developing a skilled staff and se-
curing the financial resources needed to administer and implement
competition legislation. Small developing countries face a scarcity
of skilled human resources, making it difficult for them to partici-
pate in international meetings and negotiating fora in which they
must be present simultaneously. Developing a culture of competi-
tion also presents a challenge for businesses with little or no
knowledge of competition law and its impact.302 They must be
educated.3 03
UNCTAD, The Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations
and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Similarities and Differences,
WT/WGTI/W/52 (Aug. 21,1998).
300 Besides the problem of MNEs dominating local markets, what about sub-
sidiaries of MNEs that purchase inputs from their parent, rather than source in-
puts locally, as well as parent-imposed restrictions on a subsidiary's export mar-
kets as a way of segmenting world markets? In a related vein, what of MNE
activity that can have adverse effects on development, for example, where a coun-
try has the potential to develop indigenous resources through local talent but is
preempted from doing so by an MNE? In addition, developing countries are far
less able to combat export cartels than are developed countries.
301 See OECD, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN THE BALTIC COUNTRIES (1999);
William E. Kovacic, Designing and Implementing Competition and Consumer Protec-
tion Reforms in Transitional Economies: Perspectives from Mongolia, Nepal, Ukraine,
and Zimbabwe, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1197 (1995); William E. Kovacic, Getting Started:
Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Transition Economies, 23 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 403 (1997) (discussing processes, procedures, and policies at issue when
creating new competition institutions in transition economies).
302 See, e.g., WTO Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and
Competition Policy, Communication from Trinidad and Tobago, Developing and Im-
plementing a Competition Regime: Challenges Faced by Small Open Economies,
WT/WGTCP/W/143 (Aug. 2,2000).
303 Developing countries may stand to gain from a WTO agreement that
prohibits such cartel activity and that takes developing-country interests into ac-
count when cross-border mergers are reviewed. Thus, the need may exist from a
developing country perspective for an international competition policy agreement
with a binding dispute settlement mechanism. As far as what would be in the
best interests of developing countries, Bernard Hoekman has advocated a compe-
tition policy agreement that (1) bans horizontal restraints on price fixing and mar-
ket sharing, including export cartels; (2) replaces antidumping duty laws with
competition laws; and (3) provides for binding WTO dispute settlement. See Ber-
nard Hoekman, Competition Policy and the Global Trading System: A Develop-
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Of the more than eighty countries that have enacted some form
of competition law, nearly forty of these are developing countries
and countries with economies in transition.304 UNCTAD has con-
cluded that "there would be substantial benefits to be obtained
from strengthening the application of competition law and policy
in developing and least developed countries and countries in tran-
sition in terms of greater production, allocative and dynamic effi-
ciency, welfare and growth." 305 Those developing countries that
do have competition laws in place typically are unable to apply
them extraterritorially. 306 In addition, having a competition law on
the books and having an effective national enforcement mechanism
in place are not the same thing. Developing countries that have
enacted competition legislation may lack the resources and exper-
tise to implement an effective legal regime, although a lack of ca-
pacity to pursue investigations and to bring enforcement actions is
not universally the case.307 Nevertheless, competition law en-
forcement actions are expensive whenever they are brought.
Moreover, broadly drafted legislation, coupled with agency discre-
tion, creates an environment of legal uncertainty for businesses.
One defensive (and cheap) response has been to protect local firms
ing-Country Perspective 16 (World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 1735 (1997));
Ignacio de Leon, An Alternative Approach to Policies for the Promotion of Competition
in Developing Countries, 6 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 85 (1999).
304 See Conference on Trade and Competition Policies, Exploring the Ways For-
ward, Summary, 1 OECD J. COMPETITION L. & POL'Y 7, 8 (1999) (noting that "the
majority of developing countries have enacted competition laws in the last five
years"). There is an ongoing, but quiet, debate over whether traditional competi-
tion laws are appropriate for developing countries and economies in transition.
See, e.g., Craig W. Conrath & Barry T. Freeman, A Response to "The Effectiveness of
Proposed Antitrust Programs for Developing Countries," 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 233 (1994); A.E. Rodriguez & Mark D. Williams, The Effectiveness of Proposed
Antitrust Programs for Developing Countries, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 209
(1994) (responding to the former and acknowledging the "fierce debate" over
whether it is a good or bad idea for economies in transition to market economies
to adopt antitrust laws).
305 UNCTAD, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, Empirical Evidence of the
Benefits from Applying Competition Law and Policy Principles to Economic Development
in Order to Attain Greater Efficiency in International Trade and Development 2,
TD/B/COM.2/EM/10/Rev.1 (May 25,1998).
306 See Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1501, 1537 (1998) (discussing antitrust efforts of developing countries).
307 For a review of competition law enforcement activities of several Latin
American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico,
Panama, Peru, and Venezuela), see Organization of American States, Report on
Developments and Enforcement of Competition Policy and Laws in the Western Hemi-
sphere, FTAA.ngcp/inf/04/Cor.1 (Oct. 25, 1999).
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and infant industries by restricting access of foreign investors and
foreign traders to their markets. The downside is the impoverish-
ment of the protected economy, damage to international competi-
tion, and an overall decline in aggregate world wealth.
Alternatively, one of the cheapest and most effective pro-
competitive devices available to any government is to adopt a lib-
eral trade policy that will bring competitive pressure to bear on lo-
cal monopolies in the form of imports. Equally important in the
promotion of competition in national markets is the encourage-
ment of foreign direct investment. The overall focus for develop-
ing countries, then, should be on a competition policy that pro-
motes competition in local markets, rather than competition law
that seeks to punish anti-competitive conduct. In short, competi-
tion in local markets can be promoted "on the cheap" through lib-
eral trade and foreign investment policies at the national level.
308
UNCTAD has warned, however, that "[t]rade and foreign invest-
ment liberalization, while increasing international competition in
many sectors, may enhance the incentive for firms to resort to RBPs
to maintain their marker position..." 39 Therefore, it may be too
facile to conclude that developing countries need only be con-
cerned with competition policy and not also with competition law
enforcement. The countries most vulnerable to restrictive business
practices are also the countries least capable of combating them,
namely, developing countries.
4.3. Development Concerns
At the WTO's fourth Ministerial Conference held in Doha,
Qatar in November 2001, the trade ministers of the WTO members
devoted much of their attention to the capacity of developing
countries to implement existing WTO commitments.310 Following
the debacle in 1999 at the third Ministerial Conference in Seattle,
developing countries, especially the LDCs, were determined not to
3N See id. at 13, para. 37.
39 UNCTAD, Revised Study by the UNCTAD Secretariat, Review of All As-
pects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of
Restrictive Business Practices, The role of competition policy in economic reforms in de-
veloping and other countries, at 7, TD/RBP/CONF.4/2 (May 26, 1995). See WTO
Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, Report
to the General Council 14, WT/WGTCP/2 (Dec. 8, 1998) (pointing out that trade
liberalization alone would not sufficiently guarantee competition in all circum-
stances).
310 See infra notes 317-25 and accompanying text.
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be marginalized at the next biennial meeting of the Ministerial
Conference.
Two pivotal meetings occurred in 2001 that put the spotlight at
the Doha Ministerial Conference on the economic plight of LDCs.
The first meeting was the Third United Nations Conference on the
Least Developed Countries held in Belgium in May 2001. Out of
the Conference came a document entitled Draft Programme of Action
for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2001-2010, calling for
coherent action by the United Nations, the WTO, the World Bank,
and the IMF to integrate LDCs into the global economy.31' The sec-
ond meeting was the LDC trade ministers' meeting held in Zanzi-
bar, Tanzania in July 2001. In the Zanzibar Declaration the LDCs
agreed to take steps to reverse the process of their exclusion and
marginalization in world trade.312 The trade ministers identified
no fewer than nine items that they requested the Doha Ministerial
Conference to agree to, including full implementation of the com-
mitments undertaken at the Third United Nations Conference on
the Least Developed Countries and full implementation of the In-
tegrated Framework.313 Attached to the Zanzibar Declaration was
an annex entitled LDCs Development Agenda at the Fourth Ministerial
Conference, Negotiating Objectives and Proposals of the Least Developed
Countries.314 The LDCs' agenda listed no fewer than twenty-one
agenda items for Doha, including implementation issues in the ar-
eas of agriculture, services trade, subsidies, technical assistance
with food and product standards, textiles and clothing, TRIMs,
TRIPS, customs valuation, antidumping and countervailing duties,
and safeguards.315
Speaking on behalf of a broader range of developing countries,
the Group of 77, together with China, issued a separate declaration
in October 2001 calling on the Ministerial Conference to, inter alia,
make the special and differential treatment provisions of the WTO
multilateral trade agreements "legally binding.., operational-
311 See UNCTAD, Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed
Countries, Draft Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade
2001-2010 para. 65, A/CONF.191/L.18 (2001) (stating that "[c]oherent actions...
remain an essential element of overall policy reform).
312 See Meeting of the Ministers Responsible for Trade of the Least Devel-
oped Countries, Zanzibar Declaration, circulated by the WTO, WT/L/409 (Aug. 6,
2001) (discussing the marginalization of LDCs in the multilateral trading system).
313 See id.
314 See id.
315 See id.
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ized... and enforceable so that these do not remain merely 'best
endeavour clauses.' ' 316 The Declaration also called for increased
technical assistance in order to bring developing countries' laws
into compliance with WTO obligations.
Around 100 implementation issues were raised prior to the
Doha Ministerial Conference, either in the LDC Zanzibar Declara-
tion, in the Draft Programme issued at the Third U.N. Conference
on LDCs, or in the Group of 77 Declaration. At the Doha Ministe-
rial Conference the trade ministers launched a "work program"
that includes on its agenda many of these implementation-related
issues and concerns.317 Although the trade ministers carefully
avoided the use of the politically-charged phrase, "multilateral
trade negotiation round," -perhaps out of a concern that it would
conjure up images of the seemingly interminable eight-year Uru-
guay Round-the "work program" is informally known as the
"Development Round." The Ministerial Declaration issued at the
conclusion of the Doha session provides:
We attach the utmost importance to the implementation-
related issues and concerns raised by Members and are de-
termined to find appropriate solutions to them .... [W]e
further adopt the Decision on Implementation-Related Is-
sues and Concerns in document WT/MIN(01)/17 to ad-
dress a number of implementation problems faced by
Members. We agree that negotiations on outstanding im-
plementation issues shall be an integral part of the Work
Programme we are establishing .... 318
316 Group of 77, Declaration of the Group of 77 and China on the Fourth
WTO Ministerial Conference at Doha, Qatar, para. 7, circulated by the WTO,
WT/L/424 (Oct. 24, 2001).
317 WTO Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, 9-14 November 2001, Minis-
terial Declaration adopted on 14 November 2001, para. 12,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/1 (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declara-
tion].
318 Id. para. 12. The Declaration adds that where a specific negotiating man-
date is established in the Declaration, the relevant implementation issues are to be
addressed under that mandate. See id. para. 12(a). Otherwise, the other out-
standing implementation issues are to be addressed as a matter of priority by the
relevant WTO bodies, which shall report to the Trade Negotiations Committee by
the end of 2002 for appropriate action. See id. para. 12(b).
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With regard to the specific concerns of LDCs, the Ministerial
Declaration acknowledged the concerns expressed by LDCs in the
Zanzibar Declaration.3 9 The Declaration also endorsed the Inte-
grated Framework and reaffirmed that the special and differential
(S&D) treatment provisions are an integral part of the WTO
Agreements. 320 The Declaration states that "all special and differ-
ential treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a view to
strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and
operational. In this connection, we endorse the work programme
on special and differential treatment set out in the Decision on Im-
plementation-Related Issues and Concerns."321 The Decision on
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns referred to in para-
graph 12 of the Ministerial Declaration identifies more than forty
implementation issues and proposed action by the WTO mem-
bers.322 Most of the forty-plus items were settled at or before the
Doha Conference.
The majority of the remaining items are the subject of negotia-
tions that are to be concluded not later than January 1, 2005, with a
stocktaking of the progress of the negotiations to take place in Sep-
tember 2003 at the fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mex-
ico.323 As was the case with the Uruguay Round agreements, all
agreements reached during the Doha Development Round are to
be treated as a single undertaking, that is, a package deal with no
opt-outs. 324 This single undertaking would include, of course, an
agreement on investment.
319 See id. para. 43. (recognizing that "the integration of the LDCs into the
multilateral trading system requires meaningful market access, support for the
diversification of their product and export base, and trade-related technical assis-
tance and capacity building").
320 See id.
321 Id. para. 44. It was agreed in early 2002 that the review of all S&D treat-
ment provisions will be carried out by the Committee on Trade and Development
with a view to making them more precise, effective, and operational. See WTO,
Committee on Trade and Development, Report to the General Council 1, TN/CTD/3
July 26, 2002).
322 See WTO Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Decision on Implementa-
tion-Related Issues and Concerns, WT/MIN(01)/W/10 (Nov. 14, 2001) (listing the
decisions reached by the ministerial conference).
323 See Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 317, para. 45 (detailing the
negotiations to take place).
324 See id. para. 47 ("With the exception of the improvements and clarifica-
tions of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, the conduct, conclusion, and entry
into force of the outcome of the negotiations shall be treated as part of a single
undertaking.").
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Several items were identified at the Doha Ministerial Confer-
ence that are to be the subject of future trade negotiations, includ-
ing agriculture, implementation issues, services, and market access
for non-agricultural products.325 Also on the agenda is a possible
WTO agreement on investment. Paragraphs 20 and 22 of the Doha
Ministerial Declaration state:
Recognizing the case for a multilateral framework to secure
transparent, stable and predictable conditions for long-term
cross-border investment, particularly foreign direct invest-
ment, that will contribute to the expansion of trade.. . , we
agree that negotiations will take place after the Fifth Session
of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be
taken, by explicit consensus, at that Session on modalities of
negotiations.
In the period until the Fifth Session, further work in the
Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment will focus on the clarification of: scope and defi-
nition; transparency; non-discrimination; modalities for
pre-establishment commitments based on a GATS-type,
positive list approach; development provisions; exceptions
and balance-of-payments safeguards; consultation and the
settlement of disputes between Members. Any framework
should reflect in a balanced manner the interests of home
and host countries, and take due account of the develop-
ment policies and objectives of host governments as well as
their right to regulate in the public interest. The special de-
velopment, trade and financial needs of developing and
least-developed countries should be taken into account as
an integral part of any framework, which should enable
Members to undertake obligations and commitments com-
mensurate with their individual needs and circumstances.
Due regard should be paid to other relevant WTO provi-
325 See id. paras. 13-19 (detailing the work program agenda set forth in the
Declaration).
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sions. Account should be taken, as appropriate, of existing
bilateral and regional arrangements on investment.
326
If S&D treatment is to have any meaning, what will such treat-
ment look like in the context of a WTO investment agreement?
Will developing countries be permitted to enter into reservations
and be granted exemptions under an investment agreement that in
effect codifies the status quo regarding FDI? In the face of a clear
recognition by the international trade community at the Doha Min-
isterial Conference that developing countries confront serious
problems in implementing the agreements reached during the
Uruguay Round, are developing countries once again to be asked
to assume even more legal obligations as the price for continued
WTO membership? What seems to have emerged form the Doha
Ministerial Conference is that agenda items in any future multilat-
eral trade negotiation round will be agreed to on a consensus basis
and not dictated by the Quad members to developing countries. It
seems quite predictable that in any WTO agreement on investment,
developing countries will be accorded a great deal of flexibility in
its implementation, especially in the areas of national treatment,
performance requirements, and reservations excluding certain sen-
sitive sectors from foreign investment.327 The reason why it seems
quite predictable is the backdrop of some ninety-seven provisions
in the WTO MTAs on S&D treatment for developing countries, 328
326 See id. paras. 20, 22.
327 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Communication from UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: Con-
cepts Allowing for a Certain Flexibility in the Interest of Promoting Growth and Devel-
opment, WT/WGTI/W/77 (May 25, 1999) (setting forth concepts designed to
afford developing countries great flexibility within international investment
agreements).
328 See WTO Committee on Trade and Development, Concerns Regarding
Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions,
Note by the Secretariat para. 4, WT/COMTD/W/66 (Feb. 16, 2000). The majority
of WTO MTAs contain one or more clauses providing special and differential
(S&D) treatment of developing countries. In total, there are ninety-seven S&D
treatment provisions in the WTO agreements. The S&D treatment provisions can
be divided into six categories: (1) provisions aimed at increasing trade opportuni-
ties; (2) provisions that require WTO members to safeguard the interests of devel-
oping-country members; (3) flexibility of commitments; (4) transitional time peri-
ods; (5) technical assistance; and (6) provisions relating to measures to assist least-
developed country members. Id. See also WTO Committee on Trade and Devel-
opment, Implementation of WTO Provisions in Favour of Developing Country
Members, Note by the Secretariat, WT/COMTD/W/35 (Feb. 9, 1998) (providing
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and the MFN exemptions listed under the GATS on the grounds of
culture, environment, and social objectives, 329 coupled with the
commitment in the Doha Ministerial Declaration that the S&D
treatment provisions are an integral part of the WTO Agreements.
The Declaration states:
[AIll special and differential treatment provisions shall be
reviewed with a view to strengthening them and making
them more precise, effective and operational. In this con-
nection, we endorse the work programme on special and
differential treatment set out in the Decision on Implemen-
tation-Related Issues and Concerns.330
comprehensive information on actions taken pursuant to WTO provisions in fa-
vour of developing countries).
The MTAs covering trade in goods with S&D treatment clauses include: (1)
the Agreement on Agriculture; (2) the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the Antidumping Agree-
ment); (3) the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures; (4) the
Agreement on Safeguards; (5) the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures; (6) the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade; (7) the
TRIMs Agreement; (8) the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the Valuation Agreement); (9) and the
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 431.
In addition to the WTO MTAs covering trade in goods, three other WTO
MTAs-the GATS, the TRIPS Agreement, and the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes -contain special provisions for
the benefit of developing and least-developed countries. Id.
329 WTO members listed a number of GATS MFN exemptions on the
grounds of cultural objectives (seventy exemptions), environment and conserva-
tion (twenty exemptions), industrial policy (forty-nine exemptions), and social ob-
jectives (fourteen exemptions). See Trade in Services: A Roadmap to GATS MFN Ex-
emptions, supra note 94, paras. 64-77 (detailing the breakdown of the exemptions).
330 Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 317, para. 44. The Declaration
also provides the following with regard to an agreement on investment and de-
veloping countries:
We recognize the needs of developing and least-developed countries for
enhanced support for technical assistance and capacity building in this
area, including policy analysis and development so that they may better
evaluate the implications of closer multilateral cooperation for their de-
velopment policies and objectives, and human and institutional devel-
opment. To this end, we shall work in cooperation with other relevant
intergovernmental organisations, including UNCTAD, and through ap-
propriate regional and bilateral channels, to provide strengthened and
adequately resourced assistance to respond to these needs.
Id. para. 21.
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If this kind of flexibility for developing countries is included in
a WTO investment agreement, the main argument in support of
such an agreement -predictability and stability-would be seri-
ously undercut.3 31 BITs are, therefore, an attractive alternative in
cases where flexibility is needed because they allow national poli-
cies to be given effect by subordinating the admission of invest-
ment to the host country's domestic laws.
4.4. Exceptions and Reservations Will Hollow Out a WTO Agreement
on Investment
It is not hard to predict that if negotiators proceed on the basis
of either a positive list approach (as directed in the Doha Ministe-
rial Declaration) or a negative list approach (market access is gen-
erally granted in the schedules of commitments, subject to specific
exceptions or reservations), then WTO members will either refuse
to make market access commitments or will enter reservations to
an investment agreement on the grounds of, for example, national
security (e.g., the Exon-Florio Amendment or the Helms-Burton
Act 332), or the protection of cultural industries (e.g., the EU's
sweeping MFN exemption for audio-visual services under
GATS333). Besides the reservations that developed countries might
make, they would likely be joined by developing countries in the
case of reservations to ensure continued state ownership and con-
trol over natural resources and transportation industries.334 Under
NAFTA, which uses the negative list approach, the parties have
listed reservations in Annexes that literally run for hundreds of
pages.335 Query whether these same country-specific reservations
will become part of a WTO agreement on investment. Employing
a negative list approach, the draft MAI had some 600 pages of res-
ervations and that was for only a few of the OECD countries. 336 On
331 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
332 See supra notes 32 & 40.
333 USITC Examination of GATS, supra note 115, at 5-17.
334 See, e.g., NAFTA, annex III, Schedule of Mexico, reprinted in NAFTA
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION ACTION, supra note 26, at 1679-83 (reserving to the
state the right to perform exclusively activities in the energy and transportation
sectors).
335 See NAFTA, annexes I-II, reprinted in NAFTA STATEMENT OF
ADMINISTRATION ACTION, supra note 26, at 1486-1678.
336 See MAI NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 28, art. IX (country-specific excep-
tions). See generally Don Wallace, Jr. & David B. Bailey, The Inevitability of National
Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment with Increasingly Few and Narrow Exceptions,
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the other hand, if a positive list approach is used, what will be the
quality and quantity of offers and commitments?
If negotiations on an agreement on investment do proceed at
the WTO, the GATS positive list approach based on sector-by-
sector negotiations would allow WTO members to retain control
over the type of FDI they wish to attract. As noted by the EU, the
positive list approach "has the merit of incorporating enough flexi-
bility to allow a gradual and progressive liberalisation of FDI, fully
compatible with any development strategy adopted by WTO
members." 337 A positive list approach would automatically ex-
clude new sectors that arise as a result of technological innovation.
Although a negative list approach to a comprehensive investment
agreement has advantages for investment liberalization -not the
least of which is that WTO members are required to list with speci-
ficity exempted sectors or industries -the experience to date with a
negative list approach is that it spawns so many exemptions as to
render administration of any agreement problematic.338 In the end,
both approaches enable countries to preserve discriminatory
measures and exclude from foreign investment certain sectors of
the economy as deemed necessary to further national development
policy.339 What is left could be nothing more than a mere shell of
an agreement.
4.5. An Incremental, Sectoral Approach Is Tested and Proven
What lessons can be learned from the pace of liberalization ef-
forts achieved to date under existing WTO multilateral agreements
that address key dimensions of FDI, most importantly the GATS
(and the two subsidiary agreements on financial services and basic
telecommunications) and the TRIMs Agreement? Admittedly, nei-
ther the GATS nor the TRIMs Agreement treats the subject of FDI
31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 615 (1998) (discussing relevant norms regarding FDI with a
focus on the MAI).
337 WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Communication from the European Community and Its Member States, Concept
Paper on Modalities of Pre-Establishment, para. 20, WT/WGTI/W/121 (June 27,
2002).
3 See Sauv6 & Wilkie, supra note 16, at 11 (discussing the feasibility of the
negative list approach).
339 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Communication from Canada, Development Provisions, para. 9,
WT/WGTI/W/131 (July 3, 2002) (stating the benefits of both positive- and nega-
tive-list approaches).
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in a comprehensive fashion. Most obviously, of course, the GATS
does not address the subject of FDI by manufacturers of goods.
But as explained above,340 among the four modes of supply cov-
ered by GATS, GATS provides, inter alia, for the supply of services
by the service suppliers of one WTO member through a commer-
cial presence in another WTO member, i.e., through an FDI. And,
as noted, the TRIMs Agreement fails to address altogether certain
national measures that could have distortive effects on global FDI
inflows, namely, positive TRIMs or investment incentives.
On the other hand, the 1997 Agreements on Financial Services
and Basic Telecommunications represent genuine market liberali-
zation within these two major service sectors, including the right to
establish a commercial presence. These two agreements are exam-
ples of what can be achieved using a sectoral approach that is
based on reciprocity. Perhaps an incremental, sectoral approach to
investment is preferable to a sweeping agreement on investment
whose consequences might not be easy to predict. Progressive lib-
eralization of services trade is part of the WTO's built-in agenda
and the subject of ongoing negotiations at the WTO. Negotiations
on an investment agreement should be postponed to await the out-
come of the follow-on services negotiations.
4.6. Dealing with Positive and Negative TRIMs
The most pressing issue facing the WTO membership in the
context of FDI is not a lack of market access for foreign capital. The
immediate problem is the one of TRIMs, both positive and nega-
tive, that potentially distort investment patterns. The TRIMs
Agreement prohibits, inter alia, the most egregious internal and
border measures that force investors to source inputs locally. De-
spite the benefits of FDI and the tremendous growth worldwide in
FDI, host-country barriers still exist in the form of performance re-
quirements.341 The most common restrictions include measures re-
lating to admission and establishment (e.g., investment notifica-
340 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
341 The use of performance requirements in the motor vehicle sector is not
uncommon, although many of these measures are being repealed or phased out.
See WTO Council for Trade in Goods, Trade-Related Investment Measures and
Other Performance Requirements, Joint Study by the World Trade Organization
and UNCTAD Secretariats, Addendum 2-6, G/C/W/307/Add.1 (Feb. 8, 2002)
(describing performance requirements used in various countries' motor vehicle
industries).
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tion, approval, or authorization requirements that are sometimes
contingent upon satisfying criteria that are highly subjective and,
therefore, subject to political manipulation); measures relating to
ownership and control (e.g., limitations on the nationality or resi-
dency of senior managers or members of the board of directors, lo-
cal equity requirements, and restrictions on the acquisition of real
estate); and measures relating to operations (e.g., currency ex-
change controls and employment requirements). 342 As a group,
these measures are negative TRIMs. While the TRIMs Agreement
prohibits performance requirements tied to the purchase of local
versus foreign-source goods, as well as measures that tie the
amount of foreign exchange and imported inputs to the value of
exports, many other performance requirements, such as technology
transfer requirements, mandatory use of local business partners, or
foreign exchange controls that prevent the free repatriation of prof-
its, are not the subject of the TRIMs Agreement. Such performance
requirements are likely to deter, not attract, FDI and its associated
technology, perhaps preventing increased competition in local
markets.343 However, given the competitive environment for FDI,
342 For a list of examples of investment measures relating to admission and
establishment, ownership and control, and operations, see WORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT 1996, supra note 10, at 176-79 (discussing investment measures affecting
the entry and operations of foreign investors). In the results of a survey released
in 2000, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and Industry Canada reported an
inventory of more than 110 specific restrictions on investment. See Canadian
Chamber of Commerce, supra note 14. The Report summarized that 38% of the
barriers resulted in the investment being canceled, 43% resulted in the terms of
the investment being altered, and 25% of the restrictions involved discretionary
decision-making on the part of the host government. The Report is summarized
in a submission by Canada to the WGTI. See WTO Working Group on the Rela-
tionship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from Canada,
WT/WGTI/W/97 (Mar. 9, 2001) (presenting results obtained in a report on for-
eign investment barriers).
343 As noted in a U.S. submission to the WTO Working Group on Trade and
Investment:
Sometimes these investment screening regimes have even been given a
competition policy rationale, one based on concern that efficient new
market entrants could harm existing local competitors and perhaps
achieve a local monopoly. In our view, these concerns are largely mis-
placed, especially if foreign entry is by way of "greenfield" investment
rather than through acquisition of a local competitor. On the conceptual
level, competition policies that attempt to protect (established) competi-
tors, rather than consumers, are inherently suspect; after all, competition
laws should protect competition, not competitors. While other rationales
are sometimes asserted for maintaining such protective policies, competi-
tion rarely is enhanced by them.
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it can be anticipated that countries motivated to attract FDI will
eliminate these disincentives to foreign investment out of pure self-
interest. If that doesn't occur, foreign capital will probably have lit-
tle difficulty in finding an alternative host country where such dis-
incentives do not exist. At the same time, negative TRIMs may be
negotiable, so even if in theory they would have an impact on FDI
flows, an investor may be able to negotiate around them. One
study found that in 83% of the projects covered by negative TRIMs,
investors claimed that the TRIM merely made them do what they
would have done in any event.344 That same study found that 63%
of respondents were compensated for the imposition of the
TRIM.w
With regard to possible improvements of the TRIMs Agree-
ment to make it less distortive of FDI flows, consideration should
be given to amending the TRIMs Agreement by incorporating the
NAFTA provisions on negative TRIMs, especially those dealing
with technology transfer and membership on corporate boards.
346
The list of proscribed practices in NAFTA Article 1106 includes ex-
port performance requirements, domestic content requirements,
trade balancing, product mandating (i.e., giving a preference to lo-
cal sources of supply), and technology transfer requirements.347
Under Article 1106, a NAFTA party may not, as a condition for the
establishment or operation of an investment, impose any of the fol-
lowing seven restrictions on a firm:348
" limit its sales in the domestic market by conditioning
such sales on exports or foreign exchange earnings;
" buy or use components from a local supplier or accord a
preference to domestic goods or services;
* achieve a minimum level of "domestic content";
WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Com-
munication from the United States 5, WT/WGTI/W/55 (Sept. 25,1998).
344 See EvANs & WALSH, supra note 66, at 33.
Us See id.
346 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Communication from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu,
Kinmen and Matsu, Development Provisions, at 2, WT/WGTI/W/126 (July 1, 2002)
(noting that requiring foreign investors to transfer technology to domestic firms or
to the government might have the counterproductive effect of deterring FDI).
347 The NAFTA proscription on technology transfer is not included in the
Illustrative List of the TRIMs Agreement. See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 235,
Annex, at 1452.
348 See NAFTA art. 1106.1, supra note 26, at 1101-02 (listing seven perform-
ance requirements no party may enforce).
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" limit its imports to a certain percentage of exports or
foreign exchange inflows associated with the invest-
ment;
" transfer technology to any domestic entity, except to
remedy an alleged violation of competition [i.e., anti-
trust] law;
* export a specified level of goods or services; or
* supply designated regional or world markets solely
from its local production.
The obligation to refrain from such practices extends to the in-
vestments by investors of both a NAFTA party and by non-parties
alike.349 NAFTA Chapter Eleven also forbids the NAFTA parties
from requiring that senior managers be of any particular national-
ity. However, the NAFTA parties may require that the majority of
the members of a board of directors be of a specific nationality,
provided that such a requirement does not materially impair the
ability of the investor to exercise control over its investment.35 0
Turning to the issue of investment incentives, as a preliminary
matter investment incentives come in several forms: (1) financial
incentives (funds paid directly to the investor in the form of grants
and subsidized loans); (2) fiscal incentives (tax holidays or exemp-
tions from import duties on capital goods); and (3) indirect incen-
tives, such as subsidized services or market privileges (e.g., the
provision of infrastructure at less-than-market prices, preferential
treatment in obtaining government procurement contracts, or a
monopoly position in the market).351 Regarding the issue of in-
349 See id. (extending the reach of the article to investors of a party or of a
non-party in its territory).
350 See id. art. 1107, supra note 26, at 1103. Query whether developing coun-
tries would have any interest in expanding the TRIMs Agreement to cover more
negative TRIMs, in the absence of some type of compensatory adjustment in the
areas of, for example, the use of antidumping duties by developed countries or
greater market access for goods of export interest to developing countries, such as
textiles, clothing, and agricultural products. See SauvC & Wilkie, supra note 16, at
14 (discussing investment policy issues at the WTO).
351 See Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 11, at 21-24 (classify-
ing investment incentives into three categories). For a list of the main types of in-
vestment incentives, see WORLD INvEsTmENT REPORT 1996, supra note 10, at 180.
For an inventory of common incentives, see WTO Working Group on the Rela-
tionship Between Trade and Investment, Note by the Secretariat, The Impact of In-
vestment Incentives and Performance Requirements on International Trade, at 6,
WT/WGTI/W/56 (Sept. 30,1998).
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vestment incentives,3 2 arguments have been advanced that in-
vestment incentives distort FDI inflows, but here the evidence of
such distortions is not clear.353 Just as the prohibition on the use of
export subsidies and import-substitution subsidies on other than
agricultural products was agreed to in the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement"), it is argued
that the same disciplines need to be imposed on the use of invest-
ment incentives and for the same reason: The use of such incen-
tives has the potential for distorting the market for capital, just as
the use of export and import substitution subsidies distort global
patterns for trade in goods.354 Investment incentives may have
more of an impact on FDI flows than negative TRIMs (although the
precise impact of incentives on FDI and trade flows remains the
subject of conjecture).355
The counter-argument has been made that if governments
compete for FDI through investment incentives, this helps insure
that FDI goes to those places where it is most highly valued.356
352 Despite NAFTA's restrictions on performance requirements, the NAFTA
parties remain free to use positive TRIMs that condition the receipt of government
subsidies (e.g., a tax holiday in exchange for building a facility in an economically-
depressed region of the country) on where facilities are located, on training or
employing workers, on the construction or expansion of particular facilities, or on
conducting research and development. See NAFTA art. 1106.4, reprinted in
NAFrA STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, supra note 26, at 1102.
353 See Hoekman & Saggi, supra note 8, at 12. As observed by Hoekman and
Saggi:
[Tihe empirical evidence regarding the efficacy of financial incentives to
attract FDI is ambiguous .... If one accepts the notion that there is a
solid economic case for promoting inward FDI via incentives because of
positive externalities [generated by MNEs], countries may find them-
selves in a bidding war for attracting FDI .... If this is an important
possibility, there is a potential case for international cooperation to ban
or discipline the use of fiscal incentives.
Id. at 11.
354 See Patrick Low & Arvind Subramanian, TRIMs in the Uruguay Round: An
Unfinished Business?, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 413,
414 (Will Martin & L. Alan Winters eds., 1995) (arguing that as with subsidies in
trade in goods, investment incentives tend to distort the allocation of FDI).
355 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Communication from ASEAN 1, WT/WGTI/W/41 (July 3, 1998) (ad-
dressing recent debate regarding the efficiency of investment incentives).
356 "Subsidy freedom" has been advocated in cases where incentives are ef-
fective in attracting FDI. See Eric W. Bond & Larry Samuelson, Tax Holidays as
Signals, 76 AMER. EcoN. REV. 820-26 (1986) (examining the potential role of tax
holidays as a signal).
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Moreover, the advocates of an SCM Agreement approach forget
how difficult it was to conclude that Agreement, given the impor-
tance of subsidies to governments' development policies. The sig-
nificant carve-out of agricultural subsidies from industrial subsi-
dies must also not be forgotten, the former being covered in the
WTO Agreement on Agriculture and with far fewer disciplines
than is the case under the SCM Agreement.
Developing countries are at a clear disadvantage vis-a-vis de-
veloped countries in any investment incentive competition where
an incentives package is determinative in the investment location
decision. The spread of investment incentives can distort invest-
ment patterns in favor of developed countries that have deeper
pockets. This assumes, of course, that developing countries and
developed countries are in fact in competition for the same FDI. It
seems more likely that developing countries compete inter se for
FDI.
357
In defense of incentives it has been suggested that they draw
foreign investment where they help correct market failures, e.g.,
weak infrastructure, such as roads and telecommunication net-
works. When used for this reason, incentives can be considered a
country risk premium, providing a partial counterweight to the
lack of adequate infrastructure. 8 Investment incentives also have
357 UNCTAD adds that:
Experience suggests that incentives do not rank high among the deter-
minants of FDI, although their impact on FDI locational choices is some-
times apparent at the margin .... In many instances, therefore, incen-
tives can be a waste of resources - something most countries can ill-
afford-and, when they are successful, can be distortional.
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996, supra note 10, at 181. For example, if a country
offers $200 million in incentives to attract a FDI project that brings $150 million in
total benefits, the host country is net $50 million worse off with the FDI than
without it. On the other hand, judicious use of incentives as part of a carefully
thought-out macroeconomic strategy could have wealth-creation effects that more
than offset the costs associated with providing the incentives.
358 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Communication from Singapore, WT/WGTI/W/99, at 2-3 (Mar. 13, 2001);
WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Com-
munication from Korea 1, WT/WGTI/W/62 (Oct. 28, 1998); WTO Working Group
on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from ASEAN
2, WT/WGTI/W/41 July 3,1998) (addressing the risk premium function as a key
role of incentives). But see WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between
Trade and Investment, Note by the Secretariat, The Impact of Investment Incentives
and Performance Requirements on International Trade 7, WT/WGTI/W/56 (Sept. 30,
1998) ("If investors request a 'risk premium' to compensate for the risk associated
with macroeconomic instability, runaway inflation and exchange rate fluctua-
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been defended on the ground that they serve as a directional tool
or carrot to regulate the type and nature of FDI a country re-
ceives.359 For example, incentives that are granted sequentially can
protect against unscrupulous investors who promise to modernize,
diversify, or add production capacity but who later renege on their
commitment.360 Finally, investment incentives have been defended
on the ground that they attract the kind of investment that leads to
long-term competitiveness because along with capital comes tech-
nology transfer, managerial know-how, and ready-made access to
overseas markets.361
Although all host countries might mutually benefit if they vol-
untarily foreswore the use of investment incentives, individual
"cheaters" would gain from continuing to offer incentives regard-
less of what other countries do. Because of this "prisoners' di-
lemma," as economists call it, host countries harm themselves by
pursuing their narrow self-interests and providing incentives.
When all countries offer incentives, the incentives may simply can-
cel each other out, and investments will essentially be made in the
same way as if no country was offering incentives in the first place.
As the WTO Secretariat has explained:
tions, the most sensible policy response would be to address these underlying
problems... rather than to compensate investors for the poor investment cli-
mate."); WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Communication from Mexico 3, WT/WGTI/W/64 (Nov. 19, 1998) ("To attract
FDI it is preferable to remedy, and not to compensate for, structural or economic
imperfections [through fiscal incentives]."); Pham Van Thuyet, Vietnam's Legal
Framework for Foreign Investment, 33 IWT'L LAw. 75, 77 (1999) ("[Wlhat investors
need most is reasonably good infrastructure .... Tax incentives alone are not suf-
ficient to lure investors....").
359 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Communicationfrom ASEAN 2, WT/WGTI/W/41 (July 3, 1998) (discuss-
ing the role of incentives as a directional tool); WTO Working Group on the Rela-
tionship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from Singapore 2-3,
WT/WGTI/W/99 (Mar. 13, 2001) (addressing incentives as a directional tool);
WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Com-
munication from Korea 1, WT/WGTI/W/62 (Oct. 28, 1998) (discussing incentives
provided to FDI that accompany technology).
360 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Communication from ASEAN 3, WT/WGTI/W/41 (July 3, 1998) (stating
that "[i]ncentives may help curtail 'fly-by-night' investors.").
361 See id. But see WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade
and Investment, Communication from Korea 8, WT/WGTI/W/62 (Oct. 28, 1998)
(noting that tax incentives have generally failed to achieve their desired effects).
[24:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss1/2
A INTO AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT
[H]ost country pursuit of the perceived first best solution -
attracting investment from other countries - destroys the
possibility of achieving a second best solution in which no
country offers incentives, and countries therefore end up in
a third best solution with incentives being paid out, but
with few, if any, effects on investment allocation.36
2
An amended TRIMs Agreement that imposes disciplines and
limitations on the use of investment incentives would permit WTO
members to break out of the "prisoners' dilemma," which could be
especially important for developing countries that cannot expect to
outspend developed countries in any investment incentive compe-
tition.363 The question is whether such an amendment would
362 Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 11, at 21 n.83. Accord
WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Com-
munication from Korea 3, WT/WGTI/W/62 (Oct. 28, 1998) (arguing that incentives
could unnecessarily increase the cost to society of producing goods and services).
But see Hoekman & Saggi, supra note 8, at 12 ("[I]f financial incentives are ineffec-
tive [in attracting FDI], there is no rationale for seeking multilateral disciplines
prohibiting fiscal incentives as it is in each countries [sic] self-interest not to offer
them.").
363 The question has been raised why it is that developed countries-
champions in word, if not in deed, of market mechanisms-also use investment
incentives if they are in fact as distortive of the market for capital as has been ar-
gued. See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Report (1999) of the Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment to the General Council 10, WT/WGTI/3 (Oct. 22, 1999) (asking why
developed countries used incentives when they "took the view that market forces
should determine the allocation of resources"). In the Uruguay Round the EU
opposed restrictions on investment incentives, arguing that they are part of do-
mestic industrial policy and, therefore, could not be covered in a WTO agreement
without infringing upon national sovereignty. See EVANS & WALSH, supra note 66,
at 34. Modest attempts to corral investment incentives have been taken in the
OECD Decision on Incentives and Disincentives (part of the 1976 OECD Declara-
tion on Multinational Enterprises), in the Caribbean Common Market agreement
on the harmonization of fiscal incentives, and in the EU as part of its competition
rules. See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996, supra note 10, at 181. The non-binding
OECD Decision on International Investment Incentives and Disincentives stresses
the need to strengthen international cooperation in this area by urging member
countries to give due weight to the interests of other member countries affected by
investment incentives or disincentives. The Decision encourages countries to
make investment incentive measures as transparent as possible so that their scale
and purpose can be easily determined. The Decision was revised in 1984 and
again in 1991 to provide for consultations and review procedures to make coop-
eration between adhering countries more effective. See OECD, Decision on Inter-
national Investment Incentives and Disincentives, Second Revised Decision of the
Council, DAFFE/IME(2000)02 (May 1984). The impact of these regional and
plurilateral efforts have been limited. See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996, supra
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achieve the desired result. In the case where two developing coun-
tries would have competed against each other by offering location
incentives, an agreement to refrain from the use of investment in-
centives would be in effect a collusive agreement among develop-
ing countries. Of course, only one country can be the recipient of
the FDI, but the hope must be that in the long run everything evens
out. Yet no lawyer or economist can make such a promise and de-
liver on it.364
Despite the arguments against using investment incentives,
"[airguments on the pros and cons of investment incentives have
never been conclusive and are unlikely ever to be so."365 Many de-
veloping countries still dangle new ones to attract FDI.366 For
them, investment incentives remain an important policy instru-
ment in the pursuit of development strategies. 367 Moreover, be-
cause developing countries are net importers of FDL they have no
reason to negotiate an agreement that focuses on investment incen-
tives unless the negotiations are expanded to include other issues
of interest to them.368
Certain investment incentive programs will present knotty is-
sues for negotiation. For example, the draft MAI specified that
government subsidies or advantages offered for training or em-
ploying certain workers or for constructing and expanding facili-
ties would not have been barred.369 Whether legislation that gives
note 10, at 181 (observing that "incentives do not rank high among the determi-
nants of FDI").
364 See Markusen, supra note 8, at 53 (attempting to create a model with fixed
and open policies and procedures for regulating investment).
365 WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Communication from Singapore 3, WT/WGTI/W/99 (Mar. 13, 2001). See also
Hoekman & Saggi, supra note 8, at 2 (concluding that regardless of whether in-
vestment incentives work or not, "there is no clear case for international coopera-
tion that restricts the ability of governments to pursue national policies").
366 See, e.g., Philippines Passes Law Giving Breaks to Attract Investment by Multi-
nationals, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2043 (Dec. 16, 1999) (describing how multina-
tional firms setting regional headquarters in the Philippines are not subject to in-
come tax or value-added tax); Glen Perkinson, Indonesia Preparing Tax Breaks to
Attract More Foreign Investors, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1400 (Aug. 25, 1999) (de-
scribing Indonesian tax incentives).
367 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Report (1998) of the Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and
Investment to the General Council 22, WT/WGTI/2 (Dec. 8, 1998).
368 See Hoekman & Saggi, supra note 8, at 2 (observing that no clear case for
international cooperation in restricting incentives exists).
369 See MAI NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 28, at 22 n.29.
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special preferences for socially or economically disadvantaged mi-
nority groups, e.g., preferences to minority-owned small busi-
nesses in bidding on government contracts, should be excluded
from or included on the list of prohibited investment incentives
presents another thorny issue. On the other hand, prohibiting in-
centives would have the salutary benefit of preventing disputes
over MFN treatment. For example, what if an investor from Coun-
try A was offered certain incentives for making an investment in
Country C, but an investor with the same kind of investment from
Country B was not made the same offer? The discretionary ad-
ministration of incentive programs, which can be an important
element in a country's development plans, might have to be elimi-
nated or severely curtailed if MFN treatment issues are to be
avoided. Against this backdrop of strong differences of opinion
over the value of investment incentives, perhaps the appropriate
response is to strengthen the capacity of governments to effectively
administer incentive programs rather than prohibit their use.
370
Considering the near impossibility of controlling local tax regimes
through a multilateral agreement on investment, any prohibitions
on investment incentives could be circumvented.
In sum, given the diversity of opinion on the pros and cons of
investment incentives, negotiations on disciplining the use of in-
vestment incentives should be postponed indefinitely. 371
4.7. Is the Current Legal Regime for FDI Unstable and Unpredictable?
One of the most frequently touted benefits of a multilateral
agreement on investment is that it would introduce predictability
and stability to a presumably unpredictable and unstable world
regarding FDI.372 Unfortunately, this view either ignores or under-
370 It has been suggested that the SCM Agreement, which distinguishes be-
tween prohibited and permitted subsidies, be used as a model for classifying and
regulating investment incentives. See WTO Working Group on the Relationship
Between Trade and Investment, Report (1999) of the Working Group on the Relation-
ship Between Trade and Investment to the General Council 11, WT/WGTI/3 (Oct. 22,
1999) (discussing the dispute over the definitions used in the SCM Agreement).
371 In the words of the WTO Secretariat, "As competition for FDI intensifies,
potential host governments find it increasingly difficult to offer less favourable
conditions for foreign investment than those offered by competing nations."
Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 11, at 21. But see Sauv( & Wilkie,
supra note 16, at 14 (citing authors who acknowledge the complexity of the issue
and the reluctance of key players to address it).
372 See, e.g., Dribek, supra note 6, at 4-5 (noting foreign investors' need for
transparent and predictable rules).
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estimates the role played by the network of bilateral and regional
agreements on foreign direct investment. The part played by BITs
and regional agreements on investment in quickening the pace of
FDI flows, not to mention autonomous measures taken at the na-
tional level to improve the climate for foreign investment, should
not be overlooked or minimized. The huge number of parallel le-
gal regimes at the bilateral and regional level, as well as national
laws designed to encourage inflows of foreign capital, evidence the
perception, if not the reality, that BITs and regional investment
agreements facilitate the cross-border movement of foreign capi-
tal.373 UNCTAD reports that the network of bilateral investment
treaties has quintupled during the 1990s, reaching 1941 by the end
of 2000, compared to some 400 at the beginning of 1990.374 "The
373 See UNCTAD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM,
vols. I-Il (1996), vols. IV-V (2000), vol. VI (2001), vols. VII-IX (2002) (collecting bi-
lateral and regional instruments on foreign direct investment); WTO Working
Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Bilateral, Regional,
Plurilateral and Multilateral Agreements, Note by the Secretariat, WT/WGTI/W/22
Gan. 26, 1998); UNCTAD, TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: AN
OVERVIEW 94-103 (1999) [hereinafter TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS] (listing 105 of the main bilateral, regional, and multilateral instru-
ments dealing with FDI from 1948 to 1999); ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES,
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE: A COMPENDIUM (1999) (not-
ing that sweeping economic reforms have led to a substantial liberalization in the
investment regimes of most countries in the hemisphere); Trade and Foreign Di-
rect Investment, supra note 9, at 27-28 (listing sixteen regional investment agree-
ments).
374 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2001: PROMOTING LINKAGES 6 (2001)
[hereinafter WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2001]. UNCTAD notes that as of 1999, out
of some 1700 BITs, less than 10% involve OECD countries; that is, most BITs are
concluded between a developed country and a developing country or between
two developing countries. See LESSONS FROM THE MAI, supra note 21, at 22 n.8.
One BIT was concluded on average every 2.5 days in 1997. See WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 10, at xix. The number of double taxation
treaties also increased, numbering 1982 at the end of 1999. See WORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT 2000, supra note 273, at xv. As of August 2002, the United States had con-
cluded forty-five BITs with the following countries (unless otherwise indicated by
an asterisk, the year indicates when the BIT entered into force; an asterisk indi-
cates the year the BIT was signed): Albania (1998); Argentina (1994); Armenia
(1996); Azerbaijan (1997*); Bahrain (1999); Bangladesh (1989); Belarus (1994*); Bo-
livia (1998*); Bulgaria (1994); Cameroon (1989); Democratic Republic of the Congo
(1989); Republic of the Congo (1994); Croatia (1996*); Czech Republic (1992); Ec-
uador (1997); Egypt (1992); El Salvador (1999*); Estonia (1997); Georgia (1997);
Grenada (1989); Haiti (1983*); Honduras (1995*); Jamaica (1997); Jordan (1997*);
Kazakhstan (1994); Kyrgyzstan (1994); Latvia (1996); Lithuania (1998*); Moldova
(1994); Mongolia (1997); Morocco (1991); Mozambique (1998*); Nicaragua (1995*);
Panama (1991); Poland (1994); Romania (1994); Russia (1992*); Senegal (1990); Slo-
vakia (1992); Sri Lanka (1993); Trinidad & Tobago (1996); Tunisia (1993); Turkey
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common thread that runs through the proliferation of both types of
treaties," UNCTAD concludes, "is that they reflect the growing
role of FDI in the world economy and the desire of countries to fa-
cilitate it."375 As of January 1, 2000, the forty-nine LDCs had con-
(1990); Ukraine (1996); and Uzbekistan (1994*). A current list of U.S. BITs and a
sample BIT are available at http://www.state.gov/www/issues/economic
/7treaty.html. The forty-five countries with which the United States has con-
cluded BITs account for approximately 5% of total U.S. FDI. See U.S. INT'L TRADE
COMM'N, THE YEAR IN TRADE 1994: OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM
68 (1995).
375 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 10, at xix. A sample of re-
gional activities focused on investment are the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) negotiations, U.S. outreach to Latin America, APEC initiatives, and the
ASEAN Free Trade Area.
At the Second Summit of the Americas held in Santiago, Chile, in April 1998,
the thirty-four heads of state participating in the FTAA negotiations accepted the
recommendations made by their trade ministers in San Jose and officially
launched negotiations on a Free Trade Area of the Americas. See Second Summit
of the Americas, Santiago Declaration, Apr. 19, 1998, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/ftaa/santiago/sadop-e.htm. The heads of state also
issued a Plan of Action, a body of concrete initiatives intended to promote the
overall development of FTAA countries. See Second Summit of the Americas,
Plan of Action, Apr. 19, 1998, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/ftaa/santiago
/sapoa_el.stm. The Santiago Declaration reiterates the negotiators' commitment
to complete FTAA negotiations by 2005. The Declaration also states that the
FTAA will be balanced, comprehensive, WTO-consistent, and will constitute a
single undertaking (i.e., it will be an all-or-nothing, package deal). An agreement
on investment is among the list of agenda items.
On October 30, 1998, the United States and the five-member Andean Pact or
Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) signed an agree-
ment establishing a U.S.-Andean Community Trade and Investment Council. The
Council will address key trade and investments issues, including the FTAA nego-
tiations, protection of intellectual property rights, and trade issues under the An-
dean Trade Preference Act.
On October 8, 1998, ASEAN finance ministers agreed to adopt a framework
agreement on an ASEAN Investment Area. Under the Investment Area, ASEAN
investors are to receive national treatment by 2010 (2013 for Vietnam and 2015 for
Laos and Burma), which will be extended to all investors by 2020. Each ASEAN
member is to submit a list of excepted industries by mid-1999. See Jason
Gutierrez, ASEAN Finance Ministers Approve Investment Pact, 'Surveillance' Mecha-
nism, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1716 (Oct. 14, 1998). In September 2001, the
ASEAN members agreed to move up the deadlines for eliminating certain excep-
tions in the framework investment agreement from 2020 to 2010. See Rafael D.
Frankel, Deadlines for ASEAN Investment Area Moved Up in Bid to Draw Foreign In-
vestment, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1476 (Sept. 20, 2001).
The twenty-one-member Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum has three
permanent Committees. In 1993, a Committee on Trade and Investment was cre-
ated to assume the duties of the working group assigned to that task. The work
program of the Committee includes reviewing the results of the Uruguay Round
and its implications for the region, pursuing efforts to simplify and harmonize
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cluded a total of 224 BITs, about half (120) with developed coun-
tries.376
As noted by India in a submission to the WGTI, bilateral in-
vestment treaties "provide a predictable climate for foreign in-
vestments."377 At the same time, even in the absence of a BIT, FDI
may still flow into a host country, drawing into question the rele-
vance on a WTO agreement on investment.378 Because the decision
to make an FDI is multifaceted, there may be no reason to believe
that multilateral investment rules would lead to increased FDI
flows. 379 In short, neither the presence of a multilateral agreement
on investment nor the absence of a BIT may be a determining fac-
tor in FDI inflows.
customs procedures in the region, and examining the investment environment
within APEC. See Joint Statement of APEC Ministers, Declaration on an APEC
Trade and Investment Framework, Annex 1 (Nov. 20, 1993). The APEC Non-
Binding Investment Principles were adopted in 1994. They deal, inter alia, with
transparency, non-discrimination among investor nations, national treatment, in-
vestment incentives, performance requirements, expropriation and compensation,
repatriation and convertibility, dispute settlement, temporary entry of personnel,
and avoidance of double taxation. The Investment Principles also encourage
members to minimize the use of performance requirements that distort or limit
the expansion of trade and investment. See WTO Working Group on the Relation-
ship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from APEC, WT/WGTI/W/9
(Oct. 6, 1997) (outlining APEC's approach to investment); Trade and Foreign Di-
rect Investment, supra note 11, at 30-31; WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996, supra
note 10, at 14042. The APEC Investment Principles are available at
http://www.apecsec.org.sg.
376 FDI IN LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, supra note 286, at 14 (noting 120 BITs
conducted between LDCs and developed countries).
377 WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Communication from India 3, WT/WGTI/W/74 (Apr. 13, 1999). India added
that "studies have also pointed out that transnational corporations may not even
be aware of the existence of such treaties-the determinants of their FDI decision
lie elsewhere." Id. See also WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between
Trade and Investment, Communication from India 3, WT/WGTI/W/72 (Apr. 13,
1999) ("[E]ven bilateral investment agreements have little effect on FDI flows.").
378 For example, in the absence of a BIT between Chile and Peru, Chilean in-
vestors still invested $1 billion in Peru between 1993 and 1996. Likewise, in the
absence of a BIT between the United States and Peru, the total stock of U.S. in-
vestment in Peru in 1997 was $1.46 billion. See WTO Working Group on the Rela-
tionship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from Peru, Bilateral Trea-
ties for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment: The Case of Peru 3,
WT/WGTI/W/47 Quly 8, 1998).
379 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Report (2001) of the Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and
Investment to the General Council 34, WT/WGTI/5/Rev.1 (Oct. 22, 2001).
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While the arguments put forward by the advocates of a multi-
lateral investment agreement could easily leave one with the im-
pression that national barriers to foreign capital are high, deep, and
wide, and that the international legal environment for capital is
unstable and unpredictable, the fact is that since the 1980s the
worldwide trend in national legislation regulating FDI has been to
adopt laws that attract foreign investors by creating a favorable in-
vestment climate.3 0 UNCTAD reports that "[iln recent years, there
has been a sea-change in the attitudes of developing country gov-
ernments towards FDI and [transnational corporation] activi-
ties."38' Out of 599 changes in FDI legal regimes between 1991 and
1996, 95% went in the direction of more liberal investment rules.382
UNCTAD found that in 1997 at least 151 changes in FDI regulatory
regimes were made by seventy-six countries, 89% of which were in
the direction of creating a more favorable environment for FDI.W
In 1998 the trend was the same: of 145 regulatory changes relating
to FDI by sixty countries, 94% were in the direction of creating a
more favorable climate for FDI.384 Similarly, in 2000 there were 150
regulatory changes affecting FDI, of which 147 were more favor-
able to FDI.385 UNCTAD also reports that at the national level
most of the forty-nine LDCs have legislation in place that liberal-
izes restrictions on FDI, provides for national treatment of FDI, al-
lows profit repatriation, and protects against expropriation.386
380 See TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 373, at
30 (indicating that the overwhelming majority of national regulatory changes af-
fecting FDI that have been introduced between 1991 and 1998 have been favorable
to FDI); FREE TRADE OF THE AMERICAS WORKING GROUP ON INVESTMENT, FOREIGN
INVESTMENT REGIMES IN THE AMERICAS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1999) (noting the
favorable legal climate for foreign investment within the hemisphere). For a list of
143 countries that have enacted special FDI legal regimes at the national level, see
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 10, at 56 tbl. III.1.
381 Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Note
by the UNCTAD Secretariat, Transnational Corporations, Foreign Direct Investment
and Development 5, WT/WGTI/W/8/Add.1 (Sept. 26,1997).
382 Id.
383 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 10, at xix.
384 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1999, supra note 284, at xviii.
385 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2001, supra note 374, at 6.
386 See FDI IN LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, supra note 286, at 13. UNCTAD
adds that an important area of reform involves limiting requirements on local eq-
uity participation, thereby expanding the amount of foreign ownership and con-
trol of an investment. Id.
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Finally, regarding the alleged transaction costs that are im-
posed upon MNEs in becoming familiar with a multitude of BITs
and national investment laws, Hoekman and Saggi observe:
[It seems that the major proportion of the transactions [sic]
costs associated with FDI is likely to arise from differences
in language, culture, politics, and the general business cli-
mate of a host country. Familiarizing oneself with the in-
vestment laws of a country seems trivial in contrast to those
more daunting challenges that exist regardless of whether
the country is a signatory to a multilateral or a bilateral in-
vestment agreement.387
In short, in order to answer in the affirmative the question
whether a globalization response to regulating FDI is preferable to
the internalization response, a stronger case for globalization needs
to be made.
5. A WTO AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT: BUILDING A CONSENSUS
Why should WTO members negotiate an agreement on in-
vestment, besides the fact that powerful WTO members, most no-
tably the EU, favor such an agreement? Assuming that the eco-
nomically weaker WTO members do not submit to the will of the
stronger members, several conditions must be met before negotiat-
ing and successfully concluding a multilateral FDI agreement un-
der WTO auspices.
A first condition is a consensus among policy-makers and gov-
ernments as to the value of having an open investment climate.
Moving the key players to the point where they perceive it to be in
their national interest to have international rules on investment is
the critical first step. Despite different political and economic phi-
losophies among WTO members as to the proper role of govern-
ment in the national economy and in controlling the flow of foreign
capital, a consensus is building in favor of FDI generally. Still,
many countries -especially, but not exclusively, developing coun-
tries- constantly wrestle with the question of whether the energy,
telecommunications, transportation, and natural resources sectors
should be government-owned, privatized but owned solely by na-
387 Hoekman & Saggi, supra note 8, at 16-17.
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tionals, or privatized and open to foreign ownership. Issues of na-
tional sovereignty, in both developed and developing countries,
cannot be underestimated. Developing countries ask what advan-
tages flow from a multilateral agreement on investment when their
development objectives are best achieved through autonomous lib-
eralization in conjunction with BITs. A multilateral agreement on
investment would only tie the hands of developing countries with
regard to performance requirements, such as technology transfer,
and the use of investment incentives.388
Closely related to the national sovereignty hurdle blocking a
multilateral investment agreement are powerful, and too often un-
derestimated, sentiments of nationalism and national pride that
prevent a consensus from building on a multilateral investment
agreement. This sentiment runs especially strong when the topic is
protecting cultural industries from being overwhelmed or acquired
by foreign investors. These deep feelings of national pride threaten
any multilateral investment agreement.
WTO members have to believe that it is in their economic self-
interest to conclude a multilateral agreement on investment. Such
a consensus unquestionably developed in the case of international
trade in goods and services, as evidenced by the broad-based
membership in the WTO. But even then many countries' commit-
ment to the goal of free trade has been less than unflagging over
the past fifty-five years, and the consensus, as shaky as it is, took
more than 200 years to build from the time Adam Smith first wrote
on the economic benefits of liberal trade.
A second condition is a consensus on the best forum for negoti-
ating multilateral rules on investment. Many good arguments can
be made for placing such negotiations in the WTO. The WTO
could very well prove to be a hospitable forum for negotiating an
FDI agreement, as suggested by some scholars,389 because of the
opportunities for using bargaining chips and making trade-offs
among and between trade sectors. The WTO counts among its 145
members all the world's developed countries and the major devel-
oping countries, including Brazil, India, and China. Considering
388 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Report (2000) of the Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and
Investment to the General Council 10, WT/WGTI/4 (Nov. 27,2000).
389 See, e.g., Ernest-Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for Gov-
ernments and for Private Business: A "Trade Law Approach" for Linking Trade and
Competition Rules in the WTO, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 545, at 560-61 (1996).
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the diverse and broad WTO membership that includes developed,
developing, and emerging economies, a strong argument can be
made that the WTO is the proper forum for concluding a multilat-
eral investment agreement, not only because of its broad-based
membership, but because of the close link between trade and liber-
alized investment rules.39
0
Historically, the WTO's predecessor, the GATT, had as its rai-
son d'etre for the elimination of government barriers to interna-
tional trade in goods. With the establishment of the WTO in 1995,
that portfolio has been expanded to cover trade in services and the
protection of intellectual property. In fulfilling its primary man-
date, that is, completing the unfinished business of eliminating the
many government-supported barriers to market access to foreign
goods and services, it might be appropriate to add to the Organiza-
tion's portfolio an agreement to eliminate government barriers to
FDI. However, negotiating rules on investment is far outside the
WTO's portfolio of trade in goods and services. The liberalization
of capital flows touches upon far more sensitive issues than does
liberalization of markets for goods and services. If the OECD ne-
gotiations on the stillborn MAI are any clue, WTO negotiations on
an investment agreement would be so politically charged that they
would undoubtedly become a lightening rod to which well-
organized environmental and labor NGOs would be attracted. Ig-
noring civil society and still reaching an agreement proved impos-
sible in the MAI negotiations. This suggests that perhaps NGOs
should somehow be co-opted by including them in the negotia-
tions in order to lend legitimacy to them.391 Though perhaps
sound as a theoretical matter, as a practical matter, such a strategy
seems doomed from the start.
Looking down the road, should the WTO members success-
fully conclude an agreement on investment, query whether the
WTO is robust enough to resolve satisfactorily all investment dis-
putes between host-country members and home-country members
on behalf of their investors. Query whether such disputes should
even be justiciable at the WTO.392 Assuming that a credible dispute
390 See EDWARD GRAHAM, GLOBAL CORPORATIONS AND NATIONAL
GOVERNMENTS (1996) (arguing in favor of a multilateral investment agreement
concluded under WTO auspices).
391 See Sauv6 & Wilkie, supra note 16, at 9.
392 The task of resolving investor-host country investment disputes would
probably have to be delegated to other international institutions, such as the In-
ternational Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. As Sauv6 and
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settlement process exists or can be fashioned to resolve trade-
investment disputes, will the losers have the political will to abide
by adverse dispute settlement decisions?
A third condition is a consensus that a comprehensive, global
approach to addressing foreign direct investment under WTO aus-
pices is preferable to the incremental approach we now see in exist-
ing WTO agreements, coupled with the parallel network of bilat-
eral and regional investment agreements. The provisions in WTO
agreements that deal with investment, such as the TRIMs Agree-
ment that shields foreign investors from buy-local laws, thereby
ensuring that both foreign and domestic investors are permitted to
purchase materials from the lowest-cost source, regardless of its
domestic or foreign origin, and the GATS that provides for a com-
mercial presence mode of service delivery, do not address the sub-
ject of FDI in a comprehensive fashion. Nevertheless, they repre-
sent a promising beginning. Likewise, while it is true that the two
sectoral agreements on basic telecommunications and financial
services negotiated in 1997 do not deal with investment in a com-
prehensive or systematic way either, these two agreements do rep-
resent genuine market openings to foreign capital and investors in
the two sectors covered in the respective agreements. Given the
diversity of opinion on the need for and wisdom of a WTO invest-
ment agreement, it might make more sense at this time to let the
renewed negotiations on services trade serve as a telltale for the
prospects of a comprehensive WTO framework agreement on in-
vestment, rather than launch headlong into negotiations on a com-
prehensive, multilateral approach to investment negotiations at the
WTO. It arguably would be wiser to move ahead with these fol-
low-on negotiations and build on the achievements of the Uruguay
Round before tackling a comprehensive investment agreement. As
evidenced by the reservations to investment contained in NAFTA,
the majority of which are in services industries, coupled with the
lack of genuine market liberalization commitments made in the
Uruguay Round in trade in services,393 the real liberalization to FDI
that needs to occur is in the services area.394
Wilkie point out, if private investors were given standing to bring complaints be-
fore the WTO, it would be difficult to find a principled basis for denying standing
to labor and environmental NGOs. See id. at 13.
393 For suggestions on how the follow-on GATS negotiations should proceed
in order to yield greater market liberalization, see id. at 16-20 (recommending, in-
ter alia, clarifying the definition of "commercial presence," strengthening the
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A place to start would be to eliminate the 424 MFN exemptions
that WTO members have listed under the GATS Annex to Article
IL In addition, as the OECD notes in its study of the GATS MFN
exemptions, about half of the 424 MFN exemptions were taken in
sectors that provided limited, if any, market liberalization. Audio-
visual services and maritime, air, and road transport services, for
example, account for 51% of the MFN exemptions, but the aggre-
gate level of market access commitments is relatively low in com-
parison with financial services.395 At some future date the GATS
could serve as a model for the progressive but incremental liberali-
zation of foreign investment in the manufacturing sector. 3% One
can never be sure about such things, but it would seem that ser-
vices negotiations, including progressive liberalization in the
commercial presence mode of supply, will attract less attention
from environmental groups, given that services industries are less
polluting than traditional smokestack manufacturing industries or
other primary industries, such as oil and mineral extraction.397
6. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Whether the WTO can succeed in concluding a multilateral
agreement on investment is subject to doubt. Several WTO mem-
bers (e.g., the EU) have supported such a framework agreement,
while others (e.g., the United States) have expressed misgivings
and shown reluctance to move forward on meaningful negotia-
tions.398 Considering the diverse and broad WTO membership that
includes developed, developing, and emerging economies, a strong
argument can be made that the WTO is the proper forum for con-
cluding a multilateral investment agreement, not only because of
its broad-based membership, but because of the close link between
GATS investment protection provisions, and refining the terminology used in the
GATS schedules of commitments).
394 See Alan M. Rudman & Michael Gastrin, NAFTA's Treatment of Foreign
Investment, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NAFTA 47-79 (Alan M. Rudman ed.,
1994)95 Trade in Services: A Roadmap to GATS MFN Exemptions, supra note 94, at 15.
396 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Communication from Mexico 6-7, WT/WGTI/W/132 (July 8, 2002);
Hoekman & Saggi, supra note 8, at 2; Sauvs & Wilkie, supra note 16, at 15 (claiming
that few major barriers to FDI remain in the manufacturing and primary goods
industries).
397 See Sauv6 & Wilkie, supra note 16, at 9.
398 See Lawrence J. Speer, WTO Trade Agenda Left Unresolved at Conclusion of
OECD Ministerial, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 914 (June 2,1999).
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trade and liberalized investment rules. On the other hand, it is
misguided to treat developing countries as a monolithic, homoge-
neous group. Lumping them together and forcing them to bend to
the terms of a WTO agreement on investment runs counter to the
commitment of special and differential treatment for developing
countries found in virtually every WTO agreement, as well as to
the letter, if not the spirit, of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and
the Development Round agenda. On the other hand, treating de-
veloping countries as individual countries with country-specific
needs becomes virtually impossible under a multilateral agree-
ment. Bilateral investment agreements offer the flexibility that is
not possible under a multilateral framework. BITs can be tailored
to fit country-specific needs in a way that is not possible under a
multilateral framework.399
Policy makers and government officials can stick their heads in
the sand and ignore the OECD MAI fiasco, but it would be foolish
to ignore its lessons. The first lesson is that if a small club of de-
veloped countries could not reach a binding agreement on a sub-
ject such as foreign investment, where most of the OECD members
have a relatively open investment climate, then what chance is
there of reaching agreement on foreign investment rules under
WTO auspices among 145 economically, politically, and culturally
diverse nations? The second lesson is an extrapolation of the first:
Again, if a small club of developed countries could not reach a
binding agreement on a subject such as foreign investment, where
their foreign investment laws are not dramatically far apart, then
what chance is there of those same countries, when joined with
some 100 other countries in the WTO, of reaching agreement on
common investment rules, a subject that touches the sensitive
nerve of national sovereignty? The more countries that are in-
volved in the investment negotiations, the more it is advisable to
take an incremental approach at the multilateral level.400
The economic arguments for an open investment climate may
be strong, but those arguments do not necessarily lead inexorably
to the conclusion that a multilateral agreement on investment is the
399 But see WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Communication from Canada, Development Provisions para. 14,
WT/WGTI/W/131 Uuly 3, 2002) (suggesting that developing countries can be ac-
commodated under a multilateral investment agreement through phase-in and
grace periods that would allow them to build the capacity necessary to comply
with the agreement).
40 See LEssoNs FROM THE MAI, supra note 21, at 27.
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only correct legal response. While economists make a persuasive
argument for the benefits of open markets on the cross-border flow
of capital, the -devil is in reaching agreement on multilateral rules
and institutions for achieving these economic goals. Forcing the
bitter pill of international regulation of investment down the
throats of countries which are not prepared or willing to accept
such rules is a formula for disaster. International agreements must
be perceived by the parties as being in their best interests. Devel-
oped countries may try to bully less-powerful developing coun-
tries into entering into such agreements as the price of continued
WTO membership, but adherence to the commitments made in
such agreements will be begrudging and cheating at the margins
widespread.
Depending upon the precise content of a WTO investment
agreement, the potential payoffs of such an agreement would in-
dude greater security, stability, predictability, and transparency,
thus creating a favorable legal climate for investors. On the other
hand, the impact of a WTO investment agreement could be negli-
gible, given the not inconsiderable liberalization that has already
taken place worldwide, especially in developing countries and
countries in transition. Like BITs, a multilateral agreement on in-
vestment is not an end in itself; rather, a multilateral agreement is a
means to facilitating investment by allowing economic factors to
determine whether and where an investment is made. Moreover, a
WTO agreement on investment is really beside the point if a poten-
tial host country does not have the fundamentals firmly in place:
political stability, desirable geographic location, adequate infra-
structure, human capacity, functioning legal institutions and en-
forceable contract rights, intellectual property protection, and open
trade policies.40'
Would such an agreement reduce international frictions in the
area of transnational mergers and acquisitions, an increasingly
popular mode of entry into a foreign markets? International M&A
activity is a global concern because it can reduce the competitive-
ness or contestability of a market. Such activity is of special con-
cern to the national authorities of the acquired firm because it
represents a diminution of national sovereignty and control over
domestic enterprises. The growth in FDI underscores the impor-
tance to some of concluding a WTO competition policy agreement
401 See Hoekman & Saggi, supra note 8, at 21.
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that takes into account these transborder concerns. In 1997, for ex-
ample, worldwide cross-border M&A activity totaled $342 billion.
That figure nearly tripled in 2000 to $1.1 trillion, -nearly 50% greater
than in 1999.402
The debacle at the WTO's Seattle Ministerial Conference in De-
cember 1999 was in part fueled by myths and misinformation
about the WTO, free trade, and globalization. It is true that accel-
erated trade liberalization worldwide has led to the increased
globalization of business and the interdependence of national
economies. But many environmental and workers' rights groups
view the world as a zero sum game: to the extent the WTO suc-
ceeds at promoting globalization, then to the same extent the envi-
ronment and labor rights suffer in direct proportion. Environ-
mental doomsayers proclaim that we are on the brink of a global
environmental collapse, thanks in no small part to free trade. It is
difficult not to be a bit skeptical when labor unions decry the labor
rights record of developing countries. One cannot help but won-
der whether they silently fear global economic interdependence
and wish sub rosa for autarchy. In the words of former presidential
economic adviser Murray Weidenbaum:
If the full policy agenda of the anti-global activists were
adopted, the long-run effect would be for the United States
and other industrialized nations to lose the benefits of the
specialization of labor, and suffer severe declines in stan-
dards of living. Ironically, the economic costs would soon
be translated into environmental costs. Wealthier countries
can afford to devote more resources to achieving a cleaner
environment, and they do so. Poorer countries do far less
to clean up the environment.403
Nevertheless, from the integration of national economies it
does not inexorably follow that negotiating a multilateral legal re-
gime regulating foreign investment, let alone a multilateral agree-
ment under WTO auspices, is necessarily the right approach. Mul-
402 See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2001, supra note 374, at 10. See generally
KEVIN KENNEDY, COMPETmON LAW AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION; THE
LIMrTs OF MULTILATERALISM (2001).
403 Murray Weidenbaum, Globalization Myths, CHRISTIAN SC1. MONITOR, Dec.
16, 1999, at 9.
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tilateralism is no panacea. Indeed, it has limits that policymakers
need to recognize. The legal and political arguments against such
an approach are formidable and convincing. Forcing the liberaliza-
tion of domestic laws on foreign direct investment may, in the end,
be a solution in search of a problem. Although we do not live in a
market economist's perfect investment world (i.e., a world that is
barrier free to the flow of investment capital from whatever
source), bilateral and regional agreements on investment, WTO
commitments on non-discrimination and market access to goods
and services, not to mention unilateral "disarmament" in the form
of domestic laws that remove barriers to foreign investment, have
made any multilateral investment agreements in large part redun-
dant.
The WTO is in many respects a "natural" forum for negotiating
an investment agreement. Still, there is nothing in the WTO's con-
stitution that makes a WTO agreement on FDI necessary, inexora-
ble, or preordained. Indeed, the absence of any multilateral FDI
agreement-which was underscored in 1998 with the collapse of
the OECD MAI-might not reflect a WTO lacuna or failure, but
rather might be compelling evidence that a critical mass of political
will among the world's developed countries has failed to build,
since the end of World War II, such an agreement. It has not been
for lack of trying that a multilateral investment agreement has not
been concluded. On the contrary, it has been much discussed in
other international fora, including the OECD and UNCTAD. At
least one conclusion to be drawn from these discussions and nego-
tiations is that the world is not ready for, does not want, and/or
does not need a multilateral agreement on investment.
The WTO's prestige, reputation, and authority are at an all-
time low. The United States, its most powerful membe17, has been
ambivalent at times in its support of the WTO and its goal of pro-
moting liberal trade. The commitment of the United States to U.S.
participation in the WTO is less than whole-hearted. 404 But even
44 Despite the U.S. Trade Representative's ringing endorsement of contin-
ued U.S. membership in the WTO in her March 2000 Report, 2000 TRADE POLICY
AGENDA AND THE 1999 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON
THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, a resolution was introduced in Congress in
2000 calling for U.S. withdrawal from the WTO pursuant to section 125 of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3535 (mandating a five-year review
of U.S. participation in the WTO). Gary G. Yerkey, USTR Sends Report to Congress
Urging Continued U.S. Participation in WTO, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 394 (Mar. 9,
2000). That resolution was defeated in the House of Representatives on June 21,
2000, by a vote of 363 to 56. Corbett B. Daly, House of Representatives Affirms
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the most vocal government critics of the WTO have called for re-
form of the Organization, not for U.S. withdrawal from it.405 At the
same time, intemperate and pandering remarks by former Presi-
dent Clinton at the WTO Seattle Ministerial Conference, suggesting
that the WTO conclude an agreement on core labor standards that
would be enforced through trade sanctions, steeled the resolve of
developing countries not to be steamrolled by the WTO's devel-
oped-country members in the next WTO trade negotiation round.
All of these developments are unfortunate because the WTO,
unlike virtually every other inter-governmental organization in the
world, sets rules that bind rich countries and poor countries alike.
The big losers from the debacle in Seattle were developing coun-
tries. Of all the things that developing countries need - corruption-
free government and the other institutions that make capitalism
work-open markets for foreign goods, services, and capital are
probably the easiest to create. A liberal trade policy is a policy of
increased competition and opportunity. Such a policy holds great
promise not only for developed countries, but for the developing
countries of the world as well.
In sum, with the collapse of the OECD negotiations on a Multi-
lateral Agreement on Investment, the spotlight has shifted to the
WTO as the forum for possibly concluding such an agreement.
Moving the discussions on a multilateral investment agreement
from the OECD to the WTO could simply be a case of pouring old
wine into a new and bigger bottle. With the collapse of negotia-
American Membership in World Trade Organization, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. 975 (June 22,
2000). See Press Release, Office of the USTR, USTR Barshefsky Hails Overwhelm-
ing House Vote on WTO, Bipartisan Vote Rejects U.S. Withdrawal from WTO
(June 22, 2000).
45 See Corbett B. Daly, Ways and Means Panel Rejects Resolution Calling for
U.S. Withdrawal from WTO, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 923 Uune 15, 2000); Gary G.
Yerkey, USTR Set to Issue Report Defending Continued U.S. Participation in WTO, 17
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 341 (Mar. 2, 2000) (noting that House Minority Leader
Richard Gephardt continues to support U.S. participation in the organization, but
believes that dispute settlement system needs to be reformed). In August 2002,
Congress approved and President Bush signed the Trade Act of 2002 which, inter
alia, renews the President's trade promotion authority to negotiate multilateral
trade agreements without subsequent amendments to such agreements by Con-
gress. See Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, §§ 2101-13,116 Stat. 933, 992-
1022 (2002). Trade promotion authority was formerly known as fast-track negoti-
ating authority. For a description of fast-track negotiating authority and proce-
dures, see Harold Kongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Policy, 18 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 143 (1992); Alan F. Holmer & Judith H. Bello, The Fast Track Debate: A Pre-
scription for Pragmatism, 26 INT'L LAW. 183 (1992).
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tions on the proposed OECD Multilateral Agreement on Invest-
ment in 1998, attention turned almost by default to the WTO as the
sponsor of negotiations on a WTO investment agreement. The les-
son for the WTO from the MAI debacle is clear: Tread lightly. The
MAI negotiators' expectations were unrealistically high and thus
failed to garner the necessary critical mass of support that was re-
quired for a multilateral investment agreement.
Although no comprehensive WTO agreement regulating all as-
pects of FDI currently exists, the GATT-WTO system does inte-
grate trade and FDI in several important respects, most notably
with the commercial presence mode of supply under the GATS.
The fact that developed-country economies are today overwhelm-
ingly services-based and are net exporters of FDI strengthens the
case, at least for developed countries, for further liberalization in
services trade. This fact at the same time weakens the argument
for WTO negotiations on a comprehensive, framework investment
agreement. Even though the treatment of FDI in WTO agreements
is fragmented and limited, there is no urgency to launching nego-
tiations on a WTO investment agreement. The WTO's raison d'itre
to progressively liberalize trade in goods and services could be
jeopardized if linkages are made in negotiations between invest-
ment and nontrade issues, such as labor and environment.40 6
Given the many linkages between trade and nontrade areas-
labor, environment, competition policy-a Pandora's box could be
opened if serious negotiations get underway in the WTO on an
agreement on investment.407
406 See Hoekman & Saggi, supra note 8, at 23. See also Symposium, The
Boundaries of the VATO, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002) (addressing the phenomenon of
linkage between trade and other nontrade issues).
407 See Jagdish Bhagwati, Powerful Reason for the MAI to be Dropped Even from
the WATO Agenda, FIN. TIMEs, Oct. 22, 1998, at 17.
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